Section of the blog dedicated to the study and research of uniforms and militaria in general during a time that is as fascinating as it is unknown. The time of the Argentine Confederation, as seen in the image, also regulated the use of the haircut and beard. At the beginning of the civil wars in Argentina, Federal and Unitarian forces uniformed exactly the same. Both came from the armies of the former United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata and therefore were dressed according to the regulations of the time, a rare mixture of Spanish style and surplus of the British aid to the ex-Spanish colonies. Like this repro cavalry jacket of the Scottish-type. During this exciting time, the European military style was used in combination with local clothes, now considered traditionalist elements. To differentiate themselves from each other, they used a partisan tape like the one on the mannequin. During this time, the Argentine Confederacy suffered a prolonged maritime blockade by the fleets of England and France. For this reason the charge of the Argentine Confederation, Juan Manuel de Rosas had to re-organize the army, and resort to the militarization of civilian garments. Probably the European style uniforms used at this time had been local copies of these. Throughout the 20 years of this stage of the Argentine Confederation, the French style from the time of Louis Philippe (which carried through to the time of Napoleon III) was penetrating from the Montevideo headquarters of the exiled Unitarian forces equipped since the Franco-Argentine War (1838 - 1840). From 1852, after the defeat of the Argentine Confederation, the French style of the Second Empire was imposed definitively until the early 1900s.
Reproduction: Model 1829 Argentine Governor or Captain of Militas Jacket.
Reproduction of Epaulettes Argentine Model 1810 - 1852 for High Commands. General San Martín by Gil de Castro 1818. General Facundo Quiroga by Alphonse Fermepin 1836. Epaulettes of the General Juan Manuel de Rosas Museo Historico Saavedra). Coronel Ramos Uniform (Museo Historico Nacional Buenos Aires).
Reproduction: Type 1805 Red jacket Aide-de-Camp .(Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata).
Reproduction: Type 1812 Aide-de-Camp Burgundy (Grana) Color.
Escort Governor. Escolta del Gobernador and Edecans (Aide-de-camp):
On the left and center: Cuirass model 1816 (1st French Empire) cuirassier replica. The short cavalry jacket is a reproduction of an original, based on photographs from a book that showed it in a museum. The jacket is of the Scottish type of the Napoleonic Wars, used in the cavalry regiments of East Lothian, Berwickshire around 1810. Probably the original in the museum in Argentina is of British origin or perhaps made on that same type of garment.
On the right: Colonel Edecan (Aide-de-Camp) reenactment.
On the right: Colonel Edecan (Aide-de-Camp) reenactment.
1826-39. Cuirassier Officer. "Escoltas de la Libertad".
1830. Line Cavalry by Fontenau. "Los Cuerpos Militares en la Historia Argentina".
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Carlos Morel (1813–1894) is celebrated as the "first truly Argentine painter" because he was the first artist born in Argentina to focus on the country's own culture rather than just mimicking European styles.
Born in Buenos Aires on February 12, 1813, he was the son of a wealthy Spanish merchant. He began his artistic journey at the University of Buenos Aires art school in 1827, studying under European masters like the Swiss artist José Guth and later the Italian Pablo Caccianiga. Morel was a prolific chronicler of 19th-century Argentine life, capturing everything from street scenes and grocery stores to high-stakes battlefields. He is most famous for his lithographs, particularly his 1845 collection, Manners and Customs of the Río de la Plata. This series of 24 plates is considered a definitive record of mid-century Argentine life and the gaucho. |
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Military Scenes. His work extensively documented the soldiers and military gear of the Argentine Federation under Juan Manuel de Rosas.He also painted miniatures of Rosas and his wife, as well as portraits and landscapes.
Morel’s artistic production declined after the 1840s, partly due to mental illness that affected his later capabilities. He spent the last decades of his life in Quilmes, where he worked as a photographer and stage designer for the municipal theater. He passed away in Quilmes on September 10, 1894, at the age of 81.Today, his legacy lives on through his widely reproduced works and the Carlos Morel School of Fine Arts in Quilmes, named in his honor.
Morel’s artistic production declined after the 1840s, partly due to mental illness that affected his later capabilities. He spent the last decades of his life in Quilmes, where he worked as a photographer and stage designer for the municipal theater. He passed away in Quilmes on September 10, 1894, at the age of 81.Today, his legacy lives on through his widely reproduced works and the Carlos Morel School of Fine Arts in Quilmes, named in his honor.
Florencio Escardo and Manuelita Rosas by Carlos Morel.
Interesting details of the corazeros (Cuirassier) of the Rosas era in the works of Carlos Morel and Juan Manuel Blanes. On the backs you can see some kind of half rucksack in the shape of rectangular boxes.
Ranks:
Brigadier General
Coronel Mayor
Coronel
Teniente Coronel
Sargento Mayor
Capitan
Ayudante 1ro
Teniente 1ro
Teniente 2do
Subteniente
Alferez
Abanderado
Porta-estandarte
Sargento 1ro
Sargento 2do
Cabo 1ro
Cabo 2do
Soldado
Regimental Flags:
Forage cap (Punzo Color), cavalry campaign model replica.
Federal military/political badge:
An original ribbon, political distinctive Federal badge, found in the Netherlands in an old bible in the German language. Probably it would have belonged to a priest who had been added to the Diocese of Buenos Aires at that time.
The origin of this distinction was initially to differentiate the forces of one side and another side, since at that time all were uniformed the same. During the development of the Civil War, and the appearance of France and England in support of the Unitarians, they began to introduce the French military fashion, which became universal in the armies of the world. However, the Federal Army of Argentina according to the old lithographs of the time, evidenced a British style inherited from the support of London during the independence war of the Spanish Empire. Probably that style of clothing was a copy of the English model, as well as the abundance of red and crimson. There were many styles of the ribbon in white and red.
Drawing: 1835. Guardia Argentina Battalion by Guillermo Roux.
The origin of this distinction was initially to differentiate the forces of one side and another side, since at that time all were uniformed the same. During the development of the Civil War, and the appearance of France and England in support of the Unitarians, they began to introduce the French military fashion, which became universal in the armies of the world. However, the Federal Army of Argentina according to the old lithographs of the time, evidenced a British style inherited from the support of London during the independence war of the Spanish Empire. Probably that style of clothing was a copy of the English model, as well as the abundance of red and crimson. There were many styles of the ribbon in white and red.
Drawing: 1835. Guardia Argentina Battalion by Guillermo Roux.
1850. Artillery Officer by Gullermo Roux. A very interesting pair of Double Barrel Flintlock pistols.
2th Bn. "Patricios" and Defensores de la Independencia" 1839-1852 in campaign uniform.
Line Infantry, 3th; 5th; 6th Cavalry Regiment and Trumpeter.
This watercolor painting, titled "El Fuerte de Buenos Aires" (The Fort of Buenos Aires), was created by the French engineer and artist Charles Henri Pellegrini (1800–1875) around 1831 "Rosas Era".
The image says it all. They are troops training rifle fencing, with the short infantry saber. The clothing is for instruction, a mixture of military and civilian garments of the time. This work was done shortly after Pellegrini's arrival in the country, it is estimated that in 1831.
In the background of this painting, a guard post and a guard changing are seen
The image says it all. They are troops training rifle fencing, with the short infantry saber. The clothing is for instruction, a mixture of military and civilian garments of the time. This work was done shortly after Pellegrini's arrival in the country, it is estimated that in 1831.
In the background of this painting, a guard post and a guard changing are seen
In this recreation using AI technology, on the left, the overcoat. This garment was exactly the same as the one used since the Napoleonic Wars. During the time of Rosas there were at least two variants of colors, which were blue and red. This "capote" was used with a cape (Esclavina), a kind of cloak that could be used as a hood. Although the use of these European-type garments is documented, the most common and practical was the traditional poncho.
AI image on the right, another interesting garment called "Poncho Patria". It was a poncho with a collar and sometimes pockets. Reproductions are on sale online. In my opinion the garment is closer to a cape than to a poncho. The color is blue with red lining.
