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February 3, 1852. Battle of Caseros:

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​Brazilian Imperial Army marching over Buenos Aires after winning the Platine War. The Brazilian troops were under the command of the Duke of Caxias (Marshal Luis Alves de Lima y Silva).
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​This painting (Fortuny), depicts the Brazilian Imperial Army marching through Buenos Aires on February 20, 1852, following their victory in the Platine War. The event followed the decisive Battle of Caseros, where an alliance including the Empire of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentine rebels defeated the forces of Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas. 

The bearded officer riding the central horse is the Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Luís Osório., the commander of the 2nd Brazilian Cavalry Regiment during this campaign. The troops are seen carrying the green and yellow flag of the Empire of Brazil.
This victory established Brazilian hegemony in the Platine region for a time and led to the eventual unification of Argentina under a national constitution.

Depending on which side of the border you’re on, this battle transcends the borders of what is now Argentina . Because this conflict involved a complex "Grand Army" alliance (Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentine rebels), each nation frames it through its own specific national goals:

 In Argentina: It is primarily known as the Battle of Caseros or the "Pronunciamiento de Urquiza." For Argentines, the focus is internal: it was the civil struggle to overthrow the "tyrant" Juan Manuel de Rosas and finally move toward a Constitutional Organization (the 1853 Constitution).

In Brazil: It is called the Platine War (Guerra do Prata). The Brazilian perspective focuses on geopolitics ensuring the Rio de la Plata remained open to navigation and maintaining their regional influence by removing a hostile neighbor (Rosas).
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 In Uruguay: It is often tied to the "Guerra Grande" (Great War). For Uruguayans, the fall of Rosas meant the end of the Great Siege of Montevideo, which had lasted nine years. It represented the final securing of their Independence and sovereignty against Argentine interference.

While traditional narratives often simplify Caseros as a clash between Unitarians and Federalists, the reality was a complex geopolitical conflict that indeed functioned as a direct "second round" of the Cisplatine War (1825–1828).
"Unitarian" and "Federalist" break down at Caseros. The Grand Army (Ejército Grande) led by Urquiza (a prominent Federalist) was a coalition that included:

Federalists who were tired of Rosas' centralization of power in Buenos Aires. the Uruguayan presence at the Battle of Caseros was largely made up of troops who had previously served under Manuel Oribe.
Unitarians who had returned from exile.
Foreign Powers (the Empire of Brazil).

On the other side, Rosas' forces also contained men from across the political spectrum, including former opponents like Martiniano Chilavert, who chose to defend Rosas specifically because he viewed the Brazilian-led intervention as a foreign invasion of Argentine soil.

The 1828 treaty that ended the Cisplatine War created Uruguay as a "buffer state" but failed to settle who would ultimately control the River Plate basin. Both Brazil and the government in Buenos Aires (under Rosas) continued to fight for hegemony over the region for decades.
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Beyond the inexactness, especially the details around the Cabildo, it is true that the Brazilian Imperial Army paraded triumphantly in Buenos Aires. During the Platine War victory parade on February 20, 1852, the Imperial Brazilian Army reclaimed several military trophies that had been captured by Argentine forces 25 years earlier at the Battle of Ituzaingó (1827) during the Cisplatine War. 

Following the Battle of Ituzaingó in 1827, the captured Brazilian flags were famously displayed as trophies inside the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Cathedral. During the 1852 parade through the city center, Brazilian troops made a point of recovering these specific banners to restore their national honor. 

The parade was intentionally held on February 20, 1852, which was the 25th anniversary of that very defeat at Ituzaingó. By marching through the capital and reclaiming their flags on that specific date, the Brazilian Empire sought to "erase" the previous stain on their military history.
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Barroso, Gustavo. Uniformes do exército brasileiro: obra commemorativa do centenario da independencia do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro/Paris : [Ministério da Guerra], 1922. (produced and published by request of the Brazilian ministry of army, p.3)
AuthorJosé Wasth Rodrigues (1891–1957). Wikipedia.
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This is the version of Urquiza's triumphant entry into Buenos Aires. Urquiza was acutely aware that parading side-by-side with Brazilian soldiers would look like a national surrender to his critics. According to various historical interpretations. 

The Battle of Campos de Alvarez and the Emergency War Council.

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The Battle of Campos de Álvarez was a battle of the Platine War where troops of the Argentine Confederation led by Hilario Lagos, faced troops of the so-called Ejército Grande, led by Juan Pablo López and Miguel Galarza

The battle occurred after the capture of Confederate positions on the Paraná River , which facilitated the landing of troops from the Ejército Grande (Great Army), who were embarked on ships of the Brazilian Imperial Navy, led by Admiral John Pascoe Grenfell . Lagos intended to meet his troops with General Ángel Pacheco 's army , however, Pacheco was not at the location.

This battle, although small, was quite important for the Allied advance, as it was one of the battles responsible for directing the troops led by Urquiza to Monte Caseros, where the Battle of Monte Caseros , the largest and most important battle of the war, would take place
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The image is a historical illustration of an Officer of the "Escolta Libertad" Cuirassiers (Coraceros Escolta Libertad), the personal bodyguard of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Colonel Hilario Lagos did command his own specialized units of cuirassiers and lancers during both, in Campos de Alvarez and Caseros.
The passage accurately reflects the tactical predicament of Juan Manuel de Rosas on the eve of the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852. Historically, Rosas's military leadership was criticized as lethargic and micromanaging; his top commander, Angel Pacheco, had even resigned due to Rosas’s interference.

