Bartolome Mitre and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, (Unitarian Party) honored with the Order of the Rose by Brazil Emperor Pedro II for their services in Caseros 1852 . The Imperial Order of the Rose (Portuguese: Imperial Ordem da Rosa) is a Brazilian order of chivalry, instituted by Emperor Pedro I of Brazil on 17 October 1829. Wikipedia.
Above middle: Recreation of a typical uniform of the line infantry and also used by the national guards of the separatist "State of Buenos Aires" between 1853 and 1855. The mannequin wears a French tunic model 1845 and an early kepi colonial model from 1850. According to several portraits of the time you see the same type of clothes. To the right and left are portraits of Sarmiento and Pedernera, made shortly after the Battle of Caseros in 1852. These photos show very new French uniforms for that time, taking into account that colonial kepi began to be used in Africa around 1850, replacing the shako in warm climates. The green shoulder pads (epaulettes) are the same as the French foot hunters (Chasseur a pied).
Sarmiento's cloth belt buckle is from the French model of cavalry used since the time of the First Empire, but it has the head of Medusa as worn by the French superior officers since the Second Empire.
Sarmiento's cloth belt buckle is from the French model of cavalry used since the time of the First Empire, but it has the head of Medusa as worn by the French superior officers since the Second Empire.
Left: Medusa head in the French cuirassier or dragoon helmet model 1871 -72. Right Medusa French cavalry buckle. The face or head of Medusa appears for some reason in various French military ornaments and decorative touches, from bandoliers to swords. In the case of the cuirassier helmet crest model 1872 that arrived in Argentina in the last decade of the 19th century, the crest of Medusa was reproduced in the successive models made in Argentina during the 20th century.
Left: Medusa head in the French cuirassier or dragoon helmet model 1871 -72. Right Medusa French cavalry buckle. The face or head of Medusa appears for some reason in various French military ornaments and decorative touches, from bandoliers to swords. In the case of the cuirassier helmet crest model 1872 that arrived in Argentina in the last decade of the 19th century, the crest of Medusa was reproduced in the successive models made in Argentina during the 20th century.
In 18th and 19th-century French military symbolism, the image of Medusa (the Gorgoneion) primarily served as a mark of superior rank, a protective talisman, and a revolutionary emblem of liberty.
During the 19th century, particularly from the First Empire through the Second Empire, the Medusa head became a specific ornamental feature for high-ranking officers.
Belt Buckles. Superior officers wore gilt-bronze belt buckles featuring the screaming face of Medusa.
Helm Crests. French Cuirassier and Dragoon helmets (notably the Model 1871-72) featured a brass comb with a Medusa head repoussé decoration at the front. It was frequently found on the service dress belts of French generals and senior staff officers.
Apotropaic Protection (Guardian). Following ancient Greco-Roman traditions, the Gorgoneion was used as an apotropaic symbol intended to "turn enemies to stone" with fear or ward off evil.
The Aegis. By placing Medusa on their armor, French officers invoked the Aegis of Athena/Minerva, signaling that the wearer was under divine protection.
Intimidation. The screaming expression was meant to intimidate opponents on the battlefield, much like the shield of a Roman general.
Revolutionary Symbol of Liberty
After the French Revolution (1789), the meaning of Medusa shifted from purely military to deeply political.
French Liberty. Medusa was reclaimed as a popular emblem of Jacobinism and revolutionary power.
Counter-Symbolism. She was often depicted as a personification of "French Liberty," purposefully standing in opposition to "English Liberty" (usually represented by Athena, who wore Medusa as a trophy).
A "Weapon" of the People. Radicals viewed Medusa as an "abject hero"—a victim of tyranny whose very mutilation gave her a revolutionary power to petrify the old monarchical order.
Connection to Argentina
French fashion, symbolism was exported to South America. The belt buckles, and also the crests of Argentine cuirassier helmets in the late 19th century were French Model 1872 (Or direct copies), including the Medusa head. Sarmiento himself wore a French-model cavalry belt featuring the Medusa head buckle typical of superior officers.
During the 19th century, particularly from the First Empire through the Second Empire, the Medusa head became a specific ornamental feature for high-ranking officers.
Belt Buckles. Superior officers wore gilt-bronze belt buckles featuring the screaming face of Medusa.
Helm Crests. French Cuirassier and Dragoon helmets (notably the Model 1871-72) featured a brass comb with a Medusa head repoussé decoration at the front. It was frequently found on the service dress belts of French generals and senior staff officers.
Apotropaic Protection (Guardian). Following ancient Greco-Roman traditions, the Gorgoneion was used as an apotropaic symbol intended to "turn enemies to stone" with fear or ward off evil.
The Aegis. By placing Medusa on their armor, French officers invoked the Aegis of Athena/Minerva, signaling that the wearer was under divine protection.
Intimidation. The screaming expression was meant to intimidate opponents on the battlefield, much like the shield of a Roman general.
Revolutionary Symbol of Liberty
After the French Revolution (1789), the meaning of Medusa shifted from purely military to deeply political.
French Liberty. Medusa was reclaimed as a popular emblem of Jacobinism and revolutionary power.
Counter-Symbolism. She was often depicted as a personification of "French Liberty," purposefully standing in opposition to "English Liberty" (usually represented by Athena, who wore Medusa as a trophy).
A "Weapon" of the People. Radicals viewed Medusa as an "abject hero"—a victim of tyranny whose very mutilation gave her a revolutionary power to petrify the old monarchical order.
Connection to Argentina
French fashion, symbolism was exported to South America. The belt buckles, and also the crests of Argentine cuirassier helmets in the late 19th century were French Model 1872 (Or direct copies), including the Medusa head. Sarmiento himself wore a French-model cavalry belt featuring the Medusa head buckle typical of superior officers.
Two stages in the military career of ex-President Julio Roca. Left: In a French Zouave uniform, with the rank of infantry Lieutenant in 1865. Julio Argentino Roca was a young officer of the Argentine Confederation during the post-Caseros era, specifically during the conflicts between the Confederation and the State of Buenos Aires. On March 19, 1858, at nearly 15 years old, he joined the army of the Argentine Confederation as a sublieutenant.
Battle of Cepeda (1859). He had his "baptism by fire" as a junior artillery officer in the army of Justo José de Urquiza, which defeated the forces of Buenos Aires.
Battle of Pavón (1861). He served as a lieutenant in the Confederation’s artillery during this decisive battle, which eventually led to the collapse of the Confederation and the unification of Argentina under Buenos Aires’ leadership.
Right: In 1866 with the rank of Sergeant Major (Former officer grade) with French jacket type 1845. The campaign uniform would be that of the left and parade is the one on the right.
Battle of Cepeda (1859). He had his "baptism by fire" as a junior artillery officer in the army of Justo José de Urquiza, which defeated the forces of Buenos Aires.
Battle of Pavón (1861). He served as a lieutenant in the Confederation’s artillery during this decisive battle, which eventually led to the collapse of the Confederation and the unification of Argentina under Buenos Aires’ leadership.
Right: In 1866 with the rank of Sergeant Major (Former officer grade) with French jacket type 1845. The campaign uniform would be that of the left and parade is the one on the right.
Several stages of the artist Candido Lopez. His youth, when he immortalized Mitre in painting. His return from the sad War against Paraguay (War of the Triple Alliance), without his arm. And his last years.
Cándido López (1840–1902) was an Argentine painter and soldier famously known as the "One-Armed Painter of Curupayty". He is celebrated for his meticulous, panoramic depictions of the War of the Triple Alliance (Paraguayan War), a conflict in which he personally fought.
In 1865, López joined the San Nicolás Battalion of the National Guard as a second lieutenant. He was promoted to lieutenant primarily because his literacy was a rare and valuable asset at the time.
The Battle of Curupayty (1866). During this disastrous battle, a grenade explosion shattered his right wrist. His arm was amputated above the elbow to prevent gangrene, ending his active military service.
Originally right-handed, López spent years training his left hand to paint with the same precision he had before the injury.
Artistic Style and Legacy
López’s work is unique in military art for its "documentary" feel, largely influenced by his early training as a daguerreotypist. He utilized extremely elongated horizontal canvases and high, bird's-eye viewpoints. This allowed him to capture vast landscapes where soldiers appear as "tiny shadows" or rows of ants, emphasizing the scale of the conflict over individual heroics.
His paintings are noted for their remarkable lack of nationalistic pathos or chauvinism. He depicted both Allied and Paraguayan forces with a detached, almost serene focus on tactical movements and the natural environment.
Based on hundreds of sketches made on the front lines, his 58 completed oil paintings are considered primary historical documents of the war.
After living in poverty for years, he received a subsidy from former President Bartolomé Mitre in exchange for his war series. He was buried with military honors in La Recoleta Cemetery.
Most of his surviving works are prominently displayed at the National Museum of Fine Arts (MNBA) and the National Historical Museum in Buenos Aires.
Cándido López (1840–1902) was an Argentine painter and soldier famously known as the "One-Armed Painter of Curupayty". He is celebrated for his meticulous, panoramic depictions of the War of the Triple Alliance (Paraguayan War), a conflict in which he personally fought.
In 1865, López joined the San Nicolás Battalion of the National Guard as a second lieutenant. He was promoted to lieutenant primarily because his literacy was a rare and valuable asset at the time.
The Battle of Curupayty (1866). During this disastrous battle, a grenade explosion shattered his right wrist. His arm was amputated above the elbow to prevent gangrene, ending his active military service.
Originally right-handed, López spent years training his left hand to paint with the same precision he had before the injury.
Artistic Style and Legacy
López’s work is unique in military art for its "documentary" feel, largely influenced by his early training as a daguerreotypist. He utilized extremely elongated horizontal canvases and high, bird's-eye viewpoints. This allowed him to capture vast landscapes where soldiers appear as "tiny shadows" or rows of ants, emphasizing the scale of the conflict over individual heroics.
His paintings are noted for their remarkable lack of nationalistic pathos or chauvinism. He depicted both Allied and Paraguayan forces with a detached, almost serene focus on tactical movements and the natural environment.
Based on hundreds of sketches made on the front lines, his 58 completed oil paintings are considered primary historical documents of the war.
After living in poverty for years, he received a subsidy from former President Bartolomé Mitre in exchange for his war series. He was buried with military honors in La Recoleta Cemetery.
Most of his surviving works are prominently displayed at the National Museum of Fine Arts (MNBA) and the National Historical Museum in Buenos Aires.
French ornaments for cavalry bandolier, lion head, and grenade. This type of decoration in the bandoliers was of French origin, used since the Napoleonic wars or before. In Argentina it was widely used in allied armies or supported by France. Below, a photo of the book "Soldados 1848 - 1927" page 32' In the photo, the wake of Lieutenant Feloni or Felloni, of the Italian Legion fallen after a battle with federal forces that besieged Buenos Aires in order to take it back after the defeat of 1852. These ornaments were used in gala uniforms.
In French military symbolism of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Lion was the supreme representation of Strength, Sovereignty, and the "King of Battles." While the Medusa was often an ornament for high-ranking officers, the Lion appeared on the equipment of the elite "shock" troops.
The Lion on the Helmet (The "Chinscales")
The most iconic use of the lion in the 19th-century French Army (and subsequently the Argentine Army) was on the Cuirassier and Dragoon helmets.
The Bosses (Rosetones). The heavy brass chinscales were attached to the helmet by two circular bosses. These almost always featured a lion's head in high relief.