AI image on the right, another interesting garment called "Poncho Patria". It was a poncho with a collar and sometimes pockets. Reproductions are on sale online. In my opinion the garment is closer to a cape than to a poncho. The color is blue with red lining.
In this image made with AI, what would have been the cape in red is recreated. The color red was predominant in the Army of Juan Manuel de Rosas. The red garments were combined with the blue garments.
The sleeved cap or "Bonet de Police", was the most common and popular from the end of the colonial period until its replacement by the kepi after the battle of Caseros. But also in Rosas' time there were sleeveless caps, which were those of the French models of the Second Empire. These sleeveless caps were nothing more than the predecessors of side caps (birretes).
The sleeved cap or "Bonet de Police", was the most common and popular from the end of the colonial period until its replacement by the kepi after the battle of Caseros. But also in Rosas' time there were sleeveless caps, which were those of the French models of the Second Empire. These sleeveless caps were nothing more than the predecessors of side caps (birretes).
Recreation using AI. Battalion Defensores de la Independencia - "Defenders of Independence" under the orders of Infantry Colonel Gerónimo Costa. Battalion Defensores de la Libertad - "Defenders of Freedom" under the orders of Infantry Colonel Mariano Maza.
Defensores de la "Independencia":
With this corps Geronimo Costa (Sometimes Jeronimo), participated in the Battle of Arroyo Grande (1842) and stood out in the assault on the walls of Montevideo (Sitio de Montevideo).
Defensores de la "Libertad":
Before crossing into the Banda Oriental, the Defenders of Freedom battalion had a bloody and decisive performance in the interior campaign (1840-1841) to dismantle the Northern Coalition led by Juan Lavalle and Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid.
Battle of Quebracho Herrado (1840): They participated in the pursuit of Lavalle's forces after his failed attempt to invade Buenos Aires.
Battle of Famaillá (1841): The battalion was the nucleus of General Manuel Oribe's infantry. Maza led a frontal assault against the center of Lavalle's line, capturing his artillery and sealing the definitive defeat of the unitary leader in the north. Taking of Catamarca: After Famaillá, Maza and his battalion occupied the city and executed Governor José Cubas. Persecution of Marco Avellaneda: The unit was responsible for the capture and subsequent execution of coalition leaders such as Marco Avellaneda in Metán..
Like the "Defenders of Independence" Battalion, the "Libertad" Battalion was also in the Battle of Arroyo Grande. And just like the Battalion Defenders of Independence", the Defenders of "Freedom" passed into the hands of Urquiza.
1852 Battle of Caseros
In October 1851, following the Treaty of the Pantanoso, Manuel Oribe was forced to capitulate to Justo José de Urquiza, who had turned against Rosas. As part of the surrender, Oribe’s entire army including the veteran battalions "Defensores de la Libertad" and "Defensores de la Independencia" was handed over to Urquiza, who re-baptized them Battalions "San Martin" and Constitution" respectively. Paradoxically, these battalions were used in Caseros, where they had to fight against their former colonels.
In Caseros, Colonel Gerónimo Costa commanded the "Independencia" Battalion (new formation), mostly recruits.
He was part of the forces of General Ángel Pacheco on the left wing of the Rosista OOB.
After the defeat, Costa tried to flee on the same ship as Rosas, but due to a personal altercation with the former governor, he decided to change ships.
Rosas saw himself as a statesman who had "played his hand" and lost. To him, continuing the fight at Caseros or in the city was "useless" (inútil) bloodshed because the geopolitical and military balance had already shifted. He preferred to survive and preserve his figure in history from afar.
Colonel Costa, as a professional soldier, felt betrayed. He had stayed in the trenches of the Caserón, watching his men die under the bayonets of the Brazilians and Uruguayans, while his Commander-in-Chief was already writing a resignation in a plaza. To Costa, a soldier’s duty was to go down with the ship, and Rosas's flight felt like an act of cowardice.
Colonel Mariano Maza Mariano with the Infantry of the "Reserve" (Caseros and El Palomar). He was one of the most active commanders during the defense of Rosas' central and right line He commanded two infantry battalions that defended the key position of the Casa de Caseros and the famous circular building of El Palomar. These battalions were the ones that resisted the frontal assault of the Brazilian infantry and the Uruguayan brigades that attacked the right flank of the Buenos Aires army. When Caseros' front collapsed, Maza managed to escape the battlefield into exile.
After Caseros
After Caseros, what was left of the "San Martin" (Ex- Defensores de la independencia), Battalion was renamed the "Federation" Battalion, and as soon as Urquiza passed it to Buenos Aires (so that they could fight him), renamed Battalion 1 of Infantry of the State of Buenos Aires.; While the "Constitution" (Ex- "Defenders of Freedom") became the 2nd infantry battalion of the Separatist State of Buenos Aires. The companies of Germans that fought in Caseros, went on with their needle rifles to form the company of hunters of the 3rd infantry battalion of the Separatist State of Buenos Aires that quickly integrated foreign legions into its ranks to launch an offensive against the federal provinces.
Execution of Colonel Gerónimo Costa.
"Defensores de la Independencia" It was baptized as Battalion 1 of Line Infantry and the command was handed over to Colonel Emilio Conesa, an officer of close confidence of the Unitarians and Mitre. Many of those soldiers, who for a decade shouted "Death to the unitary savages!" under Costa's orders, ended up being the base of Mitre and Conesa's army that fought against Urquiza in Pavón.
One of the cruelest and most tragic ironies in Argentine military history was that Colonel Emilio Conesa, in command of the Buenos Aires forces (which included that veteran battalion), defeated his former chief, Jerónimo Costa, in the Battle of Villamayor on January 31, 1856.
Costa had invaded Buenos Aires with a small group of officers and soldiers loyal to the Confederacy. It was intercepted by the troops of Emilio Conesa and Esteban García, who had an overwhelming numerical superiority and weapons. After the surrender, and by direct order of Governor Pastor Obligado (instigated by figures such as Mitre and Alsina), a decree was applied that condemned to death in advance any "anarchist leader" who invaded the province.
On February 2, 1856, Jerónimo Costa was shot without trial along with almost all his officers and about 140 soldiers taken prisoner. It was an act of "political extermination" that shocked even some sectors of Buenos Aires, given Costa's prestige as a hero of Martín García's defense.
The most dramatic thing about the event is that the soldiers who pulled the trigger or charged Costa in Villamayor were, to a large extent, the same men he had instructed and led for a decade in the trenches of Montevideo under the name of "Defenders of Independence.". The same battalion that Gerónimo Costa had formed on January 3, 1839.
Battalion "Defensores de Buenos Aires" 1831
Prior to the Defenders battalions "Of Independence and Freedom" there was another one of 1831 called "Defenders of Buenos Aires". This "Defensores" was an urban militia under the command of the son of the famous Martin de Alzaga (Felix Alzaga). But due to differences between Alzaga and Rosas, the battalion was disbanded.
A notable historical fact from 1831 links this body with the manumission of slaves. Documents from the time record that the governor declared soldiers such as Benito Berosi, of the Defensores de Buenos Aires battalion, "free of servitude" as a reward for their services fighting for the homeland.
Defensores de la "Independencia":
With this corps Geronimo Costa (Sometimes Jeronimo), participated in the Battle of Arroyo Grande (1842) and stood out in the assault on the walls of Montevideo (Sitio de Montevideo).
Defensores de la "Libertad":
Before crossing into the Banda Oriental, the Defenders of Freedom battalion had a bloody and decisive performance in the interior campaign (1840-1841) to dismantle the Northern Coalition led by Juan Lavalle and Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid.
Battle of Quebracho Herrado (1840): They participated in the pursuit of Lavalle's forces after his failed attempt to invade Buenos Aires.
Battle of Famaillá (1841): The battalion was the nucleus of General Manuel Oribe's infantry. Maza led a frontal assault against the center of Lavalle's line, capturing his artillery and sealing the definitive defeat of the unitary leader in the north. Taking of Catamarca: After Famaillá, Maza and his battalion occupied the city and executed Governor José Cubas. Persecution of Marco Avellaneda: The unit was responsible for the capture and subsequent execution of coalition leaders such as Marco Avellaneda in Metán..