On January 31, 1852, just three days before the main battle, Lagos commanded the federal vanguard. He engaged the advancing cavalry of the Grand Army (under Colonels Galarza and López) at Campos de Álvarez, south of the Luján River. 
Despite a stubborn defense, Lagos was defeated and forced to retreat toward Rosas's main headquarters at Santos Lugares.

Something was not right. 

When Colonel Hilario Lagos reached the Marqués Bridge (Puente de Márquez), he expected to find a reinforced defensive line under General Ángel Pacheco to halt Urquiza’s advance. Instead, he found the position largely abandoned. 
Rosas had explicitly ordered Pacheco to defend the bridge with infantry and artillery to support Lagos’s retreating cavalry. However, Pacheco had already withdrawn his troops toward his estate at El Talar, leaving the crossing virtually uncontested.

When Lagos informed of this, Rosas was reportedly incredulous and irritated, pacing back and forth and muttering that it was impossible for Pacheco to have disobeyed such a direct order. 
Shortly after, on February 1, Pacheco officially resigned his position as General in Chief, forcing Rosas to take personal command of an army he was ill-prepared to lead.

Some chiefs fearfully observed Rosas' plan of combat, motivating the meeting of a council of war that he had not thought of. The modifications were few, because it was no longer possible, militarily, to change the situation of the troops when the enemy, on the morning of February 3, 1852, spread his line of battle on the opposite blades, leaving behind him the stream and the town of Morón.

The participants of the council included:

Of course Rosas, General Pinedo, Colonel Martiniano Chilavert, Colonel Hilario Lagos, Colonel Díaz. The group included Colonels Jerónimo Costa, Sosa, Bustos, Hernández, Cortina, and Maza 

The Plan of Combat and the Council of War

Defensive Strategy. Rosas chose a static defensive position centered on the Palomar de Caseros and the Caseros house. He arranged his line in an obtuse angle along the Arroyo Morón (Morón stream), hoping to force a final encounter in a fortified square. 
Some of his chiefs, including the defected Unitarian Martiniano Chilavert, expressed deep concerns about this plan. Chilavert, known for his military prowess, had previously suggested more aggressive movements to Rosas that were ignored.

The Chilavert-Díaz Proposal

They argued for a defensive line parallel to the Arroyo Morón, specifically anchored between Perdriel's farm and Fiorini's house.This position would have utilized the natural obstacle of the creek more effectively, potentially forcing Urquiza’s Grand Army to cross under heavy fire from Chilavert's superior artillery.
The other colonels, largely influenced by Rosas’s own stubbornness and the chaotic atmosphere following General Pacheco’s desertion, rejected the plan. They favored the obtuse-angled line centered on the Caseros house and the Palomar, which ultimately left the flanks vulnerable.

By the morning of February 3, any modifications were largely futile because the Ejército Grande (Grand Army), led by Justo José de Urquiza, had already crossed the Morón creek and deployed its superior numbers across the opposite slopes. 

The council of war was held at Santos Lugares de Morón, which served as the military headquarters of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Located northwest of the city of Buenos Aires (in the present-day town of San Martin), this site was the nerve center where Rosas planned his final defense. On the night of February 1, 1852, following the defeat of his vanguard at the Battle of Alvarez Field, his forces began retreating toward these headquarters to form the new line of defense along the Morón Creek. It was in this tense atmosphere, just days before the Battle of Caseros, that the council met to discuss the tactical modifications.

​Chilavert's Preemptive Strike

As the conflict with the Empire of Brazil intensified in 1851, Martiniano Chilavert indeed urged Juan Manuel de Rosas to abandon his static defensive posture and launch a preemptive offensive. Chilavert, recognized for his exceptional military acumen, believed that Rosas's best chance lay in an aggressive move before the Allied forces composed of Brazil, Uruguay, and Urquiza’s troops could fully consolidate their superior numbers.

In 1851, Chilavert suggested "more aggressive movements" to Rosas that were ultimately ignored. He warned that staying behind the walls of Buenos Aires or waiting in a fixed position would allow the enemy to dictate the terms of the engagement.

During the council of war just before the Battle of Caseros, Chilavert (along with Colonel Pedro Díaz) argued against Rosas's chosen obtuse-angled defensive line.
They proposed anchoring the defense parallel to the Arroyo Morón, utilizing the creek as a natural obstacle that would force the Allies to cross under concentrated, lethal artillery fire. 

Despite Chilavert’s expertise, Rosas maintained a stubborn adherence to his own defensive plan, which Chilavert viewed as a military "nightmare". This decision left the Rosista flanks vulnerable and allowed the Allied "steamroller" of cavalry to eventually overwhelm the position. 
Chilavert’s loyalty remained firm despite these disagreements; he famously declared that he fought for the Confederation because he would never support a foreign-backed invasion of his homeland, regardless of his past political differences with Rosas.