Symbolism: It represented the ferocity of the heavy cavalry charge—the "lion's roar" of the unit crashing into the enemy line.
The Saber Hilt (The "Lion-Head Pommel")
The lion was the standard pommel for many Officer Sabers and elite infantry swords (like the Sabre Briquet).
Grip and Power. The lion’s head formed the top of the hilt, with the back of the grip often shaped like the lion’s mane.
Prestige: In the Napoleonic Era, a lion-head pommel was a sign of a "Combat Officer." It signaled that the wearer was a leader who possessed the "heart of a lion."
The Artillery "Lion"
Because artillery was considered the most powerful arm of the service (the "King of Battles"), it was heavily associated with the lion.
Gun Carriages Lion heads were often cast into the bronze handles or "dolphins" of French cannons to symbolize the raw power of the blast.
Buckles. While superior officers often had Medusa, Artillery officers frequently preferred lion-head belt buckles to denote the explosive force of their branch.
The Lion on the Helmet (The "Chinscales")
The most iconic use of the lion in the 19th-century French Army (and subsequently the Argentine Army) was on the Cuirassier and Dragoon helmets.
The Bosses (Rosetones). The heavy brass chinscales were attached to the helmet by two circular bosses. These almost always featured a lion's head in high relief.
Symbolism: It represented the ferocity of the heavy cavalry charge—the "lion's roar" of the unit crashing into the enemy line.
The Saber Hilt (The "Lion-Head Pommel")
The lion was the standard pommel for many Officer Sabers and elite infantry swords (like the Sabre Briquet).
Grip and Power. The lion’s head formed the top of the hilt, with the back of the grip often shaped like the lion’s mane.
Prestige: In the Napoleonic Era, a lion-head pommel was a sign of a "Combat Officer." It signaled that the wearer was a leader who possessed the "heart of a lion."
The Artillery "Lion"
Because artillery was considered the most powerful arm of the service (the "King of Battles"), it was heavily associated with the lion.
Gun Carriages Lion heads were often cast into the bronze handles or "dolphins" of French cannons to symbolize the raw power of the blast.
Buckles. While superior officers often had Medusa, Artillery officers frequently preferred lion-head belt buckles to denote the explosive force of their branch.
When Sarmiento and others pushed for the "French look" for the Argentine Army, the lion symbols were adopted wholesale
Argentine Cuirassiers: The Argentine helmets of the late 1800s featured the exact same lion-head bosses on the chinscales as the French 1872 models.
The Argentine Grenadiers. Even today, the Granaderos a Caballo (General San Martín’s Regiment) maintain historical uniform details influenced by these 19th-century European animal symbols, representing the bravery of the independence struggle.
In short, if the Medusa was about protection and rank, the Lion was about aggression and lethal force.
Argentine Cuirassiers: The Argentine helmets of the late 1800s featured the exact same lion-head bosses on the chinscales as the French 1872 models.
The Argentine Grenadiers. Even today, the Granaderos a Caballo (General San Martín’s Regiment) maintain historical uniform details influenced by these 19th-century European animal symbols, representing the bravery of the independence struggle.
In short, if the Medusa was about protection and rank, the Lion was about aggression and lethal force.
The image you are referencing is one of the most striking and famous examples of post-mortem military daguerreotypes in 19th-century Argentine history. The "body" in that photograph is indeed Second Lieutenant Federico Feloni, and the details of the image are as haunting as they are historical
The photograph was taken shortly after his death on September 30, 1856, in the settlement of Nueva Roma. To give him a final military tribute, his comrades of the Italian Legion did not photograph him in a coffin. Instead, they posed him sitting upright in a chair, with his eyes open and his feet braced against a small stool to keep the body balanced.
He is dressed in his full military uniform including the French style cavalry bandolier with ornaments lion head, and grenade, surrounded by six of his fellow officers who stood beside him for the portrait to show that, even in death, he remained part of the unit's "valiant" ranks.
In the mid-19th century, this was considered the "Ultimo Homenaje" (Last Tribute). It was a way for these volunteer soldiers many of whom were far from their families in Italy—to document the sacrifice of their "brothers in arms" and send proof of their heroic end back home or keep it as a sacred relic of the Legion.
The original daguerreotype became a prized historical artifact (once owned by the historian Juan Isidro Quesada) and remains a powerful visual testimony to the brutal and romanticized nature of the Italian Legion's service to the State of Buenos Aires.
Photo: "Soldados 1848 - 1927" book, by Alexander, Cuarterolo and Toyos.
The photograph was taken shortly after his death on September 30, 1856, in the settlement of Nueva Roma. To give him a final military tribute, his comrades of the Italian Legion did not photograph him in a coffin. Instead, they posed him sitting upright in a chair, with his eyes open and his feet braced against a small stool to keep the body balanced.
He is dressed in his full military uniform including the French style cavalry bandolier with ornaments lion head, and grenade, surrounded by six of his fellow officers who stood beside him for the portrait to show that, even in death, he remained part of the unit's "valiant" ranks.
In the mid-19th century, this was considered the "Ultimo Homenaje" (Last Tribute). It was a way for these volunteer soldiers many of whom were far from their families in Italy—to document the sacrifice of their "brothers in arms" and send proof of their heroic end back home or keep it as a sacred relic of the Legion.
The original daguerreotype became a prized historical artifact (once owned by the historian Juan Isidro Quesada) and remains a powerful visual testimony to the brutal and romanticized nature of the Italian Legion's service to the State of Buenos Aires.
Photo: "Soldados 1848 - 1927" book, by Alexander, Cuarterolo and Toyos.
The Italian Legion (Legión Italiana) served as a vital volunteer military force for the State of Buenos Aires during its period of separation from the Argentine Confederation (1852–1861).
Service during the Siege of Buenos Aires (1852–1853)
Under the command of Colonel Silvino Olivieri, a veteran of the Italian Risorgimento, the legion became a cornerstone of the city's defense. For its heroic conduct during the siege imposed by the Confederate armies of Justo José de Urquiza, the government of Buenos Aires officially granted the unit the title "Legión Valiente" (Valiant Legion).
Many members were exiled Italian revolutionaries who viewed the struggle for Buenos Aires' independence as an extension of their democratic and republican fight in Europe.
The Military-Agricultural Legion (1855–1856)
Following the siege, the unit evolved into the Legión Agrícola Militar (Military-Agricultural Legion), which aimed to secure the frontier and settle the southern pampas.
Nueva Roma. In 1856, Olivieri led approximately 500 legionnaires to found Nueva Roma (New Rome) near Bahía Blanca, an outpost of the State of Buenos Aires.
Tragedy and Mutiny. The settlement attempt ended in disaster when Olivieri was murdered by his own troops in September 1856. The legion subsequently regrouped under Antonio Susini, a friend of Giuseppe Garibaldi, and continued defending Bahía Blanca against indigenous incursions.
Final Service: Battle of Pavón (1861)
The Italian Legion’s last major engagement occurred in September 1861 at the Battle of Pavón.
Fighting for the State of Buenos Aires under General Bartolomé Mitre, the legion participated in the decisive victory that led to the final unification of Argentina.
The unit’s history is viewed as a "cross-pollination" of Italian Risorgimento ideals and the Argentine quest to modernize and populate its territory.
Service during the Siege of Buenos Aires (1852–1853)
Under the command of Colonel Silvino Olivieri, a veteran of the Italian Risorgimento, the legion became a cornerstone of the city's defense. For its heroic conduct during the siege imposed by the Confederate armies of Justo José de Urquiza, the government of Buenos Aires officially granted the unit the title "Legión Valiente" (Valiant Legion).
Many members were exiled Italian revolutionaries who viewed the struggle for Buenos Aires' independence as an extension of their democratic and republican fight in Europe.
The Military-Agricultural Legion (1855–1856)
Following the siege, the unit evolved into the Legión Agrícola Militar (Military-Agricultural Legion), which aimed to secure the frontier and settle the southern pampas.
Nueva Roma. In 1856, Olivieri led approximately 500 legionnaires to found Nueva Roma (New Rome) near Bahía Blanca, an outpost of the State of Buenos Aires.
Tragedy and Mutiny. The settlement attempt ended in disaster when Olivieri was murdered by his own troops in September 1856. The legion subsequently regrouped under Antonio Susini, a friend of Giuseppe Garibaldi, and continued defending Bahía Blanca against indigenous incursions.
Final Service: Battle of Pavón (1861)
The Italian Legion’s last major engagement occurred in September 1861 at the Battle of Pavón.
Fighting for the State of Buenos Aires under General Bartolomé Mitre, the legion participated in the decisive victory that led to the final unification of Argentina.
The unit’s history is viewed as a "cross-pollination" of Italian Risorgimento ideals and the Argentine quest to modernize and populate its territory.
1843 French Legion during the Uruguayan Independence War. Defending Montevideo there were several foreign legions, such as the French, Italian, Spanish, and Swiss among others. This last one after 1852 would settle in the outskirts of Buenos Aires like Legion Agricola Militar. In the French uniforms there are several models that will later be imposed on the Argentine Army, in the case of the shako model 1837 worn by the French legionary.
Circa 1850 - Italian Legion (Bersaglieri Style) and Spanish Legionary (Carlista Style) Interesting 1928 recreations published in the magazine "Caras y Caretas"
The photo recreates a Sapeur from the armies of Argentina during the 19th century. "Caras y Caretas" 1928.
The illustrated presidential escort (second from the left), wears a French model 1858 jacket and probably a 1858 French bandolier, the 1845 shako, and a cavalry flintlock carbine.
1852. The new army of the State of Buenos Aires.
After the battle of Caseros, the same army that was under Rosas command and surrendered in Caseros was even handed over by Urquiza to the new State of Buenos Aires (Include with the same wapons). Rosas' armies passed under the command of unitary officers who returned from exile in Montevideo.
Mitre's point of view against Reyes's through Saldías.
Bartolomé Mitre confronted Adolfo Saldías, his former student, specifically and acrimoniously, over Saldías's historical work, which presented a more balanced, "revisionist" view of Rosas and the Confederation period, challenging the official liberal narrative Mitre had established.
Adolfo Saldías, in his extensive research for Historia de la Confederación Argentina, did indeed interview survivors and key figures from the Rosas era, notably Colonel Antonino Reyes, who had served as Rosas's personal aide-de-camp (edecán) and was with him during the Battle of Caseros. Reyes provided intimate details about Rosas's conduct, mindset, and the unfolding disaster of the battle, offering a perspective from the very center of the Rosista command.
Coronel Antonino Reyes's version of the Battle of Caseros, as recorded by Saldías, did not align with the version promoted by Mitre. Their narratives clashed on several critical points. Mitre asserts that the battle was not a "bitter fight" but rather a quick engagement, largely due to the Rosas army being an "inert mass, without soul and without head.". He claims that no one "really fought on the side of Rozas" except Colonel Chilavert and his artillerymen. He mentions that many infantry units surrendered passively with their drumsticks in their rifle barrels, a sign they hadn't even fired a shot.
He dismisses Saldías's depiction of a massive cavalry charge by General Lamadrid, stating Lamadrid was out of position and the cavalry engagement had very few casualties, with "very weak" resistance.