Like the "Defenders of Independence" Battalion, the "Libertad" Battalion was also in the Battle of Arroyo Grande. And just like the Battalion Defenders of Independence", the Defenders of "Freedom" passed into the hands of Urquiza.
1852 Battle of Caseros
In October 1851, following the Treaty of the Pantanoso, Manuel Oribe was forced to capitulate to Justo José de Urquiza, who had turned against Rosas. As part of the surrender, Oribe’s entire army including the veteran battalions "Defensores de la Libertad" and "Defensores de la Independencia" was handed over to Urquiza, who re-baptized them Battalions "San Martin" and Constitution" respectively. Paradoxically, these battalions were used in Caseros, where they had to fight against their former colonels.
In Caseros, Colonel Gerónimo Costa commanded the "Independencia" Battalion (new formation), mostly recruits.
He was part of the forces of General Ángel Pacheco on the left wing of the Rosista OOB.
After the defeat, Costa tried to flee on the same ship as Rosas, but due to a personal altercation with the former governor, he decided to change ships.
Rosas saw himself as a statesman who had "played his hand" and lost. To him, continuing the fight at Caseros or in the city was "useless" (inútil) bloodshed because the geopolitical and military balance had already shifted. He preferred to survive and preserve his figure in history from afar.
Colonel Costa, as a professional soldier, felt betrayed. He had stayed in the trenches of the Caserón, watching his men die under the bayonets of the Brazilians and Uruguayans, while his Commander-in-Chief was already writing a resignation in a plaza. To Costa, a soldier’s duty was to go down with the ship, and Rosas's flight felt like an act of cowardice.
Colonel Mariano Maza Mariano with the Infantry of the "Reserve" (Caseros and El Palomar). He was one of the most active commanders during the defense of Rosas' central and right line He commanded two infantry battalions that defended the key position of the Casa de Caseros and the famous circular building of El Palomar. These battalions were the ones that resisted the frontal assault of the Brazilian infantry and the Uruguayan brigades that attacked the right flank of the Buenos Aires army. When Caseros' front collapsed, Maza managed to escape the battlefield into exile.
After Caseros
After Caseros, what was left of the "San Martin" (Ex- Defensores de la independencia), Battalion was renamed the "Federation" Battalion, and as soon as Urquiza passed it to Buenos Aires (so that they could fight him), renamed Battalion 1 of Infantry of the State of Buenos Aires.; While the "Constitution" (Ex- "Defenders of Freedom") became the 2nd infantry battalion of the Separatist State of Buenos Aires. The companies of Germans that fought in Caseros, went on with their needle rifles to form the company of hunters of the 3rd infantry battalion of the Separatist State of Buenos Aires that quickly integrated foreign legions into its ranks to launch an offensive against the federal provinces.
Execution of Colonel Gerónimo Costa.
"Defensores de la Independencia" It was baptized as Battalion 1 of Line Infantry and the command was handed over to Colonel Emilio Conesa, an officer of close confidence of the Unitarians and Mitre. Many of those soldiers, who for a decade shouted "Death to the unitary savages!" under Costa's orders, ended up being the base of Mitre and Conesa's army that fought against Urquiza in Pavón.
One of the cruelest and most tragic ironies in Argentine military history was that Colonel Emilio Conesa, in command of the Buenos Aires forces (which included that veteran battalion), defeated his former chief, Jerónimo Costa, in the Battle of Villamayor on January 31, 1856.
Costa had invaded Buenos Aires with a small group of officers and soldiers loyal to the Confederacy. It was intercepted by the troops of Emilio Conesa and Esteban García, who had an overwhelming numerical superiority and weapons. After the surrender, and by direct order of Governor Pastor Obligado (instigated by figures such as Mitre and Alsina), a decree was applied that condemned to death in advance any "anarchist leader" who invaded the province.
On February 2, 1856, Jerónimo Costa was shot without trial along with almost all his officers and about 140 soldiers taken prisoner. It was an act of "political extermination" that shocked even some sectors of Buenos Aires, given Costa's prestige as a hero of Martín García's defense.
The most dramatic thing about the event is that the soldiers who pulled the trigger or charged Costa in Villamayor were, to a large extent, the same men he had instructed and led for a decade in the trenches of Montevideo under the name of "Defenders of Independence.". The same battalion that Gerónimo Costa had formed on January 3, 1839.
Battalion "Defensores de Buenos Aires" 1831
Prior to the Defenders battalions "Of Independence and Freedom" there was another one of 1831 called "Defenders of Buenos Aires". This "Defensores" was an urban militia under the command of the son of the famous Martin de Alzaga (Felix Alzaga). But due to differences between Alzaga and Rosas, the battalion was disbanded.
A notable historical fact from 1831 links this body with the manumission of slaves. Documents from the time record that the governor declared soldiers such as Benito Berosi, of the Defensores de Buenos Aires battalion, "free of servitude" as a reward for their services fighting for the homeland.
1843 - 1851. Basic Infantry Equipment.
The weaponry used by Rosas's forces was an amalgamation of inherited Spanish arms and imported European models, primarily British ones:
Primary Weapon: The standard weapon was the smoothbore musket, most likely variations of the "Brown Bess" (British Land Pattern Musket) or Spanish copies, and potentially the later British Pattern 1842 percussion musket.
Ignition System: The technology shifted during this period from the older flintlock mechanism to the more reliable percussion cap system. The British P/42 was the last regulation smoothbore percussion musket produced for the British army, and these types of arms were widely exported and used globally.
Origins: The Argentine army imported arms from European sources during the 19th century, with later imports in the second half of the century shifting to more advanced designs like the Remington Rolling Block rifle and eventually the Model 1891 Mauser.
The infantry at the Battle of Caseros in 1852 fought primarily with these smoothbore percussion muskets. True rifles were specialized weapons usually issued only to elite or sharpshooter units during that period.
Primary Weapon: The standard weapon was the smoothbore musket, most likely variations of the "Brown Bess" (British Land Pattern Musket) or Spanish copies, and potentially the later British Pattern 1842 percussion musket.
Ignition System: The technology shifted during this period from the older flintlock mechanism to the more reliable percussion cap system. The British P/42 was the last regulation smoothbore percussion musket produced for the British army, and these types of arms were widely exported and used globally.
Origins: The Argentine army imported arms from European sources during the 19th century, with later imports in the second half of the century shifting to more advanced designs like the Remington Rolling Block rifle and eventually the Model 1891 Mauser.
The infantry at the Battle of Caseros in 1852 fought primarily with these smoothbore percussion muskets. True rifles were specialized weapons usually issued only to elite or sharpshooter units during that period.
Basic Cavalry Equipment
Chavari riding equestrian pants and black cuirass.
Regiments, Order of Battle and High Command. Colonels; Lieutnant Colonels; Sergeant major (Major), Captains and Lieutnants:
General M. Oribe; General L.M. Mansilla and General A. Pacheco. Note in the photo Mansilla is dressed in his Colonel uniform during the Argentino-Brasilera War of 1825-28. Also note the honor cords of the superior officers. Colonel Chilavert during the Battle of Caseros (where he had to again face the Brazilians) had one from the veterans of Ituzaingo on his blue artillery uniform. Manzilla also had one from Ituzaingo and one from another campaign.
Generals Quiroga and Aldao. In the painting Quiroga wears a French 1st Empire Light Cavalry ceremonial belt and buckle with the lion head. This same type of buckle appears in several portraits of commanders of the War of Independence, not only in cavalry but also in artillery.
In the photo, General Nazario Benavidez, (Governor of the Province of San Juan). He was one of Facundo Quiroga's commanders. Veteran of the 1833 desert campaign with the 2nd Regiment of Auxiliaries of the Andes (Colonel José Martín Yanzón). In 1851 he remained loyal to the government of Juan Manuel de Rosas and he was entrusted with the military command of the western region of the Argentine Confederation.