The role of General Ángel Pacheco in the tactical planning for the Battle of Caseros remains a subject of intense historical scrutiny. While it is true that Rosas is often criticized for his lack of strategic military depth compared to his top generals, the relationship between Pacheco's proposed tactics and the final disastrous outcome was because Pacheco favored a more active defense, while Rosas insisted on a static position.

Rosas had ordered Pacheco to defend the Puente de Márquez (Marqués Bridge) with infantry and artillery to support Colonel Hilario Lagos's retreating cavalry. Instead, Pacheco found the orders contradictory and, feeling micromanaged, withdrew his troops toward his estate at El Talar, leaving the crossing virtually undefended. 

Historically, Rosas was viewed more as a shrewd administrator and politician than a military strategist. Without Pacheco's expertise, Rosas personally directed the actions at Caseros. He was criticized for failing to scout the terrain effectively, simply waiting for the Allied forces to come to him at the Monte de Caseros heights.
Other commanders, including Colonel Martiniano Chilavert, had recommended a more flexible strategy, such as retreating to the city of Buenos Aires to overextend Urquiza's logistics, but Rosas insisted on a decisive, static battle that ultimately favored Urquiza's superior numbers. 
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This AI image symbolizes the philosophy of a gaucho such as Juan Manuel de Rosas preparing a military strategy to confront Caseros; A battle where 60 thousand men would participate. The image represents General Pinedo and 9 Colonels* (Martiniano Chilavert, Hilario Lagos, Pedro Díaz, Jerónimo Costa, Julian Ciriaco Sosa, Ramon Bustos, Juan Jose Hernández, Jose Maria Cortina, and Mariano Maza), of the high command of Juan Manuel de Rosas, during the council of war that took place the night before the battle. After the resignation of General Pacheco, the high command of the Army of the Argentine Confederation knew that Rosas was not a military strategist but a leader of militias.

*Tragically five of them would die during and after the battle.. In this battle Colonel Hernandez would die (killed by his own men while trying to prevent them from fleeing), General Pinedo (by a cardiac arrest during the retreat) and Colonel Chilavert executed. Years later, Colonel Costa and Bustos would be executed, (1856 Villamayor Massacre). 
After the battle of Caseros, Colonel Martín Santa Coloma was also executed, although he did not participate the night before the battle in the council of war.

In Adolfo Saldías's Historia de la Confederación Argentina, the resignation of General Ángel Pacheco is a turning point that highlights the military limitations of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Based on testimonies from Antonino Reyes, Saldías illustrates that while Rosas was a master of political administration and militia leadership, he lacked the strategic vision required for large-scale conventional warfare.

Beyond the irony, during the battle Rosas had the opportunity to use the boleadoras:

During the retreat at the Battle of Caseros (February 3, 1852), Rosas observed a soldier attempting to desert the battlefield. He turned to his trumpeter or an adjutant and requested a pair of boleadoras. With a skillful throw, Rosas "boleo" (entangled) the legs of the deserter's horse, bringing both the animal and the rider to the ground.
Saldías highlights this moment to illustrate Rosas's calm and mastery of gaucho skills even in the face of absolute defeat. It is often cited as a testament to his "cold blood" and his identity as the "First Gaucho" of the Republic. 

​In his seminal work Historia de la Confederación Argentina, Adolfo Saldías recounts this anecdote based on the testimony of Antonino Reyes, who served as the aide-de-camp and confidant to Juan Manuel de Rosas

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When the famous General Pacheco resigned the day before the battle, Juan Manuel de Rosas, who was not a career soldier, remained as commander in chief to face an army of more than 20 thousand men, led by strategists such as Urquiza and General Manuel Osorio. Rosas asked Colonel Reyes to be by his side during the battle as aide-de-camp.

The battle front that Colonels Díaz and Chilavert had proposed made more sense than the one chosen by Rosas. Díaz and Chilavert opted for a front that went from the Perdriel farm to Fiorini's house. This front is reduced to 2 kilometers keeping the barracks of Santos Lugares behind it. But Rosas went ahead with his battle plan. 

His decision ended in a stampeding flight of his forces. Four high-ranking Rosas lost their lives. Colonel Hernández died at the hands of his own men, trying to keep them from fleeing; Colonels Santa Coloma and Chilavert were executed, and General Pinedo died of a heart attack during the escape. ​Rosas himself was slightly wounded in battle. 

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The battle of Caseros offers the singular physiological phenomenon of others of its kind: it was won before it took place, and vanquished and victors had this evidence anticipated, from the generals to the last soldier of both armies, as the whole world had. Either way, it would have been won by the allies, and in the conditions in which Rozas presented it, it would have been lost a hundred times". Letter from Bartolomé Mitre to Adolfo Saldías. Buenos Aires, October 15, 1887.​
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​After the battle, Colonel Jerónimo Costa, seeing Rosas safe with his family, (Only with his legitimate children) on the same ship heading for exile, He rebuked Rosas for the defeat and for having abandoned the men who gave their lives for him resisting in the Palomar, (And probably because he did not listen to the warnings of Chilavert and other career soldiers). Jerónimo Costa did not want to share the ship with Rosas, opting to go down and continue the fight for the Federal cause. Costa would die in a Quixotic way, when he tried to create a focus of Federal resistance in 1856, being executed along with a hundred of his men.
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The exchange between General Lucio Norberto Mansilla (Rosas's brother-in-law and the hero of Vuelta de Obligado) and Juan Manuel de Rosas is a well-documented moment that highlights the internal skepticism within the Federal high command before the Battle of Caseros. 
Mansilla, a veteran of the War of Independence and a skilled military strategist, was blunt in his assessment of Rosas's readiness for a large-scale field battle. He pointed out that while Rosas was a master of political control and guerrilla-style skirmishes, he had never commanded a coordinated conventional army of 20,000 men in a pitched battle.