Mitre attributes the easy victory to Rosas's "false position" at the "dovecote of Caseros" (palomar de Caseros), a position that was isolated and allowed Urquiza to exploit a weak flank. Respect for Chilavert: While condemning Rosas and most of his forces, Mitre pays "posthumous homage" to Chilavert, acknowledging his bravery and referring to him as his "former commander and master of artillery," despite his "apostasy" (fighting for Rosas).
In essence, Mitre uses this account to reduce the battle from a significant military engagement (as perhaps described by Reyes/Saldías) to a brief skirmish resulting from a demoralized, poorly led army and a strategically unsound position, thus reinforcing his own narrative of the justified and relatively easy overthrow of a tyrannical regime.
According to Mitre: "In that encounter, V. supposes 400 men were lost; the truth is that in the battle of Caseros, no one really fought on the side of Rosas , except Colonel Chilavert. His battalions had neither the occasion nor the nerve to engage in formal combat, and several of them, those who did not revolt by killing their commander or disbanding , when surrendering in passive formation, put their drumsticks in the barrels of their clean rifles to show that they had not discharged their weapons. It was more than a dispersion ; it was a dissolution by its own force of inertia".
"The Battle of Caseros offers the singular physiological phenomenon found in others of its kind: it was won before it took place, and both the vanquished and victors had this evidence anticipated, from the generals to the last soldier of both armies, as the whole world did . Either way, it would have been won by the allies, and in the conditions in which Rosas presented it, it would have been lost a hundred times."
Mitre to Saldias. Buenos Aires, October 15, 1887.
After the battle of Caseros, the same army that was under Rosas command and surrendered in Caseros was even handed over by Urquiza to the new State of Buenos Aires (Include with the same wapons). Rosas' armies passed under the command of unitary officers who returned from exile in Montevideo.
Mitre's point of view against Reyes's through Saldías.
Bartolomé Mitre confronted Adolfo Saldías, his former student, specifically and acrimoniously, over Saldías's historical work, which presented a more balanced, "revisionist" view of Rosas and the Confederation period, challenging the official liberal narrative Mitre had established.
Adolfo Saldías, in his extensive research for Historia de la Confederación Argentina, did indeed interview survivors and key figures from the Rosas era, notably Colonel Antonino Reyes, who had served as Rosas's personal aide-de-camp (edecán) and was with him during the Battle of Caseros. Reyes provided intimate details about Rosas's conduct, mindset, and the unfolding disaster of the battle, offering a perspective from the very center of the Rosista command.
Coronel Antonino Reyes's version of the Battle of Caseros, as recorded by Saldías, did not align with the version promoted by Mitre. Their narratives clashed on several critical points. Mitre asserts that the battle was not a "bitter fight" but rather a quick engagement, largely due to the Rosas army being an "inert mass, without soul and without head.". He claims that no one "really fought on the side of Rozas" except Colonel Chilavert and his artillerymen. He mentions that many infantry units surrendered passively with their drumsticks in their rifle barrels, a sign they hadn't even fired a shot.
He dismisses Saldías's depiction of a massive cavalry charge by General Lamadrid, stating Lamadrid was out of position and the cavalry engagement had very few casualties, with "very weak" resistance.
Mitre attributes the easy victory to Rosas's "false position" at the "dovecote of Caseros" (palomar de Caseros), a position that was isolated and allowed Urquiza to exploit a weak flank. Respect for Chilavert: While condemning Rosas and most of his forces, Mitre pays "posthumous homage" to Chilavert, acknowledging his bravery and referring to him as his "former commander and master of artillery," despite his "apostasy" (fighting for Rosas).
In essence, Mitre uses this account to reduce the battle from a significant military engagement (as perhaps described by Reyes/Saldías) to a brief skirmish resulting from a demoralized, poorly led army and a strategically unsound position, thus reinforcing his own narrative of the justified and relatively easy overthrow of a tyrannical regime.
According to Mitre: "In that encounter, V. supposes 400 men were lost; the truth is that in the battle of Caseros, no one really fought on the side of Rosas , except Colonel Chilavert. His battalions had neither the occasion nor the nerve to engage in formal combat, and several of them, those who did not revolt by killing their commander or disbanding , when surrendering in passive formation, put their drumsticks in the barrels of their clean rifles to show that they had not discharged their weapons. It was more than a dispersion ; it was a dissolution by its own force of inertia".
"The Battle of Caseros offers the singular physiological phenomenon found in others of its kind: it was won before it took place, and both the vanquished and victors had this evidence anticipated, from the generals to the last soldier of both armies, as the whole world did . Either way, it would have been won by the allies, and in the conditions in which Rosas presented it, it would have been lost a hundred times."
Mitre to Saldias. Buenos Aires, October 15, 1887.
Seargeant Dubroca,. Veteran of Caseros Battle. Ex-Argentine Confederation (Rosas Soldier), "Abastecedores de Corrales" Juan de Dios Videla Division 1852. In 1854 he was in service as grenadier of the Escort Regiment or Presidential Guard. Between 1852 and 1897 he participated in numerous campaigns and revolutions. In 1897 he formed the guard of the mausoleum of San Martin in the cathedral of Buenos Aires.
In 1880 the remains of General San Martin were repatriated from France. To guard his remains that have since rested in the -Metropolitan Cathedral, a Grenadier guard was re-created. Taking into account all the campaigns in which Sergeant Dubroca participated, it is probable that this unit of honor has been integrated by veterans of military campaigns. To recreate the historical uniform, this type of French cavalry jacket model 1858 (like the one in the photo) was probably used, along with the old French shako model 1830. French cavalry bandolier and cartridge box model 1854 and the old Brown Bess musket..
Photo: May 25.1918. Caras y Caretas.
In 1880 the remains of General San Martin were repatriated from France. To guard his remains that have since rested in the -Metropolitan Cathedral, a Grenadier guard was re-created. Taking into account all the campaigns in which Sergeant Dubroca participated, it is probable that this unit of honor has been integrated by veterans of military campaigns. To recreate the historical uniform, this type of French cavalry jacket model 1858 (like the one in the photo) was probably used, along with the old French shako model 1830. French cavalry bandolier and cartridge box model 1854 and the old Brown Bess musket..
Photo: May 25.1918. Caras y Caretas.
French military uniform styles were widely adopted or heavily influenced the design of military uniforms in North, Central, and South America from the era of Napoleon III's Second Empire up to World War I. This influence was significant, especially in Latin America and the United States, where French military doctrine and fashion were highly regarded for a period.
United States: The U.S. Army's 1851 uniform regulations drew heavily from French designs, including the frock coat and a forage cap based on the French kepi. Variations of this style were used through the Civil War and remained in service until the Spanish-American War in 1898. During the Civil War, many individual Union and Confederate units even imported and wore complete French Chasseurs à pied or Zouave uniforms, the latter being particularly popular for their distinctive, colorful, North African-inspired look.
Latin America: French military fashion had a major impact in Central and South America. In Argentina, for example, the kepi was introduced in the 1850s, with some officers reportedly having their uniforms tailored directly by tailors of Napoleon III. French influence marked the differences in uniforms during their civil wars, and after the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the troops of the state of Buenos Aires fully adopted French uniforms.This trend extended across the continent, where looking to European military powers, particularly France, was common practice for modernizing national armies.
Global Trend: The French kepi headgear, in particular, became nearly universal in armies worldwide by the 1850s. The adoption of French styles was part of a broader global phenomenon where many nations looked to major European military powers for inspiration in doctrine, weapons, and dress before the widespread adoption of drab, camouflage uniforms for field use in the early 20th century.
However, this French influence in the U.S. began to wane after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, with German (Prussian) military ideas gaining prominence. By the outbreak of WWI, the highly visible traditional French uniforms (blue tunics, red trousers) were quickly replaced by more practical "horizon blue" or khaki uniforms, a shift that marked the end of the colorful, 19th-century military fashion era.
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French military uniform styles had a significant and direct impact on the Argentine Army during the period from Napoleon III's Second Empire to WWI.
Direct Adoption of Uniforms: After the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the troops of the state of Buenos Aires fully adopted French-style uniforms. This included the widespread use of the kepi, a soft cap that had become nearly universal in armies worldwide by the 1850s due to its practicality.
Tailoring: Some high-ranking Argentine Unitarian officers were reportedly dressed directly by the tailors of Napoleon III, showing a strong link and desire for authentic French style.
Differentiation: During the Argentine civil wars, French influence helped mark differences in uniforms on the field, particularly for the Unitarian officers' attire, while Federal troops initially maintained an older style.
Shifting Influence: This French influence dominated for several decades, but a major shift occurred in the early 1910s, as the Argentine Army modernized under Lieutenant General Pablo Riccheri. They moved towards the Prussian (German) war school of thought and adopted German-style uniforms, moving away from the Anglo-French model.
Thus, the French style was massively adopted in Argentina during this period, serving as the primary source of inspiration until the early 20th century.
United States: The U.S. Army's 1851 uniform regulations drew heavily from French designs, including the frock coat and a forage cap based on the French kepi. Variations of this style were used through the Civil War and remained in service until the Spanish-American War in 1898. During the Civil War, many individual Union and Confederate units even imported and wore complete French Chasseurs à pied or Zouave uniforms, the latter being particularly popular for their distinctive, colorful, North African-inspired look.
Latin America: French military fashion had a major impact in Central and South America. In Argentina, for example, the kepi was introduced in the 1850s, with some officers reportedly having their uniforms tailored directly by tailors of Napoleon III. French influence marked the differences in uniforms during their civil wars, and after the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the troops of the state of Buenos Aires fully adopted French uniforms.This trend extended across the continent, where looking to European military powers, particularly France, was common practice for modernizing national armies.
Global Trend: The French kepi headgear, in particular, became nearly universal in armies worldwide by the 1850s. The adoption of French styles was part of a broader global phenomenon where many nations looked to major European military powers for inspiration in doctrine, weapons, and dress before the widespread adoption of drab, camouflage uniforms for field use in the early 20th century.
However, this French influence in the U.S. began to wane after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, with German (Prussian) military ideas gaining prominence. By the outbreak of WWI, the highly visible traditional French uniforms (blue tunics, red trousers) were quickly replaced by more practical "horizon blue" or khaki uniforms, a shift that marked the end of the colorful, 19th-century military fashion era.
.............................
French military uniform styles had a significant and direct impact on the Argentine Army during the period from Napoleon III's Second Empire to WWI.
Direct Adoption of Uniforms: After the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the troops of the state of Buenos Aires fully adopted French-style uniforms. This included the widespread use of the kepi, a soft cap that had become nearly universal in armies worldwide by the 1850s due to its practicality.
Tailoring: Some high-ranking Argentine Unitarian officers were reportedly dressed directly by the tailors of Napoleon III, showing a strong link and desire for authentic French style.
Differentiation: During the Argentine civil wars, French influence helped mark differences in uniforms on the field, particularly for the Unitarian officers' attire, while Federal troops initially maintained an older style.
Shifting Influence: This French influence dominated for several decades, but a major shift occurred in the early 1910s, as the Argentine Army modernized under Lieutenant General Pablo Riccheri. They moved towards the Prussian (German) war school of thought and adopted German-style uniforms, moving away from the Anglo-French model.
Thus, the French style was massively adopted in Argentina during this period, serving as the primary source of inspiration until the early 20th century.