Brigadiers (List of 1840)
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Jose de San Martin
Felipe Ibarra Miguel E. Soler Guillermo Brown |
Pascual Echagüe
Juan Manuel de Rosas Carlos M. de Alvear Jose Felix Aldao |
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This symbol represents the "Estrella Federal", Each point marks an orientation indicator (North, South, Northeast, etc.) It was the Federal symbol.
This image is a modern representation.
This image is a modern representation.
Brigadier Juan Bautista Bustos 1779 - 1830. Artist/Lithographer: César Hipólito Bacle (1794–1838) was a Swiss-born lithographer who was a pioneer of the craft in Argentina.
The Brigadier Juan Bautista Bustos participated in the defense against the British invasions of the Río de la Plata and served as Chief of Staff of the Army of the North. He was elected governor of Córdoba in 1820 and governed until 1829. During his administration, the province's first constitution was enacted in 1821.Federalist Bustos was a major figure in the Argentine civil wars, leading the federalist cause in Córdoba until his defeat by Unitarian General José María Paz.
Ramón Bustos (1810–1856) was the son of Juan Bautista Bustos and María Juliana Maure. He lived with his father in Córdoba starting in 1818 and studied at the prestigious Colegio de Monserrat.
Following in his father’s footsteps, Ramón became a colonel in the Argentine army. He was an active participant in the Argentine Civil Wars, fighting on the Federalist side, and also served during the Great Siege of Montevideo.
In 1826, he was granted a scholarship by the provincial government to study in England, reflecting his family's high status at the time.
After the Treaty of Pantanoso (Uruguay) Bustos had to surrender his cavalry battalion to Urquiza. However, Colonel Bustos fought in Caseros in 1852 in command of a cavalry battalion against the Allied Army.
There is no known portrait of the Colonel Ramon Bustos, leaving him without a visual record for posterity. His death (1856 Villamayor Massacre) and the lack of a verified grave are tied to the brutal end of the Federalist resistance in Buenos Aires after Caseros.
The Brigadier Juan Bautista Bustos participated in the defense against the British invasions of the Río de la Plata and served as Chief of Staff of the Army of the North. He was elected governor of Córdoba in 1820 and governed until 1829. During his administration, the province's first constitution was enacted in 1821.Federalist Bustos was a major figure in the Argentine civil wars, leading the federalist cause in Córdoba until his defeat by Unitarian General José María Paz.
Ramón Bustos (1810–1856) was the son of Juan Bautista Bustos and María Juliana Maure. He lived with his father in Córdoba starting in 1818 and studied at the prestigious Colegio de Monserrat.
Following in his father’s footsteps, Ramón became a colonel in the Argentine army. He was an active participant in the Argentine Civil Wars, fighting on the Federalist side, and also served during the Great Siege of Montevideo.
In 1826, he was granted a scholarship by the provincial government to study in England, reflecting his family's high status at the time.
After the Treaty of Pantanoso (Uruguay) Bustos had to surrender his cavalry battalion to Urquiza. However, Colonel Bustos fought in Caseros in 1852 in command of a cavalry battalion against the Allied Army.
There is no known portrait of the Colonel Ramon Bustos, leaving him without a visual record for posterity. His death (1856 Villamayor Massacre) and the lack of a verified grave are tied to the brutal end of the Federalist resistance in Buenos Aires after Caseros.
Oil of Felix Revol preserved in the Historical Museum of Santa Fe with the image of Brigade (Brigadier) General Pascual Echagüe, governor of the province to the time of the battle of Quebracho in June 1846. Photo: ellitoral.com
General Ángel Pacheco did not lead Rosas's army in the Battle of Caseros, and his actions are widely considered a betrayal or, at the very least, a decisive act of passive non-compliance that critically weakened Rosas.
Rosas had initially appointed Pacheco as commander-in-chief of his forces to face Urquiza's "Grand Army". However, due to what was described as "contradictory micromanagement and incompetence on Rosas's part" or possibly due to an agreement with Urquiza, Pacheco resigned from his command just days before the battle, on January 27, 1852, and retired to his estate (estancia).
Pacheco's forces retreated and allowed Urquiza's army to advance almost unmolested across strategic points like the Arroyo Márquez. This passive attitude left the main Rosista army a "muddled and cornered" position and left Rosas to take personal command, a role for which he was not a skilled field commander.
Further evidence supporting the view of betrayal is that after Rosas's defeat and exile, Pacheco accepted a ministerial position (Minister of War and Navy) in the new government of Buenos Aires, which was led by those who had overthrown Rosas.
* Many historians and military analysts believe that the battle was lost for Rosas even before it began, primarily due to the desertion of General Pacheco and the resulting poor morale and confusion among the troops. There was significant concern expressed regarding the size and strength of Urquiza's army prior to the Battle of Caseros, and that General Lucio Norberto Mansilla, Rosas's brother-in-law and a key commander, was involved in these discussions.
General Ángel Pacheco, the intended commander-in-chief, had serious doubts about their forces' readiness and the strategic situation. He repeatedly expressed his concerns to Rosas and ultimately resigned, which was a critical blow to Rosas's command structure. General Mansilla was aware of the shortcomings and part of the communication loop. He commanded forces (infantry and artillery) defending the Paraná River line under Pacheco's overall command. When Pacheco ordered a general withdrawal to a defensive line closer to Buenos Aires, the aim was to consolidate forces and allow time for more troops to arrive.
Rosas's reply to Mansilla's concerns * and suggestions for positioning was that he would "consult with Pacheco," indicating an ongoing discussion about the military reality facing an army of what was reported as 20,000-28,000 strong allied forces.
While Pacheco was the primary figure who effectively refused command due to the dire situation, Mansilla was also involved in the strategic discussions that highlighted the numerical and logistical disadvantages of Rosas's position. The consensus among the professional generals was that facing the allied army in a pitched battle at that moment was a severe risk.
Colonel Martín Chilavert was another key figure who identified the critical logistical and strategic disadvantages of the position chosen by Rosas and tried to caution him, only to be ignored.
Chilavert was a highly respected artillery officer and a Unitarian (ironically, like Colonel Pedro Diaz and others, fighting for the Federalist Rosas at this stage due to the foreign invasion component of the allied army). He was tasked with commanding the main artillery park at the chosen battle site.
* Juan Manuel de Rosas was not a career, academically trained general or a strategist in the European sense. His military background was rooted in the realities of the Argentine pampas: leading militias, fighting civil wars with irregular forces, managing a cavalry-centric army, and campaigning against indigenous populations. This required excellent horsemanship, toughness, political acumen, and a deep understanding of local logistics, but not formal grand strategy.
He had a profound understanding of the Argentine pampas economy and society, which was the source of his political and military power. He was a capable administrator of his vast lands before entering politics. His isolation was likely more political than physical—he chose to surround himself with loyalists rather than necessarily the most qualified strategists, which ultimately prevented him from heeding the warnings of trained officers like Pacheco, Chilavert, and Mansilla when faced with a conventional, modern army at Caseros. His reliance on his own intuition, derived from an earlier style of warfare, proved fatal in that specific battle.
His pride was evident in his autocratic rule, his refusal to share power, and his insistence on the universal display of the Federalist red. Militarily, this pride likely prevented him from accepting the advice of his generals (Pacheco, Chilavert) to delay or reposition his army. He would not admit weakness or cede strategic control, believing his personal authority and determination were enough to secure victory.Rosas was "proud and suspicious" are two traits that perfectly align with historical descriptions of Juan Manuel de Rosas's personality. These characteristics are often cited as major factors in his political longevity and his eventual isolation and downfall.
Rosas had initially appointed Pacheco as commander-in-chief of his forces to face Urquiza's "Grand Army". However, due to what was described as "contradictory micromanagement and incompetence on Rosas's part" or possibly due to an agreement with Urquiza, Pacheco resigned from his command just days before the battle, on January 27, 1852, and retired to his estate (estancia).