He viewed the attempt to face the Ejército Grande (30,000 men, including professional Brazilian and Uruguayan troops) as a tactical suicide under Rosas's direct leadership.
Mansilla essentially warned Rosas that he was out of his depth. He recognized that the Federal army, though large on paper, lacked the professional unity and the "scientific" military leadership required to stop Urquiza’s coalition. 

Because of this disagreement and his health issues, Mansilla did not take an active command during the battle. His absence, along with that of Ángel Pacheco, left Rosas to command the center left himself exactly the scenario Mansilla had feared. 
History eventually proved Mansilla right. Rosas’s static, frontal strategy was easily dismantled by Urquiza’s more modern and maneuverable forces.
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​These are plans from the military archives of Brazil.
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The commander of the Brazilian 2nd Cavalry Regiment during the Battle of Caseros was then Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Luís Osório. (who would later be named Marquis of Herval and is the current Patron of the Cavalry of the Brazilian Army).
The infantry of the Imperial Army of Brazil in the Battle of Caseros was under the command of Brigadier Manuel Marques de Sousa. Marquis of Sousa, who would later receive the title of Count of Porto Alegre, led the 1st Brazilian Division within the Army Grande apparatus commanded by Justo José de Urquiza.
​The infantry of the Eastern Division in the Battle of Caseros was under the command of Colonel César Díaz.
According to Brazilian plans, the assault on the Palomar and the Caseros house was in order of 5 (3.500 - 4000) attackers for each defender (600 - 800). The comparison of the desperate defense of the forces trapped in this defensive perimeter can be compared to the defense of the Dien Bien-Phu airfield where the wounded had to continue fighting desperately. 

At Dien Bien Phu, Colonel Christian de Castries and his staff remained in the central bunker until the final fall, sharing the fate of their troops (captivity). On the other hand, in Caseros, there was a total break in the chain of command.
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Handmade plan of the Battle of Caseros by Adolfo Saldias with the help of Antonino Reyes. ​Except for small differences, it is the same as that of the Brazilian military archives. 
Fiorini's house with its observation tower is just behind the battle line presented by Rosas. The Brazilian cavalry was facing Chilavert's artillery, while other artillery pieces alternating with infantry battalions, covered the defense of the Palomar. 

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Copy of the original plan of the battle. Document found in the general archives of the Nation. Beyond some topographical differences with the plan of the Brazilians and the one made by Saldías with the help of Antonino Reyes, they also agree. Although it seems unreal, the battle line presented by Rosas follows the route of the current Ferrocarriles line, so the batteries of Colonel Chilavert would have been in what is now the Caseros Station. It is not that Rosas stopped in 1852 on the railroad tracks, to wait for the Allied Army, but that he took the heights of the area to position his forces; Later the construction of the railways also took on those topographical characteristics of the area.
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This map details the position of the trenches and wagon lines where the abandoned troops of different units of the Army of the Argentine Confederation were trapped between Casa de Caseros and the Palomar of that estancia. These troops fought desperately to the last man in an unequal and hand-to-hand fight against the infantry of the empire of Brazil and the Uruguayan troops who took the fortifications. 
​The battle

Unlike his generals who wore full military regalia, Rosas wore a dark levite (a long, buttoned frock coat) that was relatively plain. He maintained the symbolic Federalist red, typically through a red waistcoat (vest) or the mandatory red badge (divisa punzó) that declared "Federation or Death".
To maintain his image as the "first gaucho" and connect with his base, he often paired more formal upper garments with traditional chiripás (a wrap-around garment worn over trousers) and lace-trimmed drawers (calzoncillos con cribas).
Rather than a military shako or bicorn, Rosas was frequently seen on the battlefield wearing a straw hat, which signaled his role as an estanciero (landowner) leader rather than a professional career soldier.
True to his reputation, his horse was outfitted with luxurious but functional silver-mounted gear, including a traditional broad belt (tirador) and elaborate silver spurs.​

On February 3, 1852 Rosas (now without Pacheco ), presented a linear battle order of the frontal type with 3km of front. Rosas' left wing was in what is now the Palomar Railway station. the reason for the name Caseros a la batalla is because of the house and the dovecote that belonged to a landowner named Caseros and that is next to the Station called "The Dovecote Palomar, in what is now the Military College of the Nation. The next station going to the city of Buenos Aires is Caseros, but this was not the geographical center of the battle.

That was the critical tactical error that sealed his fate. By presenting a rigid, frontal line without the strategic maneuvering that someone like Ángel Pacheco (the most capable federal general) could have provided, Rosas left himself wide open.
Pacheco had "retired" to his ranch just before the battle, likely realizing the cause was lost or disagreeing with Rosas's stubbornness. Without him, Rosas who was a great administrator but a mediocre field tactician was in sole command.