French headgear and clothing from Louis Philippe to the III Republic:
In the photo above (1 and 2) you can see the style of the French Colonial kepis that by 1850 were beginning to be universal in the armies of the world. This particular model of the photo, was very used in the Rio de la Plata civil wars and late during the American Civil War, especially by the Confederate side, where the blue kepi belonged to the infantry and cavalry officers, while the red to the artillery officers. In Argentina the kepi was introduced from the Battle of Caseros (the background in the photo above), used by Unitarian officers who were dressed directly by the tailors of Napoleon III. Unitarians and Federales at the beginning of the Civil War in 1829 were dressed in the standard Argentine uniform, for that reason to differentiate themselves they used party ribbons on their chests. With time the French influence was marking the differences on the field, especially in uniforms of Unitary officers. After the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the troops of the Unitary state of Buenos Aires dressed in French uniforms. On the Federal side, the officers also dressed in French uniforms, while the troop preserved even the old style of the Argentine Confederation.
In figures 3 and 4, the models of standard caps of infantry / artillery (3) and cavalry (4). These old French models, adopted by Spaniards, had been used since before the War of Independence. Their practicality and economy made its life in service last at least half a century.
In figures 3 and 4, the models of standard caps of infantry / artillery (3) and cavalry (4). These old French models, adopted by Spaniards, had been used since before the War of Independence. Their practicality and economy made its life in service last at least half a century.
French shako model 1830 and 1837 (Louis Philippe) and Second Republic.
French shako model 1845 (Napoleon III) and 1872 (III Republic),
French Second Empire, hussar dolman model 1853- 1860 and pelisse from unknown origin. The Bandolier for the Second Empire Music band. The shako in the pictures is a model 1872 (Chasseur), so it would not correspond with a hussar pattern. This type of red dolman was from the Trumpet Major of the 4th of Hussars during the Second Empire. It had been of the same type as those used by the band of music of the Presidential Escort Regiment between 1859 and 60. According to the book "The Military Corps in Argentine History", in 1859 the music band used dolmans in the style of the 4th of Hussars of the Second Empire. In the last picture, a pelisse and colbac in the style of the First Empire.
Standard infantry and cavalry belt in the middle of the 19th century. In the photo on the left, a British belt and ammo box are used, of the Napoleonic wars type or earlier, 1840s French jacket (Monarchy of July - Louis Philippe). The photo on the right recreates the presidential escort regiment around 1860, with a French Grenadier shako 1845, Kurtka Kurka cavalry jacket, bandolier, and an ammo box model 1858 (2th Empire - Napoleon III).
Since the English invasions of 1807, Argentina used captured material, huge quantities of rifles, ammunition deposits and even clothing. This antecedent, added to the later British support during the War of the Independence from Spain, and to the commercial flow between Buenos Aires and London (especially leathers and beef), The British style and its military surplus were very common until 1852, and the later French consolidation in the clothing (modern military clothing and in use at that time in France). Although the old Colonial heritage from Spain and the British armament would continue for a couple of decades more.
Since the English invasions of 1807, Argentina used captured material, huge quantities of rifles, ammunition deposits and even clothing. This antecedent, added to the later British support during the War of the Independence from Spain, and to the commercial flow between Buenos Aires and London (especially leathers and beef), The British style and its military surplus were very common until 1852, and the later French consolidation in the clothing (modern military clothing and in use at that time in France). Although the old Colonial heritage from Spain and the British armament would continue for a couple of decades more.
On the right, a French jacket circa 1840 (Louis Philippe), type 1812. On the left a French short kurtka Kurka type jacket model 1858. The one from 1845 is more similar to those of infantry used at the time of the Argentine Confederation until 1852. The model 1858 was used in different colors, by the cavalry, and especially the presidential escort regiments between 1860 - 1870. Curiously, the jackets worn by the grenadiers on horseback (Historical Regiment and Presidential Escort) since 1810, are very similar in style to those of the Model 1858, especially in the shape of the front flap.
Left: Model 1910 Horse Grenadier Jacket (Type French 1858). This corps covers the Government House and presidential escort. This regiment had disappeared after the War with Brazil, and was recreated by presidential decree by President Julio Roca in 1903, whose draft was made by the Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ricchieri.
Right: French jacket model 1893 and Argentine model 1896 kepi, French style 1872 colonial kepi.
Right: French jacket model 1893 and Argentine model 1896 kepi, French style 1872 colonial kepi.
Left: French cuirassier helmet, model 1872 and cuirass. Right: Chasseur jacket, Second Empire era, and French infantry shako model 1872, III Republic.The first model 1872 helmets arrived in the last decade of the 19th century, to equip the Escort Regiment. With the passage of time and their continuity in service they were being repaired with parts alien to the French model, and modified. Undoubtedly the first modification was to replace the front insignia of the French grenade with the Argentine national shield. The also cut eventually cut the crin. The dolman jacket on the right, in gray blue, is very similar in appearance to those used around 1890, in the Military College, when it was located in the former House of Juan Manuel de Rosas in Palermo.
1910 Uniform. Officer and troops.
Circa 1960s. Argentine cavalry soldier (1888 - 1904) by Guillermo Roux. French dolman, trousers and light cavalry shako model. 1872.
This is a typical button of a French uniform from the time of Louis Philippe. It represents a rooster treading the globe. The symbol of the rooster was adopted by the police of the Capital of Buenos Aires since the middle of the 19th century.
1896 - 1902/4
Infantryman with M1896 kepi, tornister, 1891 Mauser and bayonet, German type flat shovel and blanket. AGN.
That historical tension between imported elegance and national self-sufficiency is what led directly to the creation of the Sastrería Militar (Military Tailory) on December 23, 1897.
The "French Era" and the Officers' Dilemma
Before the centralized tailory existed, the Argentine military was functionally a "customer" of French fashion:
From the Battle of Caseros (1852) until roughly 1910, the Argentine Army was a direct reflection of the French Second Empire and III Republic. Uniforms, kepis, and even buttons were often ordered directly from French tailors in Paris.
Because the state-provided uniforms were often inconsistent or poorly distributed, high-ranking officers frequently begged to use their own funds to hire elite civilian tailors in Buenos Aires. These tailors would replicate French patterns using expensive imported cloth to ensure the prestige and "smartness" required of the officer corps.
Before the centralized Sastrería Militar was established, the Army functioned more like a massive civilian customer than a manufacturer. The state would open bids for thousands of uniforms. These were won by wealthy businessmen who often had no military background. These contractors would outsource the work to hundreds of women working from their homes. This led to massive inconsistency, one battalion’s blue might be a slightly different shade than another's, and the fit was often poor because there was no standardized military pattern-making. This "piece-rate" quality is exactly why officers begged to go to private, high-end tailors. They didn't want to wear a "contractor" uniform that looked like a sack; they wanted the sharp, tailored look of the French military tradition.
The "French Era" and the Officers' Dilemma
Before the centralized tailory existed, the Argentine military was functionally a "customer" of French fashion:
From the Battle of Caseros (1852) until roughly 1910, the Argentine Army was a direct reflection of the French Second Empire and III Republic. Uniforms, kepis, and even buttons were often ordered directly from French tailors in Paris.
Because the state-provided uniforms were often inconsistent or poorly distributed, high-ranking officers frequently begged to use their own funds to hire elite civilian tailors in Buenos Aires. These tailors would replicate French patterns using expensive imported cloth to ensure the prestige and "smartness" required of the officer corps.
Before the centralized Sastrería Militar was established, the Army functioned more like a massive civilian customer than a manufacturer. The state would open bids for thousands of uniforms. These were won by wealthy businessmen who often had no military background. These contractors would outsource the work to hundreds of women working from their homes. This led to massive inconsistency, one battalion’s blue might be a slightly different shade than another's, and the fit was often poor because there was no standardized military pattern-making. This "piece-rate" quality is exactly why officers begged to go to private, high-end tailors. They didn't want to wear a "contractor" uniform that looked like a sack; they wanted the sharp, tailored look of the French military tradition.
Note that exactly the same thing happened with the rest of the Latin American armies and even with the United States.
The United States military went through a profound "French period" before the Civil War, driven by a deep admiration for the Napoleonic and Second Empire military systems.
The 1851 Regulations: The U.S. Army adopted a new uniform that was a direct copy of French styles. This introduced the frock coat and the forage cap (the iconic "kepi"), both of which were based on the French model of 1844.
Much like the Argentine officers, wealthy American units often bypassed local contractors to get the "real thing."
The 10,000 Uniform Buy. Just before the Civil War, the U.S. government purchased 10,000 French Chasseurs à pied uniforms to outfit elite brigades.These imports famously ran into trouble because French tailoring was cut too small for the larger-framed American soldiers. This led to many of the imported uniforms being discarded or stuck in warehouses while local tailors were hired to make "American-sized" versions of the French patterns.
Before the Civil War, the U.S. also relied on a system of local contractors and home-based seamstresses.
The US as a Factory for French Style: Before the 1860s, the US military was deeply influenced by French design, adopting the frock coat, kepi (forage cap), and Zouave aesthetics. Because the US began mass-producing these designs using local contractors and home-based seamstresses, they became a more accessible source for Argentina than direct Parisian imports.
The United States military went through a profound "French period" before the Civil War, driven by a deep admiration for the Napoleonic and Second Empire military systems.
The 1851 Regulations: The U.S. Army adopted a new uniform that was a direct copy of French styles. This introduced the frock coat and the forage cap (the iconic "kepi"), both of which were based on the French model of 1844.
Much like the Argentine officers, wealthy American units often bypassed local contractors to get the "real thing."
The 10,000 Uniform Buy. Just before the Civil War, the U.S. government purchased 10,000 French Chasseurs à pied uniforms to outfit elite brigades.These imports famously ran into trouble because French tailoring was cut too small for the larger-framed American soldiers. This led to many of the imported uniforms being discarded or stuck in warehouses while local tailors were hired to make "American-sized" versions of the French patterns.
Before the Civil War, the U.S. also relied on a system of local contractors and home-based seamstresses.
The US as a Factory for French Style: Before the 1860s, the US military was deeply influenced by French design, adopting the frock coat, kepi (forage cap), and Zouave aesthetics. Because the US began mass-producing these designs using local contractors and home-based seamstresses, they became a more accessible source for Argentina than direct Parisian imports.
Argentine Imports
During the Rio de la Plata civil wars (1830s–1850s), Argentine forces—particularly the Unitarians—sought out these French-style uniforms. While the elite officers often bought direct from Napoleon III's tailors, the broader military frequently acquired US-made copies that mimicked the French cut.
Deployment in the Paraguayan War and "Indian Wars"
Argentine battalions in the early phases of the conflict were often outfitted in these uniforms, which featured the distinctive French-cut tunics and kepis.
The Kepi Connection. The French Colonial kepi, which became universal by 1850, was introduced to Argentina during the Battle of Caseros (1852). These were the same models used extensively by the US Confederate and Union forces just a decade later.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento played a pivotal role in modernizing the Argentine military by leveraging his position as a diplomat in the United States (1865–1868) to acquire cutting-edge American Civil War technology. Sarmiento is credited with introducing the first machine guns to South America. In April 1867, while serving as Minister tothe U.S., Sarmiento purchased the first Gatling gun for the Argentine Army under instructions from President Bartolomé Mitre. He was fascinated by the "battery gun" patented by Richard Gatling in 1862. He believed this overwhelming firepower would allow a smaller, professional force to defeat the provincial caudillo militias.
Rifles and Modern Armament. Sarmiento recognized that the smoothbore muskets used in the early Paraguayan War (1864–1870) were obsolete compared to American innovations.