Pacheco's forces retreated and allowed Urquiza's army to advance almost unmolested across strategic points like the Arroyo Márquez. This passive attitude left the main Rosista army a "muddled and cornered" position and left Rosas to take personal command, a role for which he was not a skilled field commander.
Further evidence supporting the view of betrayal is that after Rosas's defeat and exile, Pacheco accepted a ministerial position (Minister of War and Navy) in the new government of Buenos Aires, which was led by those who had overthrown Rosas.
* Many historians and military analysts believe that the battle was lost for Rosas even before it began, primarily due to the desertion of General Pacheco and the resulting poor morale and confusion among the troops. There was significant concern expressed regarding the size and strength of Urquiza's army prior to the Battle of Caseros, and that General Lucio Norberto Mansilla, Rosas's brother-in-law and a key commander, was involved in these discussions.
General Ángel Pacheco, the intended commander-in-chief, had serious doubts about their forces' readiness and the strategic situation. He repeatedly expressed his concerns to Rosas and ultimately resigned, which was a critical blow to Rosas's command structure. General Mansilla was aware of the shortcomings and part of the communication loop. He commanded forces (infantry and artillery) defending the Paraná River line under Pacheco's overall command. When Pacheco ordered a general withdrawal to a defensive line closer to Buenos Aires, the aim was to consolidate forces and allow time for more troops to arrive.
Rosas's reply to Mansilla's concerns * and suggestions for positioning was that he would "consult with Pacheco," indicating an ongoing discussion about the military reality facing an army of what was reported as 20,000-28,000 strong allied forces.
While Pacheco was the primary figure who effectively refused command due to the dire situation, Mansilla was also involved in the strategic discussions that highlighted the numerical and logistical disadvantages of Rosas's position. The consensus among the professional generals was that facing the allied army in a pitched battle at that moment was a severe risk.
Colonel Martín Chilavert was another key figure who identified the critical logistical and strategic disadvantages of the position chosen by Rosas and tried to caution him, only to be ignored.
Chilavert was a highly respected artillery officer and a Unitarian (ironically, like Colonel Pedro Diaz and others, fighting for the Federalist Rosas at this stage due to the foreign invasion component of the allied army). He was tasked with commanding the main artillery park at the chosen battle site.
* Juan Manuel de Rosas was not a career, academically trained general or a strategist in the European sense. His military background was rooted in the realities of the Argentine pampas: leading militias, fighting civil wars with irregular forces, managing a cavalry-centric army, and campaigning against indigenous populations. This required excellent horsemanship, toughness, political acumen, and a deep understanding of local logistics, but not formal grand strategy.
He had a profound understanding of the Argentine pampas economy and society, which was the source of his political and military power. He was a capable administrator of his vast lands before entering politics. His isolation was likely more political than physical—he chose to surround himself with loyalists rather than necessarily the most qualified strategists, which ultimately prevented him from heeding the warnings of trained officers like Pacheco, Chilavert, and Mansilla when faced with a conventional, modern army at Caseros. His reliance on his own intuition, derived from an earlier style of warfare, proved fatal in that specific battle.
His pride was evident in his autocratic rule, his refusal to share power, and his insistence on the universal display of the Federalist red. Militarily, this pride likely prevented him from accepting the advice of his generals (Pacheco, Chilavert) to delay or reposition his army. He would not admit weakness or cede strategic control, believing his personal authority and determination were enough to secure victory.Rosas was "proud and suspicious" are two traits that perfectly align with historical descriptions of Juan Manuel de Rosas's personality. These characteristics are often cited as major factors in his political longevity and his eventual isolation and downfall.
Generals (List of 1840)
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Agustin de Pinedo
Angel Pacheco Tomas Guido Lucio Mansilla Juan Pablo Lopez Manuel Lopez Jose Gregorio Calderon Nasario Benavidez Prudencio Rozas |
Mariano B. Rolon
Felipe Heredia Pablo Aleman Celestino Vidal Jose Ruiz Huidobro Gervasio Espinosa Manuel Corbalan Justo Jose de Urquiza Gregorio Paez |
General Servando Gomez Ca 1795 - 1865
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General Manuel de la Trinidad Corvalan 1774 - 1847
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General Pablo Aleman 1791 - 1845.
Colonels (List of 1840)
Cavalry Colonel Hilario Lagos (Father) 1806 - 1860.
Infantry Colonel Pedro Jose Diaz 1800 - 1857.
Coronel Pedro Diaz according to the AI.
\Interesting detail on Colonel Diaz's (Infantry) collar. It seems have a Voltigeur light infantry badge (Bugle horn and flaming grenade on the left, and a huge grenade on the right side) on his 1812 pattern jacket. The Voltigeurs were skirmish skirmisher units created in 1804 by Emperator Napoleon I.
\Interesting detail on Colonel Diaz's (Infantry) collar. It seems have a Voltigeur light infantry badge (Bugle horn and flaming grenade on the left, and a huge grenade on the right side) on his 1812 pattern jacket. The Voltigeurs were skirmish skirmisher units created in 1804 by Emperator Napoleon I.
Above left: Colonel Juan Isidro Quesada. On the right the photo of his Argentine Confederation Colonel epaulettes, pocket multi barrel flintlock pistol, medal, and cordon of honor. Photo from the book "Memorias del Coronel Juan Isidro Quesada" 1902.
Left: Original 1821 pattern Order of Merit (Sol of Peru), belonging to Colonel Quesada (Independence War Veteran). Right Colonel Branden Order of Merit.
Above left the uniform of an aide-de-camp (Colonel Pedro Ramos) of the Argentine Confederation. On the right, Colonel Pedro Ramos. Photo Revisionistas.
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Above, the Governor's residence and Government House painting by Mariano Fortuny and the Edecans uniform.
On the right, a painting of Colonel Joaquin Ramiro with the Government Edecan uniform. Photo from Revisionistas Web. |
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Colonels Jeronimo Costa (Infantry); Hilario Lagos (Cavalry); Martiniano Chilavert (Artillery).
Martiniano Chilavert's drawing bears the signature of the artist (Decaux), probably Ernest Decaux and Cia. Below the portrait of Lagos and Chilavert are their respective signatures, which presumably were made by hand by the colonels. The images were published in Caras y Caretas.
The firm "Decaux" refers to Ernest Decaux, a prominent French engraver and lithographer whose work was widely circulated in the Río de la Plata region during the 1840s and 50s.
Martiniano Chilavert's drawing bears the signature of the artist (Decaux), probably Ernest Decaux and Cia. Below the portrait of Lagos and Chilavert are their respective signatures, which presumably were made by hand by the colonels. The images were published in Caras y Caretas.
The firm "Decaux" refers to Ernest Decaux, a prominent French engraver and lithographer whose work was widely circulated in the Río de la Plata region during the 1840s and 50s.
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Agustin Rabelo
Pedro Ramos Ramon Rodriguez Juan Correa Morales Gregorio Castro Bonifacio Ramos Juan Antonio Garreton Lorenzo Rojo Juan Jose Hernandez Segundo Roca Juan P. Luna Francisco Crespo Hilario Lagos Francisco Erezcano Evaristo Uriburu Joaquin Maria Ramiro Nicolas Martinez Fontez Casto Caceres Antonio Toll Pantaleon Argañaraz Andres Segui Jose Montes de Oca Nicolas Granada |
Bernardo Gonzalez
Narciso del Valle Antonio Ramirez Vicente Gonzalez Ventura Miñana Juan Aguilera Martiniano Rodriguez Pedro Burgos Jose Ildefonso Alvarez Arenales Francisco Quevedo Mariano Maza Manuel de la Barcena Jose Maria Pinedo Isidoro Quesada Eugenio Hernandez Juan Valerio Sanchez Martin Hidalgo Juan Garay Jorge Velazco Felipe Santiago Videla Santiago Villamayor Facundo Borda |
Jose Rufino de Zado
Cayetano Laprida Fabian Rosas Roque Cepeda Joaquin Hidalgo Julian Vega Manuel del Carmen Garcia Jose Maria Flores Matias Garcia Ramon Quevedo Andres Parra Jose Santos Ramirez Ciriaco Cuitiño Bernardo Echeverria Julian Salomon Bruno Ponce de Leon Ramon Mendez Juan Pablo Sosa Manuel Delgado Bernardino Vera Estanislao Recabarren Hilario Ortiz |
Colonel Martin Santa Coloma.