Rosas waited for Urquiza to come to him. He anchored his infantry in the buildings (the Caseros House and Palomar) but left his massive cavalry wings in open ground with no clear orders other than to stand their ground.

Urquiza, a master of cavalry warfare, didn't fall for a frontal assault. He used his superior numbers to sweep around the flanks. While the infantry was stuck defending walls and windows in the center-left, Urquiza’s cavalry simply bypassed them, causing the Rosista right wing to panic and dissolve.

Rosas had about 22,000 men, but they were demoralized. Urquiza had nearly 28,000, including professional Brazilian troops. Trying to fight a set piece, frontal battle against a numerically superior and better equipped professional army was a tactical suicide.

Rosas fought a 19th-century "pitched battle" against a modern, coordinated "Grand Army." By the time the first shots were fired, the lack of a flexible strategy meant he was already beaten. Because the Right Wing (South) Lagos’s veteran cavalry arrived at the line of Caseros already defeated and exhausted, they had no "fight" left in them. On February 3, when Urquiza launched his charge toward the Ramos Mejía sector, Lagos's men (positioned on Rosas’s right) broke and fled almost immediately.

This retreat left the center (Chilavert) and the left (Maza at the Palomar) completely exposed. Without the cavalry protecting their flank at Ramos Mejía, the infantry was essentially surrounded before the battle even reached its peak.

"The explanation for this easy victory lies in the fact that Rozas' army was an inert mass, without soul and without head, which had no hope of resisting. It was an immobile line, on the defensive passive, with no possible initiative, tied to a false position such as that of the dovecote of Caseros, which, at any point that was attacked, could not change its defensive plan, so that, this position being isolated, the battle was won. This was what General Urquiza understood at the first glance, when he rushed to undo Rozas's left.

But otherwise the battle would have been won, and perhaps better. The proof of this is that the attack was carried out head-on in the most advantageous conditions for those who defended it, under the fire of sixty well-placed and well-commanded cannons, supported by all its intact infantry. In spite of this, the solid nucleus of Rozas's forces offered almost no resistance, and his defeat only had the honor of being bravely saluted by Chilavert's guns in the two positions he successively occupied, fighting alone with his gunners as he had done in the battle of Arroyo Grande under the banner of liberty. It is pleasing to me to pay this posthumous homage to the memory of my former chief and master of artillery, whose apostasy I shall return in life, and whose death occurs in the presence of the victor of Caseros".

 Letter from Bartolomé Mitre to Adolfo Alsina, October 3, 1857.

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At least 1000 men from the remnants of the Pinedo Division resisted the Brazilian, Entre Rios and Uruguayan forces at this fortified point. After the rapid disbanding of the whole army of the Argentine Confederation, the center under the command of Colonels Chilavert and Díaz (Paradoxically Unitarians), resisted as much as they could the full weight of the battle. In these fortifications, survivors of disbanded units were trapped fighting an unequal hand-to-hand. The perimeter was filled with dead and wounded. 
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​Detail of the Palomar defensive square. You can see the trenches. The aquitectonic differences in different drawings are due to the interpretation of each artist, although in my opinion these buildings suffered serious damage and were later rebuilt.
​According to the war reports and historical records of the Brazilian Army, the infantry force under the command of Sousa was mainly located in the center of the allied battle line, operating alongside infantry battalions from Montevideo and troops from Entre Ríos. Composition: The Imperial division had six infantry battalions and one artillery regiment. Decisive action: During the final phase of the combat, the Brazilian infantry launched the final attack on Rosas' right flank and the dovecote of Caseros. After exhausting the ammunition of the enemy artillery, his battalions advanced to ensure victory
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Troops of the Empire of Pedro II and militias of the Argentine Confederation of Juan Manuel de Rosas face to face. Austrian writer Alejandro Bernheim and the Italian cartoonist Carlos Penutti.
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Manuel Marques de Sousa (the Count of Porto Alegre) is a central figure in this series of lithographs.Sousa is often depicted as the officer on horseback leading the Brazilian 1st Division of the Grand Army (Ejército Grande) during the charge against the forces of Juan Manuel de Rosas. This lithograph of the Battle of Caseros (1852) is credited to the Italian artist and cartoonist Carlos Penuti (sometimes spelled Penutti), in collaboration with the Austrian printer and writer Alejandro Bernheim. This lithograph was created in 1852, shortly after the battle itself. 
​In this period drawing, the uniforms of the infantry hunters of the Empire of Brazil are perfectly visible. The batteries destroyed are probably the 10 canions that Colonel Maza had to defend the square of Palomar. There are also remains of a rejected cavalry charge, probably in this sector, it belonged to that of Colonel Santa Coloma.
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The participation of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment under Manuel Luís Osório was indeed a critical support factor for the Brazilian and Oriental infantry during the final assault on the Palomar and the Caseros house.
While the infantry (led by Marques de Sousa and César Díaz) moved toward the buildings, Osório’s cavalry was tasked with clearing the outer defenses and the artillery batteries protecting the right flank of the Rosista line. This removed the "shield" of the Palomar, allowing the infantry to approach the walls without being decimated by flanking fire.
In the tactical reality of the 19th century, cavalry usually avoided stone structures, but at Caseros, Osório’s men operated in very close proximity to the "cuadrado defensivo." They prevented any of the Rosista defenders from attempting a counter-charge or escaping the perimeter, effectively sealing the fate of those inside.