Repeating Rifles. He pushed for the adoption of modern rifled carbines and repeating rifles to replace flintlocks and percussion smoothbores.
Surplus Acquisitions. While in Washington, he famously proposed that Argentina should purchase surplus American ships and weapons being sold off following the end of the U.S. Civil War.
During the Rio de la Plata civil wars (1830s–1850s), Argentine forces—particularly the Unitarians—sought out these French-style uniforms. While the elite officers often bought direct from Napoleon III's tailors, the broader military frequently acquired US-made copies that mimicked the French cut.
Deployment in the Paraguayan War and "Indian Wars"
Argentine battalions in the early phases of the conflict were often outfitted in these uniforms, which featured the distinctive French-cut tunics and kepis.
The Kepi Connection. The French Colonial kepi, which became universal by 1850, was introduced to Argentina during the Battle of Caseros (1852). These were the same models used extensively by the US Confederate and Union forces just a decade later.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento played a pivotal role in modernizing the Argentine military by leveraging his position as a diplomat in the United States (1865–1868) to acquire cutting-edge American Civil War technology. Sarmiento is credited with introducing the first machine guns to South America. In April 1867, while serving as Minister tothe U.S., Sarmiento purchased the first Gatling gun for the Argentine Army under instructions from President Bartolomé Mitre. He was fascinated by the "battery gun" patented by Richard Gatling in 1862. He believed this overwhelming firepower would allow a smaller, professional force to defeat the provincial caudillo militias.
Rifles and Modern Armament. Sarmiento recognized that the smoothbore muskets used in the early Paraguayan War (1864–1870) were obsolete compared to American innovations.
Repeating Rifles. He pushed for the adoption of modern rifled carbines and repeating rifles to replace flintlocks and percussion smoothbores.
Surplus Acquisitions. While in Washington, he famously proposed that Argentina should purchase surplus American ships and weapons being sold off following the end of the U.S. Civil War.
The Turning Point: 1897 and Riccheri
The French Model. You can still see this legacy in the historical dress of units like the Colegio Militar de la Nación, which initially used a blue-gray "dolman" jacket almost identical to French military school models of the 1890s.
The first regulation that rigorously established uniforms for each branch of the armed forces and mandated the need for both a dress uniform and a parade uniform was in 1871. Until then Standard uniforms did not always exist. The foundation of the Sastrería Militar was a key piece of General Pablo Riccheri’s modernization. Riccheri realized that a professional army could not rely on transatlantic shipments or the whims of private civilian tailors. The 1897 decree centralized production, ending the era where an officer’s appearance depended on his personal wealth.
Prussian Shift. Interestingly, just as the Sastrería was perfecting its "French" production, the Army began a doctrinal shift toward the Prussian war school around 1910, eventually adopting the field-gray and Pickelhaube (spiked helmet) style that replaced the colorful French aesthetic.
The French Model. You can still see this legacy in the historical dress of units like the Colegio Militar de la Nación, which initially used a blue-gray "dolman" jacket almost identical to French military school models of the 1890s.
The first regulation that rigorously established uniforms for each branch of the armed forces and mandated the need for both a dress uniform and a parade uniform was in 1871. Until then Standard uniforms did not always exist. The foundation of the Sastrería Militar was a key piece of General Pablo Riccheri’s modernization. Riccheri realized that a professional army could not rely on transatlantic shipments or the whims of private civilian tailors. The 1897 decree centralized production, ending the era where an officer’s appearance depended on his personal wealth.
Prussian Shift. Interestingly, just as the Sastrería was perfecting its "French" production, the Army began a doctrinal shift toward the Prussian war school around 1910, eventually adopting the field-gray and Pickelhaube (spiked helmet) style that replaced the colorful French aesthetic.
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Left: Detaille, "Hussard aux manoeuvrcs". Right: Postcard Colegio Militar.Collection FP France. Courtesy of Historian Frédéric Pineau.
1904 Pattern.
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Prototype uniforms in 1901. Photos: "Caras y Caretas".
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Araucanian Chilean born, Indian Chief Colonel.Namuncura with Argentine Cavalry colonel uniforms. Left, early colonial kepi from the Second Empire era. Middle and right, cavalry dolman model 1872 and colonial kepi model 1895.
1905/1909 Argentine Army Horse Grenadier Epaulettes.
Model 1910. Argentine Army Epaulettes.
Uniform regulations:
1909 (Figueroa Alcorta)
1911 (Roque Saenz Peña)
Photo: "Universal Military Service in Argentina" by George Marvin.
Cadets. Photo-group "Colegio Militar de la Nacion".
The Generation of 1837
The Generation of 1837 was a foundational group of Argentine intellectuals, writers, and politicians who sought to build a modern, liberal nation. Often described as the "sons of the May Revolution," they were born around 1810 and believed it was their mission to complete the independence process by emancipating Argentina's culture and institutions.
Key Ideological Pillars
They rejected Spanish colonial heritage and neoclassicism, importing European Romanticism to create a national literature and identity reflective of the country's social reality.
Civilization vs. Barbarism
The most famous member, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, famously codified this dichotomy, arguing that the rural caudillos and Juan Manuel de Rosas represented "barbaric" tendencies that stalled national progress.
The Dogma Socialista
Published in 1838 as the group's manifesto, this document emphasized freedom, equality, and the need for a national project to overcome the divide between Unitarians and Federalists.
Prominent Members and Their Works
Esteban Echeverría: The spiritual leader who founded the Asociación de Mayo. He wrote El matadero (The Slaughter Yard), a brutal critique of the Rosas regime.
Juan Bautista Alberdi: Author of Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina, which served as the blueprint for the 1853 Constitution.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento: Future president (1868–1874) and author of Facundo, which established the "Civilization vs. Barbarism" framework.
Bartolomé Mitre: Future first president of a unified Argentina and a key historian of the revolutionary period.
Historical Legacy
Opposition to Rosas: Their activities led to severe persecution by Rosas, forcing most into long exiles in Uruguay, Chile, and Europe.
State Formation: After Rosas was overthrown in 1852, their ideas directly shaped the 1853 Constitution and the institutional development of modern Argentina.
Controversies: While promoting liberty, their works also contained racist attitudes toward the indigenous and gaucho populations, viewing them as inferior to European immigrants who would bring "civilizing" influences.
The Generation of 1837 was a foundational group of Argentine intellectuals, writers, and politicians who sought to build a modern, liberal nation. Often described as the "sons of the May Revolution," they were born around 1810 and believed it was their mission to complete the independence process by emancipating Argentina's culture and institutions.
Key Ideological Pillars
They rejected Spanish colonial heritage and neoclassicism, importing European Romanticism to create a national literature and identity reflective of the country's social reality.
Civilization vs. Barbarism
The most famous member, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, famously codified this dichotomy, arguing that the rural caudillos and Juan Manuel de Rosas represented "barbaric" tendencies that stalled national progress.
The Dogma Socialista
Published in 1838 as the group's manifesto, this document emphasized freedom, equality, and the need for a national project to overcome the divide between Unitarians and Federalists.
Prominent Members and Their Works
Esteban Echeverría: The spiritual leader who founded the Asociación de Mayo. He wrote El matadero (The Slaughter Yard), a brutal critique of the Rosas regime.
Juan Bautista Alberdi: Author of Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina, which served as the blueprint for the 1853 Constitution.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento: Future president (1868–1874) and author of Facundo, which established the "Civilization vs. Barbarism" framework.
Bartolomé Mitre: Future first president of a unified Argentina and a key historian of the revolutionary period.
Historical Legacy
Opposition to Rosas: Their activities led to severe persecution by Rosas, forcing most into long exiles in Uruguay, Chile, and Europe.
State Formation: After Rosas was overthrown in 1852, their ideas directly shaped the 1853 Constitution and the institutional development of modern Argentina.
Controversies: While promoting liberty, their works also contained racist attitudes toward the indigenous and gaucho populations, viewing them as inferior to European immigrants who would bring "civilizing" influences.
Anti-Rosas Federalists and Rosas's Unitarians.
The Battle of Caseros was not just another battle in the war between Unitarians and Federalists, but rather one of Unitarians and Federals against Rosas. Just as there were Unitarians allied with Urquiza, there were also those fighting on the side of Rosas. The latter fought against the invasion of the Empire of Brazil. At present, revisionism considers Urquiza's campaign against Rosas as the second war against the Empire of Brazil.
When Justo José de Urquiza (Federal) declared himself against Rosas (Federal) and abolished the slogan "Death to the unitary savages" (imposed by Rosas), replacing it with "Death to the enemies of the national organization," he was allied with the old Unitarian politicians, the Empire of Brazil, and the "Colorado" Party of the Banda Oriental.
They defeated the army (Mostly Porteño) of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the Battle of Caseros. Rosas abandoned the battle and, after seeking refuge in the house of the British consul, left for exile in England. After the defeat of Rosas, a Congress of all the provinces met in 1853 and drafted a National Constitution, which proclaimed Argentina as a Federal Republic.
The Battle of Caseros was not just another battle in the war between Unitarians and Federalists, but rather one of Unitarians and Federals against Rosas. Just as there were Unitarians allied with Urquiza, there were also those fighting on the side of Rosas. The latter fought against the invasion of the Empire of Brazil. At present, revisionism considers Urquiza's campaign against Rosas as the second war against the Empire of Brazil.
When Justo José de Urquiza (Federal) declared himself against Rosas (Federal) and abolished the slogan "Death to the unitary savages" (imposed by Rosas), replacing it with "Death to the enemies of the national organization," he was allied with the old Unitarian politicians, the Empire of Brazil, and the "Colorado" Party of the Banda Oriental.
They defeated the army (Mostly Porteño) of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the Battle of Caseros. Rosas abandoned the battle and, after seeking refuge in the house of the British consul, left for exile in England. After the defeat of Rosas, a Congress of all the provinces met in 1853 and drafted a National Constitution, which proclaimed Argentina as a Federal Republic.
General Manuel Guillermo Pinto. He fought against the Unitarian revolution of Juan Lavalle in 1828 on Rosas's side.Pinto was also a veteran of the English invasions 1806 - 1807 and fought during the Argentine War of Independence in various auxiliary posts, reaching the rank of colonel in 1815. Pinto declared the Buenos Aires province a sovereign state, separate from the Argentine Confederation on September 1852. In 1828.
Revolution of 11 September 1852
During the first days after the Battle of Caseros, Urquiza's preeminence was accepted by everyone. He named Vicente López y Planes as deputy Governor on the 4 February. For a few weeks, an alliance of Unitarians and Federales was in charge of the provincial government, symbolized by the participation in office of Unitarian leader Valentín Alsina.
On the 11th of April, Urquiza called for elections for the House of Representatives of Buenos Aires, from which the Unitarian parties emerged victorious. Nonetheless, López y Planes was elected Governor on 1 May.
An agreement known as the Palermo Protocol, signed 6 April (in Rosas' house) by the governors of the four coastal states, endowed Urquiza with full powers, and over foreign relations. Esto provocó la reacción de lo que aun quedaba del Partido Unitario. Taking advantage of Urquiza's absence from the city, rebels seized control of Buenos Aires on September 11, 1852, declaring it a separate state.
While Urquiza was in Santa Fe organizing the San Nicolás Agreement, General Manuel Pinto and the Buenos Aires elite (the "Unitarians" returning from exile like Mitre and Alsina) struck. Pinto was named Governor of Buenos Aires and used his military authority to declare the province a sovereign state, separate from the Argentine Confederation. Pinto represented the "Porteño" fear that under Urquiza's new federal plan, Buenos Aires would lose its Customs House and its status as the "only" window to the world.