Lieutenant colonels (List of 1840)
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Geronimo Costa
Ramon Bustos Jose Corbalan Pedro Lorca Martin Santa Coloma Juan B. Navarrete Juan Zeballos Antonio Giles Jose Arias Acosta Eugenio Barrios Jose Ignacio Burgos Celestino Vazquez Benjamin Mendez Manuel Maestre Francisco Moreno Marcos Paz Felix Meneses Salvador Maria Gonzalez |
Justo Oliva
Mariano Espinosa Manuel Vorto Manuel Brizuela Angel Rivas Rafael Masias Lucas Llanos Jose Pons Antonio Espinosa Jose Tomas Beruti Agustin Vidal Rafael M. Fuentes Juan Osorio Santiago Baldeon Pedro Jose Dominguez Carlos Bownes Angel Rolon Miguel del Rio Juan Mendez Felix Ponce |
Luis Maria Salguero
Juan Ramon Urien Benito Millan Fernando Visillac Julian Ciriaco Sosa Jose Zereso Baldomero Lamela Jose Ramon Islas Manuel Capdevila Manuel Seiva Francisco Morell Luis Palavecino Mariano Figueredo Juan Francisco Diaz Francisco Moyano Pedro Juan Obredo Patricio Lima |
Source: "Vindicacion y memorias" by Antonino Reyes, Volume 1; Gaceta Mercantil 1840.
General Agustín de Pinedo (1784-1852). Photo found on Wikipedia. This general was in command of the defense of the right wing of the Argentine Confederation during the battle of Caseros. He dies during withdrawal from a heart attack. Some sources cite that it was a result of sunstroke.
Following the death of General Mariano Benito Rolón in February 1849, Agustín de Pinedo, who was already a trusted General and Rosas' Minister of War and Marine took formal command of the Batallón Guardia Argentina. This veteran infantry may have been one of three infantry battalions in the Palomar on February 3, 1852.
Following the death of General Mariano Benito Rolón in February 1849, Agustín de Pinedo, who was already a trusted General and Rosas' Minister of War and Marine took formal command of the Batallón Guardia Argentina. This veteran infantry may have been one of three infantry battalions in the Palomar on February 3, 1852.
Colonel Nicolas Granada.
Colonel Jose Prudencio Brown Arnold.
Colonel Ramon Rodriguez. Commander of the Patricios Infantry during the Obligado Battle. Photo: Revisionistas
Colonel Jose Tomas Beruti
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Colonel (Infantry) Don Juan Jose Hernandez
(December 1798 - Febraury 1852) |
Colonel Julian Ciriaco Sosa 1801 - 1872. Of course it is not Ciriaco Sosa, but this cuirassier is a symbol of the cavalry that he commanded. The work is probably by Carlos Morel. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Baldomero Lamela 1805 - 1867. Photo revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Jose Maria Cortina 1794 - 1869. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Mariano Maza 1808 - 1879. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Cayetano Laprida 1804 - 1868.
He fought in Caseros on the Rosas side (Being a Cavalry Colonel since 1840). After the defeat, he joined the new army of Buenos Aires. He supported the September revolution against Urquiza. But it went back to the Federal side with the Revolution of Colonel Hilario Lagos and Jerónimo Costa. He participated in the battle of Pavón. When he surrounded the last redoubt of the cavalry of Buenos Aires that was still resisting, He learned that Urquiza, despite having won at Pavón, ordered the retreat, transforming a partial victory of the Argentine Confederation into a total defeat, one of the great mysteries of Argentine history.
Buenos Aires took advantage of Urquiza's retreat and advanced to Rosario where they were joined by the Uruguayan general Venancio Flores. During the battle of Cañada de Gómez, Venancio Flores commits a massacre against the prisoners. Laprida, already a General, had been left for dead due to serious wounds, but he managed to recover and escape from the place. He recovered from his wounds, as a prisoner in Rosario, later released, he did not return to military life.
He fought in Caseros on the Rosas side (Being a Cavalry Colonel since 1840). After the defeat, he joined the new army of Buenos Aires. He supported the September revolution against Urquiza. But it went back to the Federal side with the Revolution of Colonel Hilario Lagos and Jerónimo Costa. He participated in the battle of Pavón. When he surrounded the last redoubt of the cavalry of Buenos Aires that was still resisting, He learned that Urquiza, despite having won at Pavón, ordered the retreat, transforming a partial victory of the Argentine Confederation into a total defeat, one of the great mysteries of Argentine history.
Buenos Aires took advantage of Urquiza's retreat and advanced to Rosario where they were joined by the Uruguayan general Venancio Flores. During the battle of Cañada de Gómez, Venancio Flores commits a massacre against the prisoners. Laprida, already a General, had been left for dead due to serious wounds, but he managed to recover and escape from the place. He recovered from his wounds, as a prisoner in Rosario, later released, he did not return to military life.
Colonel Jose Evaristo Uriburu 1796 - 1885
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Colonel Juan Antonio Garreton 1794 - 1867. Officer of the Estado Mayor de Plazas (État Major des Places / General Staff of Places). Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Jose Ildenfonso Alvarez de Arenales 1798 - 1862. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Coronel Juan Valerio Sanchez 1795 - 1865. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Jorge Velazco 1792 - 1874. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Jose Maria Flores 1807 - 1856.
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Colonel Juan Correa Morales 1794 - 1842. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Jose Segundo Roca 1800 - 1866.
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Colonel Jose Montes de Oca 1792 - 1852. Photo: revisionistas.com.ar
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Colonel Narciso del Valle 1794 - 1849. Photo geni.com
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The capture shows the detail of an interesting red oval badge on the lapels of the uniforms of Admiral Brown and the Edecan Coronel del Valle.
French type bandolier. Lion head and grenade. Detail of the uniforms of Colonels Jose Montes de Oca and Juan Valerio Sanchez.
Colonel Pedro Jose Diaz 1800 - 1857
Diplomacy in the era of Juan Manuel de Rosas
Not exactly Putin's Lavrov, but Felipe Arana served as Rosas's Minister of Foreign Affairs for 17 years (1835–1852).
His tenure is primarily marked by his role as the legal and diplomatic architect of treaties that ended major European interventions in the Río de la Plata.
Arana’s most significant achievements involve negotiating the end of long-standing naval blockades by European powers:
The Mackau-Arana Treaty (1840):
This agreement successfully ended the two-year French blockade of the Río de la Plata. It is often viewed as a victory for the Federalist cause, as France withdrew without achieving its primary goals of weakening Rosas.
The Arana-Southern Treaty (1849):
Formally known as the Convention of Settlement, this treaty ended the Anglo-French blockade. It was a landmark for Argentine sovereignty, as Great Britain formally recognized the Paraná River as an internal river subject to Argentine regulation.
The Arana-Le Prédour Treaty (1850):
Shortly after the British treaty, Arana negotiated this final settlement with France to fully restore diplomatic and commercial relations.
Historians often debate the long term impact of the Arana-Southern Treaty. By signing a "full peace treaty" that did not explicitly mention the Falkland Islands, some argue Arana and Rosas effectively sacrificed Argentina's claim to the islands in exchange for re-establishing "perfect friendship" with Britain.
After Caseros:
Unlike many high-ranking Federalists who went into exile in Europe or neighboring countries, Arana remained in Buenos Aires. He completely withdrew from politics and diplomacy, retiring to his private residence. Because he was viewed more as a legal technician and "professional" minister rather than a "caudillo" or a perpetrator of political violence, he was largely left alone by the new Unitarian-led government.
His tenure is primarily marked by his role as the legal and diplomatic architect of treaties that ended major European interventions in the Río de la Plata.