The "Lances" at the Palomar

Brazilian military history emphasizes that Osório led his men with "cold steel" (sabers and lances) right up to the trenches and ditches surrounding the Caseros estate. This aggressive pressure forced the remaining defenders to retreat inside the buildings (the house and the circular Palomar tower), where they were eventually trapped and, as we discussed, brutally finished off.

Osório’s performance was so central to the collapse of this specific sector that he was promoted to Colonel right there on the battlefield. His regiment provided the mobility and "shock" that complemented the slower, methodical advance of the infantry.
In summary, while the infantry did the room-to-room fighting and the final breach of the Palomar, they could only do so because Osório’s 2nd Cavalry had neutralized the surrounding support and pinned the defenders against the walls.
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Charge of the Oriental Division (Uruguayan) under the orders of the César Díaz, which was next to the Brazilian Infantry Division of the Marquis de Souza. From this angle, behind the fortified positions was a building that could be interpreted as the tower of the house of the painter Fiorini.

The "Voltígeros" (Skirmishers) was a prestigious elite battalion within the Oriental Division (Uruguayan), commanded by the legendary and controversial Lieutenant Colonel León de Palleja.
The Voltígeros were specifically trained for fast, light infantry maneuvers. At Caseros, they were the first to reach the Palomar and the Caseros House. Under Palleja’s direct leadership, they spearheaded the breach of the defensive perimeter, moving through the orange groves under heavy fire.
It was the Voltígeros who effectively forced the surrender of the defenders inside the circular tower. However, historical accounts from the time (including those by Brazilian witnesses) note that the "surrender" was short-lived. Once inside, the Voltígeros participated in the indiscriminate killing of the defenders, including those who had already laid down their arms or were wounded.

León de Palleja’s Leadership

Palleja was a Spanish-born soldier of fortune known for his strict discipline and tactical brilliance, but also for his ruthlessness. He demanded total obedience. During the battle, he was seen in the thick of the fight, urging his men forward with a ferocity that matched the brutality of the aftermath.

The Voltígeros and Palleja would later gain even more notoriety during the War of the Triple Alliance (Paraguayan War). Palleja became a famous figure for his detailed war diaries, which are some of the most vivid records of that conflict. He was eventually killed in action at the Battle of Boquerón (1866).

The Voltígeros are remembered as the unit that clinched the victory at the Palomar, but they are also inextricably linked to the executions and lack of quarter that followed the collapse of the Rosista lines.
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León de Palleja died at the Battle of Boquerón (also known as the Battle of Boquerón del Sauce) on July 18, 1866. He was killed in action while leading the Uruguayan Florida Battalion during the War of the Triple Alliance. He died during a daring assault on a Paraguayan trench system that protected the access to Potrero Sauce. 

León de Palleja was not a "Unitarian" in the strict ideological sense, though he fought under their banner at Caseros. His situation, and that of the Uruguayan troops, is a classic example of the "shifting loyalties" typical of the River Plate wars.

Soldier of Fortune. Palleja was a professional Spanish soldier who arrived in Montevideo during the Great Siege. In Uruguay, political labels were different, the supporters of Manuel Oribe (allied with Rosas) were known as Blancos, while those in Montevideo (allied with the Unitarians and Brazil) were the Colorados. 
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León de Palleja was often described by his contemporaries as a "man out of time," possessing the same fanatical bravery, religious conviction, and extreme cruelty found in the Spanish Conquistadors of the 16th century
 León de Palleja (born José Pons de Ojeda) was a former officer in the Carlist forces during the First Carlist War in Spain, fighting for the pretender Carlos María Isidro de Borbón. 

After the Carlist defeat, he fled to France and eventually reached the River Plate, where he changed his name and integrated into the local conflicts. His transition from a Spanish traditionalist (Carlist) to a key figure in the "Liberal" or Unitarian-aligned forces (the Colorados of Montevideo and the Ejército Grande) is historically striking.

The Switch at Caseros. Many Oriental (Uruguayan) troops had originally belonged to Oribe's army. When Oribe capitulated in 1851, his troops were integrated into Urquiza's Ejército Grande. Something similar to the case of the "Aquino Battalion".

Palleja's Voltígeros battalion was formed primarily from these former Oribe soldiers who had essentially been "handed over" to the Allied side. To ensure their loyalty, they were placed under professional officers like Palleja, who were known for their iron discipline and lack of political sentiment.
For Palleja, the fight was more about professional duty than federalism or unitarianism. This lack of ideological bond likely contributed to the ruthlessness seen at the Palomar; he treated the defenders as military obstacles to be cleared rather than political brethren. 

In essence, Palleja fought for the Colorados of Montevideo (the "Unitarian" side in that specific context), leading troops who, just months earlier, had been the Federalist vanguard of Oribe.
North (The Right Wing)

It was in charge of General Agustín de Pinedo who commanded 2 battalions of militia cavalry under the orders of Colonel Martín de Santa Coloma and major Juan Balbis, and three infantry battalions that defended the defensive square of Palomar and the Casa de Caseros, under the orders of Colonel Mariano Maza and Colonel Martin Arenas, supported by 10 guns and 4 Congreve rocket launchers. 
In the last phase of the battle, cavalry units under the command of Colonel Juan de Dios Videla joined the defense of the right wing.