For the next ten years, Argentina was divided into two distinct entities: the Argentine Confederation (capital in Paraná) and the State of Buenos Aires.
The Empire of Brazil was indeed the "silent engine" that made the fall of Rosas possible, providing the professional military and financial backbone that Urquiza lacked on his own. After the withdrawal of Brazilian forces. Buenos Aires rebelled against Urquiza. Considering the weakness of Urquiza's armies in retaking Buenos Aires, it is logical to think that without Brazil's help, Urquizas could never have defeated Rosas. The Siege of Buenos Aires (1852–1853) failed largely because Urquiza could no longer rely on a superior naval and professional force to block the city’s international trade.
The failed siege by land of Colonel Lagos to the city of Buenos Aires
Urquiza attempted to subdue the rebellious province through a military siege and naval blockade from late 1852 until July 1853, which failed after the blockade commander was bribed with gold to defect.
When Alsina resigned, on December 7, 1852, as a result of the federal revolution of Colonel Hilario Lagos, Pinto was again appointed interim governor. His ministers were Nicolás Anchorena, Carreras and Ángel Pacheco, all of them former "Rosistas". He had to defend the city from the siege to which Lagos placed it, to which Urquiza joined shortly after.
General Ángel Pacheco (Rosas's most brilliant strategist) and the unitarian-turned-federalist Martiniano Chilavert both realized that the "Allied Army" under Urquiza was professionally superior and larger. They advised Rosas to avoid a pitched battle in the open fields of Caseros. Instead, they wanted to withdraw into the gates of city of Buenos Aires. Rosas, perhaps blinded by his own legalism or a sense of "mechanical" fate, chose to fight at Caseros. Pacheco was so disgusted by Rosas's lack of a clear plan that he effectively "retired" from the field before the battle began, leaving the defense in shambles. In December 1852 Lagos himself was defeated in front of the very gates of Buenos Aires. Colonel Hilario Lagos, unlike Pacheco and Chilavert, wanted to go out to meet the invading army in the open field. Ironically, he himself was defeated at the gates of a Buenos Aires that had been converted into a fortress and protected by Pacheco. Also paradoxicallyLagos besieged Buenos Aires along with Urquiza, who had defeated him months earlier in the Battle of the Pagos de Álvarez.
During the first days after the Battle of Caseros, Urquiza's preeminence was accepted by everyone. He named Vicente López y Planes as deputy Governor on the 4 February. For a few weeks, an alliance of Unitarians and Federales was in charge of the provincial government, symbolized by the participation in office of Unitarian leader Valentín Alsina.
On the 11th of April, Urquiza called for elections for the House of Representatives of Buenos Aires, from which the Unitarian parties emerged victorious. Nonetheless, López y Planes was elected Governor on 1 May.
An agreement known as the Palermo Protocol, signed 6 April (in Rosas' house) by the governors of the four coastal states, endowed Urquiza with full powers, and over foreign relations. Esto provocó la reacción de lo que aun quedaba del Partido Unitario. Taking advantage of Urquiza's absence from the city, rebels seized control of Buenos Aires on September 11, 1852, declaring it a separate state.
While Urquiza was in Santa Fe organizing the San Nicolás Agreement, General Manuel Pinto and the Buenos Aires elite (the "Unitarians" returning from exile like Mitre and Alsina) struck. Pinto was named Governor of Buenos Aires and used his military authority to declare the province a sovereign state, separate from the Argentine Confederation. Pinto represented the "Porteño" fear that under Urquiza's new federal plan, Buenos Aires would lose its Customs House and its status as the "only" window to the world.
For the next ten years, Argentina was divided into two distinct entities: the Argentine Confederation (capital in Paraná) and the State of Buenos Aires.
The Empire of Brazil was indeed the "silent engine" that made the fall of Rosas possible, providing the professional military and financial backbone that Urquiza lacked on his own. After the withdrawal of Brazilian forces. Buenos Aires rebelled against Urquiza. Considering the weakness of Urquiza's armies in retaking Buenos Aires, it is logical to think that without Brazil's help, Urquizas could never have defeated Rosas. The Siege of Buenos Aires (1852–1853) failed largely because Urquiza could no longer rely on a superior naval and professional force to block the city’s international trade.
The failed siege by land of Colonel Lagos to the city of Buenos Aires
Urquiza attempted to subdue the rebellious province through a military siege and naval blockade from late 1852 until July 1853, which failed after the blockade commander was bribed with gold to defect.
When Alsina resigned, on December 7, 1852, as a result of the federal revolution of Colonel Hilario Lagos, Pinto was again appointed interim governor. His ministers were Nicolás Anchorena, Carreras and Ángel Pacheco, all of them former "Rosistas". He had to defend the city from the siege to which Lagos placed it, to which Urquiza joined shortly after.
General Ángel Pacheco (Rosas's most brilliant strategist) and the unitarian-turned-federalist Martiniano Chilavert both realized that the "Allied Army" under Urquiza was professionally superior and larger. They advised Rosas to avoid a pitched battle in the open fields of Caseros. Instead, they wanted to withdraw into the gates of city of Buenos Aires. Rosas, perhaps blinded by his own legalism or a sense of "mechanical" fate, chose to fight at Caseros. Pacheco was so disgusted by Rosas's lack of a clear plan that he effectively "retired" from the field before the battle began, leaving the defense in shambles. In December 1852 Lagos himself was defeated in front of the very gates of Buenos Aires. Colonel Hilario Lagos, unlike Pacheco and Chilavert, wanted to go out to meet the invading army in the open field. Ironically, he himself was defeated at the gates of a Buenos Aires that had been converted into a fortress and protected by Pacheco. Also paradoxicallyLagos besieged Buenos Aires along with Urquiza, who had defeated him months earlier in the Battle of the Pagos de Álvarez.
Pastor Obligado (1818–1870) was a pivotal figure in 19th-century Argentine politics, serving as the first constitutional governor of the secessionist State of Buenos Aires from 1853 to 1858. His governorship represents the era of the "secessionist Port," where Buenos Aires refused to submit to the federal authority of Justo José de Urquiza.
He was a key figure in the "September 11" movement, advocating for a radical separation between Buenos Aires and the interior to protect the city's exclusive customs and port privileges.
The 1854 Constitution.
He obtained the passage of a separate Constitution of Buenos Aires in April 1854, which asserted the province's sovereignty, including its own diplomatic relations and bicameral legislature.
Obligado utilized the massive revenues from the Buenos Aires Customs which he refused to share with the Confederation to fund a major modernization program.
He inaugurated the first railway line in Argentina in 1857 (running from the city center to Flores) and installed the city's first running water and gas lighting systems.
He founded numerous primary schools and established the foundations of what would become the Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires.
He witnessed the first successful demonstration of the electric telegraph in the country, although his government did not immediately implement it.
Political Paradoxes
Like many of his generation, Obligado's career was marked by shifting alliances:
Despite being a pillar of the anti-Rosas "Liberal" faction, Obligado had been a firm supporter of Juan Manuel de Rosas during the 1840s due to his upper-class background, receiving his law degree in 1845.
After Caseros, he aligned with the Unitarian Party and became a close ally of Bartolomé Mitre and Domingo Sarmiento.
After his governorship, he served in the military and in the National Congress, eventually presiding over the Chamber of Deputies in 1862.
He was a key figure in the "September 11" movement, advocating for a radical separation between Buenos Aires and the interior to protect the city's exclusive customs and port privileges.
The 1854 Constitution.
He obtained the passage of a separate Constitution of Buenos Aires in April 1854, which asserted the province's sovereignty, including its own diplomatic relations and bicameral legislature.
Obligado utilized the massive revenues from the Buenos Aires Customs which he refused to share with the Confederation to fund a major modernization program.
He inaugurated the first railway line in Argentina in 1857 (running from the city center to Flores) and installed the city's first running water and gas lighting systems.
He founded numerous primary schools and established the foundations of what would become the Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires.
He witnessed the first successful demonstration of the electric telegraph in the country, although his government did not immediately implement it.
Political Paradoxes
Like many of his generation, Obligado's career was marked by shifting alliances:
Despite being a pillar of the anti-Rosas "Liberal" faction, Obligado had been a firm supporter of Juan Manuel de Rosas during the 1840s due to his upper-class background, receiving his law degree in 1845.
After Caseros, he aligned with the Unitarian Party and became a close ally of Bartolomé Mitre and Domingo Sarmiento.
After his governorship, he served in the military and in the National Congress, eventually presiding over the Chamber of Deputies in 1862.
Left: Valentin Alsina (Unitarian). Right: Pastor Obligado (Federal)
Valentín Alsina (1802–1869) was the ideological heart of the State of Buenos Aires during its period of secession (1852–1861). While Mitre provided the military and strategic vision, Alsina represented the "extreme wing" of the Unitarian Party, fiercely defending the city's right to remain independent from the Argentine Confederation. Alsina believed that Buenos Aires was the only "civilized" province capable of leading the nation.
Alsina served as Governor of the State of Buenos Aires during two critical intervals:
First Governorship (1852): Elected shortly after the September Revolution, he resigned after only a few months due to internal military pressure and the Siege of Buenos Aires led by Hilario Lagos.
Second Governorship (1857–1859): He returned to power during the peak of the state's independence. During this term, he oversaw the inauguration of the first railway line in Argentina and the reburial of his former boss, Bernardino Rivadavia, in Buenos Aires.
Alsina’s second term ended in disaster following the Battle of Cepeda (1859).
After Urquiza’s Confederation forces defeated the Buenos Aires army, Alsina was forced to resign as a condition for peace.
His resignation paved the way for the Pact of San José de Flores, which formally brought Buenos Aires back into the Argentine national fold, albeit temporarily on its own terms.
Valentín Alsina (1802–1869) was the ideological heart of the State of Buenos Aires during its period of secession (1852–1861). While Mitre provided the military and strategic vision, Alsina represented the "extreme wing" of the Unitarian Party, fiercely defending the city's right to remain independent from the Argentine Confederation. Alsina believed that Buenos Aires was the only "civilized" province capable of leading the nation.
Alsina served as Governor of the State of Buenos Aires during two critical intervals:
First Governorship (1852): Elected shortly after the September Revolution, he resigned after only a few months due to internal military pressure and the Siege of Buenos Aires led by Hilario Lagos.
Second Governorship (1857–1859): He returned to power during the peak of the state's independence. During this term, he oversaw the inauguration of the first railway line in Argentina and the reburial of his former boss, Bernardino Rivadavia, in Buenos Aires.
Alsina’s second term ended in disaster following the Battle of Cepeda (1859).
After Urquiza’s Confederation forces defeated the Buenos Aires army, Alsina was forced to resign as a condition for peace.
His resignation paved the way for the Pact of San José de Flores, which formally brought Buenos Aires back into the Argentine national fold, albeit temporarily on its own terms.
Battle of Cepeda (1859)
Fought on October 23, 1859, this engagement ended the six-year secession of the State of Buenos Aires and forced its reincorporation into the Argentine Confederation.
Argentine Confederation (Victors): Total of 14,000–15,000 men.
Breakdown: 10,000 horsemen, 3,000 infantry, 1,000 artillery/auxiliaries, and 32 cannons.