Arana’s most significant achievements involve negotiating the end of long-standing naval blockades by European powers:
The Mackau-Arana Treaty (1840):
This agreement successfully ended the two-year French blockade of the Río de la Plata. It is often viewed as a victory for the Federalist cause, as France withdrew without achieving its primary goals of weakening Rosas.
The Arana-Southern Treaty (1849):
Formally known as the Convention of Settlement, this treaty ended the Anglo-French blockade. It was a landmark for Argentine sovereignty, as Great Britain formally recognized the Paraná River as an internal river subject to Argentine regulation.
The Arana-Le Prédour Treaty (1850):
Shortly after the British treaty, Arana negotiated this final settlement with France to fully restore diplomatic and commercial relations.
Historians often debate the long term impact of the Arana-Southern Treaty. By signing a "full peace treaty" that did not explicitly mention the Falkland Islands, some argue Arana and Rosas effectively sacrificed Argentina's claim to the islands in exchange for re-establishing "perfect friendship" with Britain.
After Caseros:
Unlike many high-ranking Federalists who went into exile in Europe or neighboring countries, Arana remained in Buenos Aires. He completely withdrew from politics and diplomacy, retiring to his private residence. Because he was viewed more as a legal technician and "professional" minister rather than a "caudillo" or a perpetrator of political violence, he was largely left alone by the new Unitarian-led government.
This is an authentic short cavalry jacket of the Argentine Confederation (Saavedra Museum). Many thanks to Adrian Rodriguez Yemha for sharing with us.
Infantry Units:Cazadores del Rio de la Plata.
Left: Officers of the Guardia Argentina and The Rio de La Plata by Joseph Fontenau. "Los Cuerpos Militares en la Historia Argentina". |
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The mannequin is dressed like an infantry soldier in a campaign uniform (Circa 1840), with equipment and webbing.
On the right, an original Argentine-Confederation Shako, possibly in some Montevideo Museum or Collection; Note the wavy gallon,which probably came from the bicorn pattern for Superior Officers. Photos: Kalipedia.com
1840. 2th "Patricios Battalion". Right: Line Infantry. "Los Cuerpos Militares en la Historia Argentina" by Julio Mario Luqui-Lagleyze.
Artist: Louis Fonteneau. They are valuable drawings of the period.
This painting, titled Un Mazorquero, was painted by the Uruguayan artist Juan Manuel Blanes (1830–1901). While the term "Mazorquero" is often used broadly in art catalogs to describe any soldier from the Rosas era wearing the full red ensemble, the visual evidence show a classic portrayal of an infantryman on sentinel duty within a military camp.
Cavalry Units:Escort Governor. Escolta del Gobernador.
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6th Regiment Cuirassier by Beufort. "Los Cuerpos Militares en la Historia Argentina".
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Coraceros, Cuirassiers Lithography by Juan Carlos Morel.
Artillery Units:
Batallon de Artilleria de Buenos Aires.
Compania de Artilleria de Buenos Aires.
Spanish 4"; 6"; 8" Field Gun. French/Spanish 12" Field Gun (Gribeouval System). Right: British 5.5" Howitzer.
During the early 19th century (1800–1852), Argentine artillery primarily consisted of traditional smoothbore, muzzle-loading cannons and howitzers. These weapons were largely inherited from the Spanish colonial period and supplemented by acquisitions from major European powers, particularly Great Britain.
The standard Spanish calibers were:
4-pounder guns (approx. 3.2 inches or 81mm caliber).
8-pounder guns (approx. 4 inches or 100mm caliber).
12-pounder guns (approx. 4.7 inches or 120mm caliber).
Spain also used a 7-pulgada (Spanish inches, roughly 6.4 inches or 163mm) howitzer.
This rounded munition sizes correspond to these standard artillery pieces in the Spanish arsenal: the 4-inch (8-pounder) gun, and possibly the 6.4-inch howitzer or a heavier 8-inch siege howitzer. These were the types of guns found in the arsenals of Buenos Aires and used during the Rosas era.
Rosas's army commanded by General Pacheco and Colonel Chilavert was equipped with around 60 traditional artillery pieces (cannons and howitzers). Their final stand was an artillery duel using these conventional guns, which were ultimately overwhelmed by the opposing fire. There are no reliable accounts of Rosas's troops deploying or firing rockets during the battle.
During the early 19th century (1800–1852), Argentine artillery primarily consisted of traditional smoothbore, muzzle-loading cannons and howitzers. These weapons were largely inherited from the Spanish colonial period and supplemented by acquisitions from major European powers, particularly Great Britain.
The standard Spanish calibers were:
4-pounder guns (approx. 3.2 inches or 81mm caliber).
8-pounder guns (approx. 4 inches or 100mm caliber).
12-pounder guns (approx. 4.7 inches or 120mm caliber).
Spain also used a 7-pulgada (Spanish inches, roughly 6.4 inches or 163mm) howitzer.
This rounded munition sizes correspond to these standard artillery pieces in the Spanish arsenal: the 4-inch (8-pounder) gun, and possibly the 6.4-inch howitzer or a heavier 8-inch siege howitzer. These were the types of guns found in the arsenals of Buenos Aires and used during the Rosas era.
Rosas's army commanded by General Pacheco and Colonel Chilavert was equipped with around 60 traditional artillery pieces (cannons and howitzers). Their final stand was an artillery duel using these conventional guns, which were ultimately overwhelmed by the opposing fire. There are no reliable accounts of Rosas's troops deploying or firing rockets during the battle.
Guardia Argentina Battalion Fusiliers (Fusileros), Riflemen (Cazadores). Artillery company congreve rocket launcher and wagon of that time.
The Congreve rocket launcher was not a single, standardized piece of heavy machinery like a modern artillery piece, but rather a simple, portable apparatus for directing and firing unguided rockets. The system was developed by Sir William Congreve in the early 19th century based on Indian war rockets and was used extensively by the British in the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812.
The key components and function of the launcher were:
Launch Platforms: The rockets could be launched from a variety of simple platforms, often chosen for mobility and ease of deployment.
Ground-based frames: These were typically collapsible, A-frame ladders or tripod stands made of metal or wood that held a metal trough or guiding rod. The angle of the frame was adjusted to determine the rocket's range.
Wheeled launchers: Wheeled carts capable of launching multiple rockets (five to ten simultaneously) were also used for field operations.
Naval launchers: For use at sea, rockets were often fired from ships' rails or through special portholes (scuttles) in the ship's side, often without a formal frame other than a guide tube.
Firing Mechanism: A flintlock mechanism, triggered by pulling a long cord, would ignite two fuses: one for the main propellant in the rocket's iron case and another for the warhead, timed to explode at the correct moment.
Operation: The rockets, which had a long wooden guide stick for stabilization (later replaced by a center-mounted stick), were placed in or on the guiding trough or rod. Once ignited, the rocket would sputter and then "dart forth" in the general direction of the target. Due to their inherent inaccuracy, they were typically used for area bombardment to create fires or psychological terror rather than precision strikes.
The launchers were valued for their portability, high rate of fire, and the ability to be used where heavy conventional artillery could not be easily transported. The famous "rockets' red glare" from the U.S. national anthem refers to the use of Congreve rockets launched during the British bombardment of Fort McHenry in 1814. The system remained in use until the 1850s, when it was largely superseded by more accurate spin-stabilized rockets, like the Hale rocket, and advances in rifled artillery.
The presence of a dedicated "1° Roving Artillery Regiment and Congreve Rocket Battery" is noted within the composition of Urquiza's allied forces, indicating they had the specific equipment and personnel for this weapon system.
Prior to his rebellion, General Urquiza commanded an army that had been under Rosas' command, so this system was on both sides during the battle.
The key components and function of the launcher were:
Launch Platforms: The rockets could be launched from a variety of simple platforms, often chosen for mobility and ease of deployment.
Ground-based frames: These were typically collapsible, A-frame ladders or tripod stands made of metal or wood that held a metal trough or guiding rod. The angle of the frame was adjusted to determine the rocket's range.
Wheeled launchers: Wheeled carts capable of launching multiple rockets (five to ten simultaneously) were also used for field operations.