Another cavalry units in this area:

The South Division (División Sur) of the Confederation's forces, which defended the southern approach to Buenos Aires.
Colonel Pedro Rosas y Belgrano was the Commander of the South (Juez de Paz and military chief of Azul). He led a large contingent of cavalry from the southern frontier, approximately 2,000 men. His division was positioned to protect the flanck but, like much of the cavalry, it suffered from low morale and the superior maneuverability of Urquiza’s entrerriano forces. After the defeat, he briefly remained in the field before following Rosas into exile. 
Colonel Manuel Komet served as a senior officer under Pedro Rosas y Belgrano and led one of the southern regiments that retreated from the Azul/Tapalqué frontier to join the main army. His unit was integrated into the defensive line's cavalry wings. 

This division was primarily composed of frontier militias and veteran "blandengues" who were accustomed to fighting indigenous groups rather than large-scale professional armies like the Platine War's Ejército Grande.

This is where the Casa de Caseros and the Palomar were located. It was the strongest point because the buildings acted as natural fortresses. The intensity of the combat here and the fact that Rosas used the house as his headquarters is exactly why history calls it the Battle of Caseros.

In the defense of that perimeter, Colonel Juan Mariano Maza commanded a mix of infantry troops specifically tasked with holding the "fortified square" around the Casa de Caseros and the Palomar. 
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Maza's troops were entrenched in a square of about 10,000 square meters. These soldiers used the thick colonial walls of the manor and the circular dovecote (the Palomar) as firing positions to repel the professional Brazilian infantry and Uruguayan brigades. His perimeter was supported by cannons and Congreve rocket batteries positioned nearby to cover the infantry's front.
As the battle turned into a desperate house-to-house struggle, Maza's infantry and the remnants of the artillery batteries became one single defensive unit. When Chilavert ran out of conventional ammunition, the defenders in Maza's sector reportedly resorted to firing whatever scrap they could fin from the ruins of the dovecote (Palomar) and the house of Caseros.

The role of the Brazilian Imperial troops was decisive because they provided the professional "heavy lifting" that the local militias lacked. Under the command of Brigadier Manuel Marques de Sousa, the Brazilian division was specifically tasked with breaking the strongest point of Rosas’s line: the left flank (the Caseros House and the Palomar).
The Oriental Division (Uruguayans) operated in close coordination during the assault on the left wing. 
The storming of the Caseros House and the Palomar was a chaotic and bloody affair, and the Oriental Division (Uruguayans) played a central role in those final moments.

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Artillery Colonel Martín Arenas. Like Martiniano Chilavert and Pedro Díaz, Arenas was another officer with Unitarian roots who fought for the Rosas regime during its final stand. This phenomenon occurred because many officers viewed the conflict as a defense of national sovereignty against "foreign" intervention (Brazil and Uruguay), prioritizing their role as professional soldiers over party affiliation.

During the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852, Colonel Martín Arenas served as a commander within the Confederate forces under Juan Manuel de Rosas. He was specifically tasked with defending the right wing of the Rosista line. 
Arenas led a regiment of artillery and infantry, which included six cannons and four Congreve rocket launchers.
His forces were stationed at the base of the Palomar, a key defensive point that sat approximately 300 paces from the main Caseros family house. 
Despite the defensive efforts at the Palomar, the Rosista forces were decisively defeated by the Ejército Grande (Great Army). Following the collapse of the Confederate lines, Colonel Arenas was taken prisoner. 

Colonel Martín Arenas (1808–1871) was a veteran of several significant 19th-century conflicts in the Río de la Plata region: 
Cisplatine War: Served under Admiral Guillermo Brown, notably distinguished for his bravery during the naval battle of Los Pozos in 1826.
Post-Caseros. After being released, he eventually joined the defense of Buenos Aires and later served in the War of the Triple Alliance as chief of the 1st Light Artillery Brigade.
He died in 1871 during the yellow fever epidemic in Buenos Aires.

Unitarian Colonel Pedro León de Aquino meets his new Federal Battalion

The Anglo-French blockade and the seizure of the Argentine squadron (the "theft of the fleet" at the hands of the British and French) left the Argentine Confederation's army completely stranded in the Banda Oriental.
Without Admiral Brown's ships, there was no way to ferry thousands of veteran soldiers back across the Río de la Plata once Oribe's situation became untenable in 1851. This logistical trap led directly to the political compromise.

Under the Pact of the Pantanoso, Urquiza allowed the high-ranking Federal Colonels men like Ramón Bustos, Jerónimo Costa, Nicolas Granada, Mariano Maza, to board small vessels or neutral ships to return to Buenos Aires. Urquiza respected their rank and avoided execution at that stage to facilitate a peaceful surrender of the city.