Leader: Justo José de Urquiza.
State of Buenos Aires: Total of 9,000 men.
Breakdown: 4,000 horsemen, 4,700 infantrymen, 300 artillerymen, and 26 cannons.
Leaders: Bartolomé Mitre and Luis María Campos; they were assisted by a Uruguayan division under Venancio Flores.
................................................................................
Venancio Flores.
Venancio Flores. Throughout his career, he was consistently opposed to the Oriental Blancos (National Party) and their Federalist allies in Argentina. After the Battle of Caseros, Flores became an officer in the Argentine army under Bartolomé Mitre, and fought against the Argentine Confederation and the Blanco government in Uruguay.
After being overthrown by the Blanco president Manuel P. Bustamante in 1855, Flores took refuge in Argentina, where he aligned himself with the Buenos Aires government (the Liberals).
Service in the Argentine Army: During his exile, Flores became a general in the Argentine army. He fought alongside Bartolomé Mitre at the Battle of Cepeda (1859), where Buenos Aires was defeated by the Argentine Confederation forces under Justo José de Urquiza.
In 1863, with covert support from Mitre and the Argentine government, Flores invaded Uruguay to overthrow the Blanco government of Bernardo Berro. This government was allied with both Argentine Federalists and Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López.
Backed by Brazilian and Argentine forces, Flores captured Montevideo in February 1865 and became the provisional president of Uruguay. This alignment directly led Uruguay into the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay.
Flores stepped down from the presidency in February 1868 and was assassinated four days later amid the ongoing intermittent civil war between the Colorados and Blancos.
Fought on October 23, 1859, this engagement ended the six-year secession of the State of Buenos Aires and forced its reincorporation into the Argentine Confederation.
Argentine Confederation (Victors): Total of 14,000–15,000 men.
Breakdown: 10,000 horsemen, 3,000 infantry, 1,000 artillery/auxiliaries, and 32 cannons.
Leader: Justo José de Urquiza.
State of Buenos Aires: Total of 9,000 men.
Breakdown: 4,000 horsemen, 4,700 infantrymen, 300 artillerymen, and 26 cannons.
Leaders: Bartolomé Mitre and Luis María Campos; they were assisted by a Uruguayan division under Venancio Flores.
................................................................................
Venancio Flores.
Venancio Flores. Throughout his career, he was consistently opposed to the Oriental Blancos (National Party) and their Federalist allies in Argentina. After the Battle of Caseros, Flores became an officer in the Argentine army under Bartolomé Mitre, and fought against the Argentine Confederation and the Blanco government in Uruguay.
After being overthrown by the Blanco president Manuel P. Bustamante in 1855, Flores took refuge in Argentina, where he aligned himself with the Buenos Aires government (the Liberals).
Service in the Argentine Army: During his exile, Flores became a general in the Argentine army. He fought alongside Bartolomé Mitre at the Battle of Cepeda (1859), where Buenos Aires was defeated by the Argentine Confederation forces under Justo José de Urquiza.
In 1863, with covert support from Mitre and the Argentine government, Flores invaded Uruguay to overthrow the Blanco government of Bernardo Berro. This government was allied with both Argentine Federalists and Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López.
Backed by Brazilian and Argentine forces, Flores captured Montevideo in February 1865 and became the provisional president of Uruguay. This alignment directly led Uruguay into the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay.
Flores stepped down from the presidency in February 1868 and was assassinated four days later amid the ongoing intermittent civil war between the Colorados and Blancos.
After Valentín Alsina was forced to resign following the defeat at the Battle of Cepeda (1859), he was succeeded by Felipe Llavallol (another "Lyric" and businessman) as interim governor. However, the real power was shifting toward Bartolomé Mitre, who finally assumed the governorship on May 3, 1860.
The resignation of Alsina was a requirement of the Pact of San José de Flores. The Confederation (Urquiza) refused to negotiate with Alsina because he was seen as a radical isolationist.
Llavallol acted as a bridge, managing the peaceful transition and the beginning of the constitutional reforms.
Mitre was seen as a more "Nationalist" liberal—someone who wanted Buenos Aires to lead the country rather than just hide behind its walls. He was elected Governor in 1860 to finalize the re-entry into the Confederation.
Mitre's governorship (1860–1862) was a masterclass in political maneuvering.
During this period, Mitre famously met with Justo José de Urquiza and the new President of the Confederation, Santiago Derqui, in Buenos Aires. They attended Masonic banquets and public festivals together, appearing to be "brothers" at last.
While he smiled for the public, Mitre was using the Buenos Aires Customs money to modernize his infantry and purchase rifles and modern artillery. He was preparing for the final "re-programming" of the state.
The Return to War
The peace didn't last. In 1861, a political conflict in San Juan (the assassination of Governor Virasoro) caused a "glitch" that neither side could ignore.
Mitre, still Governor of Buenos Aires, refused to accept the Confederation's intervention in the provinces. This led directly to the Battle of Pavón (1861).
The resignation of Alsina was a requirement of the Pact of San José de Flores. The Confederation (Urquiza) refused to negotiate with Alsina because he was seen as a radical isolationist.
Llavallol acted as a bridge, managing the peaceful transition and the beginning of the constitutional reforms.
Mitre was seen as a more "Nationalist" liberal—someone who wanted Buenos Aires to lead the country rather than just hide behind its walls. He was elected Governor in 1860 to finalize the re-entry into the Confederation.
Mitre's governorship (1860–1862) was a masterclass in political maneuvering.
During this period, Mitre famously met with Justo José de Urquiza and the new President of the Confederation, Santiago Derqui, in Buenos Aires. They attended Masonic banquets and public festivals together, appearing to be "brothers" at last.
While he smiled for the public, Mitre was using the Buenos Aires Customs money to modernize his infantry and purchase rifles and modern artillery. He was preparing for the final "re-programming" of the state.
The Return to War
The peace didn't last. In 1861, a political conflict in San Juan (the assassination of Governor Virasoro) caused a "glitch" that neither side could ignore.
Mitre, still Governor of Buenos Aires, refused to accept the Confederation's intervention in the provinces. This led directly to the Battle of Pavón (1861).
Buenos Aires did not participate in the 1853 Constituent Assembly, resulting in a national constitution that the province did not recognize for nearly a decade. Continued tensions led to major military confrontations, including the Battle of Cepeda (1859) and the Battle of Pavón (1861).
Following Mitre's victory at Pavón, the Confederation government dissolved, and Mitre became the president of a unified nation in 1862, fulfilling the Porteño goal of organizing the country under Buenos Aires's preeminence.
The fate of the federal provinces
During the presidency of Bartolomé Mitre (1862–1868), the federal provinces experienced what many historians describe as a "policy of pacification" through blood and fire. Having conquered the Confederation at Pavón, Mitre sought to "homogenize" the interior to fit his liberal, Buenos Aires-centric vision.
The "pacification" was arguably the most brutal period in Argentine history, precisely because it was framed as a
clash between "Civilization" and "Barbarism." To Mitre and his circle, the gauchos of the interior were not just political enemies; they were an evolutionary obstacle that had to be removed for the "modern machine" of the state to function.
As in the plans of the Scottish general Maitland, to conquer the southern cone, it was strategic to start with Buenos Aires. Mitre knew that once Rosas was defeated, Buenos Aires under his control could conquer the rest of the provinces. Mitre's genius was realizing that Buenos Aires didn't need the provinces to survive, but the provinces couldn't survive without Buenos Aires.
Following Mitre's victory at Pavón, the Confederation government dissolved, and Mitre became the president of a unified nation in 1862, fulfilling the Porteño goal of organizing the country under Buenos Aires's preeminence.
The fate of the federal provinces
During the presidency of Bartolomé Mitre (1862–1868), the federal provinces experienced what many historians describe as a "policy of pacification" through blood and fire. Having conquered the Confederation at Pavón, Mitre sought to "homogenize" the interior to fit his liberal, Buenos Aires-centric vision.
The "pacification" was arguably the most brutal period in Argentine history, precisely because it was framed as a
clash between "Civilization" and "Barbarism." To Mitre and his circle, the gauchos of the interior were not just political enemies; they were an evolutionary obstacle that had to be removed for the "modern machine" of the state to function.
As in the plans of the Scottish general Maitland, to conquer the southern cone, it was strategic to start with Buenos Aires. Mitre knew that once Rosas was defeated, Buenos Aires under his control could conquer the rest of the provinces. Mitre's genius was realizing that Buenos Aires didn't need the provinces to survive, but the provinces couldn't survive without Buenos Aires.
1852. The successor of the Unitary Party was the Liberal Party: Bartolomé Mitre (Unitarian), Valentín Alsina (Unitarian), Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (Unitarian), Dalmacio Vélez Sarsfield (Unitarian), Pastor Obligado (Federal) and Florencio Varela and Juan Cruz Varela (Unitarian Brothers).
The Liberal Party was divided into:
Autonomist Party (Adolfo Alsina, son of Valentin).
Nationalist Party (Mitre)
Following the Battle of Pavón (1861), the victorious "Liberal" forces of Buenos Aires split into two factions over how to integrate the rest of the country:
1852. The Liberal Party (Mitristas or Mitrism): Led by Bartolomé Mitre, they wanted a National government. They believed Buenos Aires should lead a unified Argentina, even if it meant sharing some customs revenue and power with the provinces.
In 1862 it was succeeded by Nationalist Party (Liberalism), led for the same Mitre. This party will continue to identify itself with the old Unitary Party.
1862. The Autonomist Party (Alsinistas): Led by Adolfo Alsina, they were "Porteño" isolationists. They believed Buenos Aires should remain autonomous—keeping its port wealth and city status for itself—rather than becoming the national capital and subsidizing the "barbaric" interior.
The Autonomist Party was dissolved in 1874 and was succeeded by National Autonomist Party. Although the Alsinas were unitarians, this party was identified as the successor of the old Federal Party.
The National Autonomist Party (Julio Roca and Carlos Pellegrini) represented a paradoxical synthesis: though its founding lineage (the Alsinas) was rooted in the Unitarian traditions of Buenos Aires, the party became the functional successor to the Federal Party for the rest of the country.
Avellanedas's "Policy of Conciliation between the Mitre's Nationalist Party and the Alsina's Autonomist one
1874 - 1875. A critical moment known as the "Policy of Conciliation" (Política de Conciliación). It was the moment when the "Nationalist" faction of Mitre and the "Lyric" (idealist/intellectual) faction of the Autonomist Party (After the death of its leader Adolfo Alsina) tried to bridge their blood-soaked divide.
By 1874, Mitre’s party was called the Partido Nacionalista, but They were the "Hard Liberals."
After losing the 1874 election to Nicolás Avellaneda (due to what they called fraud), Mitre led a violent revolution.
When the revolution failed, Mitre was imprisoned. The "Nationalists" were defeated militarily but remained a powerful intellectual and social force in Buenos Aires.
Within the Autonomist Party, there was a divide. While Adolfo Alsina was a pragmatist, there was a faction of intellectuals and high-society youths often referred to as "Líricos" (Lyrics). They were called "Lyrics" because they spoke of romanticized republican ideals, constitutional purity, and national brotherhood.
In 1875, President Nicolás Avellaneda realized he could not govern a broken country. He initiated the "Conciliation."
Avellaneda (a Federalist-leaning Autonomist) reached out to the defeated Mitre.