Naval launchers: For use at sea, rockets were often fired from ships' rails or through special portholes (scuttles) in the ship's side, often without a formal frame other than a guide tube.
Firing Mechanism: A flintlock mechanism, triggered by pulling a long cord, would ignite two fuses: one for the main propellant in the rocket's iron case and another for the warhead, timed to explode at the correct moment.
Operation: The rockets, which had a long wooden guide stick for stabilization (later replaced by a center-mounted stick), were placed in or on the guiding trough or rod. Once ignited, the rocket would sputter and then "dart forth" in the general direction of the target. Due to their inherent inaccuracy, they were typically used for area bombardment to create fires or psychological terror rather than precision strikes.
The launchers were valued for their portability, high rate of fire, and the ability to be used where heavy conventional artillery could not be easily transported. The famous "rockets' red glare" from the U.S. national anthem refers to the use of Congreve rockets launched during the British bombardment of Fort McHenry in 1814. The system remained in use until the 1850s, when it was largely superseded by more accurate spin-stabilized rockets, like the Hale rocket, and advances in rifled artillery.
The presence of a dedicated "1° Roving Artillery Regiment and Congreve Rocket Battery" is noted within the composition of Urquiza's allied forces, indicating they had the specific equipment and personnel for this weapon system.
Prior to his rebellion, General Urquiza commanded an army that had been under Rosas' command, so this system was on both sides during the battle.
Left" Artillery Batallon Officers and Regimental Drum. Right: Line Infantry Soldier. Brigadier Cornelio Saavedra Museum. Los Cuerpos Militares en la Historia Argentina".
Here is the work of Descalzi (Battle of Arroyo Grande 1842), (Unknown artist. Painting at Saavedra Museum in Buenos Aires) and Manuel Blanes: Battle of Caseros, made at the request of Urquiza for his residence. These works are period, so presumably the details on the uniforms are accurate. The Infantry offcier In the Battle of Arroyo Grande, and artillery officers in 1840 and in the Blanes painting of the Battle of Caseros in 1852, blue jackets with red lapels and bicornes are seen in battles.
Police Corps:
Juan Moreno. He was Chief of the Federal Police of Buenos Aires between 1845 and 1852. He was born in the Banda Oriental. Next to it is an old police plate with the symbol of the Gaullic rooster from his time.
Collectibles:
In the photo, a pair of boleadoras which was an arm used militarily (among other uses) to down enemy horses. In the above photo you see an officer and his assistant in retreat being pursued by the advancing enemy. Note the use of the boleadoras and how the officer tries to neutralize them with the base of the lance so that they don't make it to the horse's legs. The ones I have are made from etched rocks, but some were made more elaborately of metal.
Gaucho Knife (Facon).
Argentine Gaucho Spurs.It is a typical element of Argentine folklore. By the middle of the 19th century, the gauchos nicknamed them "Nazarenas" because of their resemblance to the crown of Christ, and also "Lloronas" (cry babies) for the noise they made.
Gaucho belt and buckle (Cinto y rastra). This gaucho belt is authentic and original Federal party one. It was found in England and is adorned with coins from the 19th century, after 1852. The buckle is made of brass, with the shield of the Argentine Confederation.
Memorabilia:
Documents:
Paints, Daguerreotype, Photos, Lithographs:
Colonel Reyes, (Edecan). J.M Rosas and Manuelita Rosas.
Rosas grave. Old Cemetery Southampton Hampshire, England
During the time of Rosas there were countless European artists who, affected by the appearance of the daguerreotype, sought to continue their careers in Latin America. Unfortunately for them, the Daguerreotype traveled and landed with them.
The arrival of the daguerreotype in the Río de la Plata (around 1843) created a fascinating technological clash. Many European painters, like Raymond Quinsac Monvoisin, Jacobo Lorenzo Fiorini or Carlos Pellegrini, found themselves competing with this "magic box" that could capture a perfect likeness in minutes.
In fact, the Rosas era is one of the first in South American history where we can compare the idealized oil portraits of leaders with their actual "photographic" faces.
The arrival of the daguerreotype in the Río de la Plata (around 1843) created a fascinating technological clash. Many European painters, like Raymond Quinsac Monvoisin, Jacobo Lorenzo Fiorini or Carlos Pellegrini, found themselves competing with this "magic box" that could capture a perfect likeness in minutes.
In fact, the Rosas era is one of the first in South American history where we can compare the idealized oil portraits of leaders with their actual "photographic" faces.
This painting represents the execution of Camila O'Gorman, one of the most controversial events of the "Era of Juan Manuel de Rosas. The painting itself provides the strongest clue to his origin. On the bottom right of the canvas, it is signed "F. Augero" (Francesco Augero) and dated "Turin 1858". This indicates he was either Italian or had returned to Turin, Italy, to complete the work after his time in South America. The painting is from 1858, made by a painter who was at the time in the Río de la Plata, and perfectly describes the uniforms of officers and troops of the Argentine Confederation.
Then-Captain Mariano Rubio was indeed identified as the officer in command of the firing squad at the Santos Lugares de Rosas camp in 1848. Historical lore often emphasizes the grim nature of his duty that day.
Just days before the decisive Battle of Caseros, on January 31, 1852, a preliminary combat took place at Campos de Álvarez. During this skirmish, the now Major Mariano Rubio was killed in action while fighting for the forces of Juan Manuel de Rosas against the advance of Urquiza's "Ejército Grande."
Francesco Agüero's ability to capture that collective internal conflict is precisely what makes La ejecución de Camila O'Gorman (1858) a masterpiece of 19th-century political art. By choosing to paint the moments before the shots were fired, Agüero creates a psychological tension that forces the viewer to look at the faces of the executioners:
The Officer is often depicted with a stiff, almost rigid posture. His face reflects the "burden of duty" a conflict between his personal morality and the absolute, unyielding order of Rosas. His downward gaze or stern focus often symbolizes the emotional weight of leading the squad against a pregnant woman. If you look closely at the firing squad, their faces are not those of eager executioners. Agüero uses subtle shadows and lowered brows to suggest a sense of somber resignation.
Regarding the uniforms, the officer is seen wearing straight pants and the troop with a chiripa. By this time, straight trousers (Pantalones rectos con barras) were beginning to be worn at the battalion level in some units, so the chiripa would not have lasted much longer. The sleeved cap or forage cap (Gorro de manga) that had been in use since before the Napoleonic wars, was at that time co-existing with the pastel cap, with or without a visor that would undoubtedly have been the standard cap (the same as the straight pants), if the army of the Argentine Confederation based in Buenos Aires would have survived the battle of Caseros.
Just days before the decisive Battle of Caseros, on January 31, 1852, a preliminary combat took place at Campos de Álvarez. During this skirmish, the now Major Mariano Rubio was killed in action while fighting for the forces of Juan Manuel de Rosas against the advance of Urquiza's "Ejército Grande."
Francesco Agüero's ability to capture that collective internal conflict is precisely what makes La ejecución de Camila O'Gorman (1858) a masterpiece of 19th-century political art. By choosing to paint the moments before the shots were fired, Agüero creates a psychological tension that forces the viewer to look at the faces of the executioners:
The Officer is often depicted with a stiff, almost rigid posture. His face reflects the "burden of duty" a conflict between his personal morality and the absolute, unyielding order of Rosas. His downward gaze or stern focus often symbolizes the emotional weight of leading the squad against a pregnant woman. If you look closely at the firing squad, their faces are not those of eager executioners. Agüero uses subtle shadows and lowered brows to suggest a sense of somber resignation.
Regarding the uniforms, the officer is seen wearing straight pants and the troop with a chiripa. By this time, straight trousers (Pantalones rectos con barras) were beginning to be worn at the battalion level in some units, so the chiripa would not have lasted much longer. The sleeved cap or forage cap (Gorro de manga) that had been in use since before the Napoleonic wars, was at that time co-existing with the pastel cap, with or without a visor that would undoubtedly have been the standard cap (the same as the straight pants), if the army of the Argentine Confederation based in Buenos Aires would have survived the battle of Caseros.
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