To "fuse" the two elites of Buenos Aires (the Nationalists and the Autonomists) to prevent the "barbaric" provinces from taking over the state.
Mitre was amnestied. The "Nationalists" and the "Autonomists" began to share ministries and seats in Congress.
This "Fusion" between the Mitristas and the Alsinistas had a massive side effect: it disgusted the provincial leaders.
The governors of the interior saw this "Fusion" as a "Porteño" conspiracy to keep all the power in Buenos Aires.
In response, Julio Argentino Roca organized the "League of Governors." Roca argued that while the "Nationalists" and "Lyrics" were busy reciting poetry and debating in the salons of Buenos Aires, he was out in the "Desert" conquering territory.
The "Fusion" was the last attempt of the old 19th-century "Romantic" leadership (the men of the 1852 generation) to hold onto power. It failed because it was too "lyric"—too focused on salon politics.
By 1880, the National Autonomist Party (PAN) under Roca swept them all away. Roca didn't care about "Lyric" reconciliations; he cared about "Order and Progress" backed by the telegraph and the rifles.
1880 - 1890. Nationalist Party
In 1880, the political landscape of Argentina underwent a definitive transformation as Bartolomé Mitre’s Nationalist Party (the continuation of his original Liberal Party) and the Autonomist Party faced a final, violent confrontation that solidified the power of the National Autonomist Party (PAN).
The Revolution of 1880: The Final Stand
The year 1880 marked the final attempt by the Buenos Aires liberal elite (Mitristas and Autonomists) to resist the rising power of the interior provinces led by Julio Argentino Roca.
Mitre’s Nationalist Party supported the rebellion of Buenos Aires Governor Carlos Tejedor against the federal government's attempt to federalize the city.
Roca’s national army crushed the rebellion. This military victory resulted in the Federalization of Buenos Aires, finally achieving the "National Organization" that Mitre had sought, but under the control of Roca and the PAN.
1880 - 1890 Mitre's Liberal Party
Following this defeat, Mitre’s party lost its ability to compete for national power through force. Mitre focused on his role as a "statesman and historian" through his newspaper, La Nación, while many former liberals and autonomists—including Quintana eventually found their way into the broad "National Autonomist" umbrella.
The Liberal Party was divided into:
Autonomist Party (Adolfo Alsina, son of Valentin).
Nationalist Party (Mitre)
Following the Battle of Pavón (1861), the victorious "Liberal" forces of Buenos Aires split into two factions over how to integrate the rest of the country:
1852. The Liberal Party (Mitristas or Mitrism): Led by Bartolomé Mitre, they wanted a National government. They believed Buenos Aires should lead a unified Argentina, even if it meant sharing some customs revenue and power with the provinces.
In 1862 it was succeeded by Nationalist Party (Liberalism), led for the same Mitre. This party will continue to identify itself with the old Unitary Party.
1862. The Autonomist Party (Alsinistas): Led by Adolfo Alsina, they were "Porteño" isolationists. They believed Buenos Aires should remain autonomous—keeping its port wealth and city status for itself—rather than becoming the national capital and subsidizing the "barbaric" interior.
The Autonomist Party was dissolved in 1874 and was succeeded by National Autonomist Party. Although the Alsinas were unitarians, this party was identified as the successor of the old Federal Party.
The National Autonomist Party (Julio Roca and Carlos Pellegrini) represented a paradoxical synthesis: though its founding lineage (the Alsinas) was rooted in the Unitarian traditions of Buenos Aires, the party became the functional successor to the Federal Party for the rest of the country.
Avellanedas's "Policy of Conciliation between the Mitre's Nationalist Party and the Alsina's Autonomist one
1874 - 1875. A critical moment known as the "Policy of Conciliation" (Política de Conciliación). It was the moment when the "Nationalist" faction of Mitre and the "Lyric" (idealist/intellectual) faction of the Autonomist Party (After the death of its leader Adolfo Alsina) tried to bridge their blood-soaked divide.
By 1874, Mitre’s party was called the Partido Nacionalista, but They were the "Hard Liberals."
After losing the 1874 election to Nicolás Avellaneda (due to what they called fraud), Mitre led a violent revolution.
When the revolution failed, Mitre was imprisoned. The "Nationalists" were defeated militarily but remained a powerful intellectual and social force in Buenos Aires.
Within the Autonomist Party, there was a divide. While Adolfo Alsina was a pragmatist, there was a faction of intellectuals and high-society youths often referred to as "Líricos" (Lyrics). They were called "Lyrics" because they spoke of romanticized republican ideals, constitutional purity, and national brotherhood.
In 1875, President Nicolás Avellaneda realized he could not govern a broken country. He initiated the "Conciliation."
Avellaneda (a Federalist-leaning Autonomist) reached out to the defeated Mitre.
To "fuse" the two elites of Buenos Aires (the Nationalists and the Autonomists) to prevent the "barbaric" provinces from taking over the state.
Mitre was amnestied. The "Nationalists" and the "Autonomists" began to share ministries and seats in Congress.
This "Fusion" between the Mitristas and the Alsinistas had a massive side effect: it disgusted the provincial leaders.
The governors of the interior saw this "Fusion" as a "Porteño" conspiracy to keep all the power in Buenos Aires.
In response, Julio Argentino Roca organized the "League of Governors." Roca argued that while the "Nationalists" and "Lyrics" were busy reciting poetry and debating in the salons of Buenos Aires, he was out in the "Desert" conquering territory.
The "Fusion" was the last attempt of the old 19th-century "Romantic" leadership (the men of the 1852 generation) to hold onto power. It failed because it was too "lyric"—too focused on salon politics.
By 1880, the National Autonomist Party (PAN) under Roca swept them all away. Roca didn't care about "Lyric" reconciliations; he cared about "Order and Progress" backed by the telegraph and the rifles.
1880 - 1890. Nationalist Party
In 1880, the political landscape of Argentina underwent a definitive transformation as Bartolomé Mitre’s Nationalist Party (the continuation of his original Liberal Party) and the Autonomist Party faced a final, violent confrontation that solidified the power of the National Autonomist Party (PAN).
The Revolution of 1880: The Final Stand
The year 1880 marked the final attempt by the Buenos Aires liberal elite (Mitristas and Autonomists) to resist the rising power of the interior provinces led by Julio Argentino Roca.
Mitre’s Nationalist Party supported the rebellion of Buenos Aires Governor Carlos Tejedor against the federal government's attempt to federalize the city.
Roca’s national army crushed the rebellion. This military victory resulted in the Federalization of Buenos Aires, finally achieving the "National Organization" that Mitre had sought, but under the control of Roca and the PAN.
1880 - 1890 Mitre's Liberal Party
Following this defeat, Mitre’s party lost its ability to compete for national power through force. Mitre focused on his role as a "statesman and historian" through his newspaper, La Nación, while many former liberals and autonomists—including Quintana eventually found their way into the broad "National Autonomist" umbrella.
The Generation of '90
The Generation of '90 (or the Generación del 90) represented the first massive "glitch" in the political machine built by Julio Argentino Roca. If the Generation of '37 were the "founding fathers" of the liberal state, the Generation of '90 were its first internal rebels.
The "Crisis of '90"
By 1890, the National Autonomist Party (PAN) had turned Argentina into a booming but corrupt "automaton."
A massive financial crisis (the Baring Crisis) caused the Argentine peso to lose value, leading to bankruptcy and widespread hunger.
The "Unicato" (the absolute rule of President Miguel Juárez Celman, Roca's brother-in-law) practiced open electoral fraud, treating the country like a private ranch.
The Birth of the Civic Union (Unión Cívica)
The Generation of '90 was a heterogeneous "fusion" of groups that hated the PAN for different reasons:
Students and young professionals who demanded "suffrage and honesty."
Bartolomé Mitre (the Nationalist) joined forces with his old rival, Leandro N. Alem, a charismatic leader with federalist roots.
To "unplug" the corrupt machine of Juárez Celman and restore the "romantic" republican values of 1853.
The Revolution of the Park (Revolución del Parque)
In July 1890, this generation took up arms. They occupied the Artillery Park in Buenos Aires. It was a bloody urban conflict, but more importantly, it was a Masonic and political drama.
While Alem was on the barricades ready to die, Mitre reached a secret pact with the "Grand Mechanic," Julio Argentino Roca.
The revolution was militarily defeated, but the president (Juárez Celman) was forced to resign. Roca returned to power behind the scenes, effectively "repairing" the machine by sacrificing his brother-in-law.
The Legacy: The Birth of Modern Parties
The Generation of '90 failed to seize power, but it shattered the PAN's monopoly forever:
The U.C.R. (Radical Civic Union)
Leandro Alem, disgusted by Mitre's "betrayal," founded the UCR. This became Argentina's first modern mass party, representing the "popular" voice against the "caste."
The Socialist Party
Founded shortly after by Juan B. Justo, representing the new immigrant working class.
The "Mitrista" Separation
Mitre’s faction became the Unión Cívica Nacional, eventually merging back into the conservative establishment.
The Generation of '90 was the moment the "Automaton of the Elite" faced the "Will of the People." It began the long transition from the oligarchic republic of the 19th century toward the democratic and populist movements of the 20th century.
The Generation of '90 (or the Generación del 90) represented the first massive "glitch" in the political machine built by Julio Argentino Roca. If the Generation of '37 were the "founding fathers" of the liberal state, the Generation of '90 were its first internal rebels.
The "Crisis of '90"
By 1890, the National Autonomist Party (PAN) had turned Argentina into a booming but corrupt "automaton."
A massive financial crisis (the Baring Crisis) caused the Argentine peso to lose value, leading to bankruptcy and widespread hunger.
The "Unicato" (the absolute rule of President Miguel Juárez Celman, Roca's brother-in-law) practiced open electoral fraud, treating the country like a private ranch.
The Birth of the Civic Union (Unión Cívica)
The Generation of '90 was a heterogeneous "fusion" of groups that hated the PAN for different reasons:
Students and young professionals who demanded "suffrage and honesty."
Bartolomé Mitre (the Nationalist) joined forces with his old rival, Leandro N. Alem, a charismatic leader with federalist roots.
To "unplug" the corrupt machine of Juárez Celman and restore the "romantic" republican values of 1853.
The Revolution of the Park (Revolución del Parque)
In July 1890, this generation took up arms. They occupied the Artillery Park in Buenos Aires. It was a bloody urban conflict, but more importantly, it was a Masonic and political drama.
While Alem was on the barricades ready to die, Mitre reached a secret pact with the "Grand Mechanic," Julio Argentino Roca.
The revolution was militarily defeated, but the president (Juárez Celman) was forced to resign. Roca returned to power behind the scenes, effectively "repairing" the machine by sacrificing his brother-in-law.
The Legacy: The Birth of Modern Parties
The Generation of '90 failed to seize power, but it shattered the PAN's monopoly forever:
The U.C.R. (Radical Civic Union)
Leandro Alem, disgusted by Mitre's "betrayal," founded the UCR. This became Argentina's first modern mass party, representing the "popular" voice against the "caste."
The Socialist Party
Founded shortly after by Juan B. Justo, representing the new immigrant working class.
The "Mitrista" Separation
Mitre’s faction became the Unión Cívica Nacional, eventually merging back into the conservative establishment.
The Generation of '90 was the moment the "Automaton of the Elite" faced the "Will of the People." It began the long transition from the oligarchic republic of the 19th century toward the democratic and populist movements of the 20th century.