The common soldiers, however, were treated as spoils of war. Roughly 5,000 veterans of the Siege of Montevideo were forcibly incorporated into Urquiza’s Army. 
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This federal battalion was given to Colonel Aquino (Unitarian) by General Urquiza (Federal). But this cavalry veteran battalion had probably belonged before to Colonel Granada or Colonel Ramón Bustos, both from cavalry branch.
 If these men originally belonged to a Federal cavalry battalion from Buenos Aires in Montevideo, they had a federal cavalry chieff. Then, after the mutiny in Pergamino, they had to returned to their natural chain of commands. 

When Urquiza invaded Uruguay in 1851, Cavalry Colonel Bustos embarked for Buenos Aires along with Colonels Mariano Maza , Pedro Ramos , Jerónimo Costa , and José María Flores , while his soldiers were forcibly incorporated into Urquiza's Grand Army. Despite the loss of his battalion in Montevideo, Bustos commanded a division of cavalry in Rosas's reserve. Under direct orders from Juan Manuel de Rosas, he led a vigorous charge against an enemy flanking column that was attempting to envelop the Rosista line.When the federal line finally broke, his division was among those that disbanded, but Bustos himself remained in the country. 

The Aquino battalion was one of Rosas's battalions that Urquiza captured while they were besieging Montevideo. Urquiza simply replaced his Federal chief with a Unitary one (Colonel Pedro León Aquino). These became the 3rd cavalry division of the Buenos Aires army, where Mitre was a lieutenant colonel in charge of one of the flying artilleries. Being Federal, these troops killed their unitary leader and returned to their natural commands in the barracks of Santos Lugares. There were about 540 men. who fought on the right wing of Rosas.

After the battle, from 500s, only 200 of them remained. These prisoners were executed on Urquiza's orders and their corpses served as decorations in the trees of Palermo. 
Urquiza’s decision to hang the survivors of the Aquino Battalion along the road to Palermo was indeed a calculated act of psychological warfare. 
The Recollect monks (the Order of Augustinian Recollects) had long been the caretakers of the Recoleta Cemetery, which was the primary burial ground for the city's deceased, including those of modest means or those who died in violent circumstances. It is almost certain that those bones remain as NN (Nomen Nescio / No Name) within the Recoleta. Given the circumstances of 1852, there were several factors that ensured their anonymity.

There is no documentation from Urquiza side of the names or the number of executed, so there is no guarantee that all those convicted were from the so-called "Aquino Battalion."
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​"1851, General Manuel Oribe reviews the Federal troops, by Juan Manuel Blanes. "Guerra Grande (Great War) in Uruguay, specifically showing the forces commanded by General Manuel Oribe in 1851. The painting captures the Federal troops just before their world was upended by Justo José de Urquiza's "Pronunciamiento."
Campamento del Cerrito (located at the Cerrito de la Victoria), which served as the headquarters for the Gobierno del Cerrito during the Siege of Montevideo. Puerto del Buceo was the primary port for the Gobierno del Cerrito, and Admiral William Brown operated his squadron from there during the long siege.
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In the center of the painting, the Marching Band acts as the heartbeat of the formation. During the era of Juan Manuel de Rosas, military music wasn't just for morale; it was a powerful tool for discipline and political identity. In the painting, General Oribe, accompanied by General Antonio Díaz and his assistants, observed the band

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The Center 

The Center Division (División Centro) or the central defensive core of the Confederation army before the battle was under General Ángel Pacheco who was originally the Commander-in-Chief of the Confederation forces. However, his role in the actual battle is controversial. Disagreeing with Rosas on how to confront Urquiza, Pacheco resigned his command shortly before the battle. On the day of the battle, he was not present in the field, having retired to his estate, "El Talar". Rosas subsequently assumed personal command of the army. 

General Ángel Pacheco who was the original architect of the defense—was absent from the field entirely, leaving Echagüe
and the colonels to hold the center against the Empire of Brazil and Urquiza
While General Pascual Echagüe held the formal command of the troops in the center (composed largely of infantry and cavalry that had retreated from Santa Fe), the sector’s tactical weight rested on Colonel Martiniano Chilavert’s batteries.

Coronel Juan Maria Cortina and Coronel Juan Aguilera led specific units within the Center Division, which was largely composed of forces that had retreated from the frontiers (Barrancosa and Guardia de Lujan) to defend Buenos Aires under the Coronels Cortina and Aguilera. Their units were integrated into the central line to support the veteran infantry and the massive artillery batteries (30 pieces) commanded by Coronel Chilavert. 

The Center Division was intended to be the "anchor" of Rosas's line, positioned between the Palomar (Right Wing) and the infantry of Pedro José Díaz (Left Wing).

During the Battle of Caseros, General Pascual Echagüe was positioned in the Center of Juan Manuel de Rosas's defensive line. Echagüe commanded forces in the Center, specifically overseeing divisions that supported the main defensive core. Before the battle, Echagüe had served as the Governor of Santa Fe. Upon the advance of Urquiza's Army, he retreated toward Buenos Aires to join Rosas's forces. In the Center, he acted alongside high-ranking officers like Coronel Martiniano Chilavert, who commanded the artillery. This central sector was intended to be the strongest part of the line, although it eventually collapsed under the combined pressure of the Ejército Grande.

During the Battle of Caseros, Coronel Serrano (often identified as Coronel José de los Santos Serrano) was a key officer within the Northern Division (División Norte) of Juan Manuel de Rosas's army. Prior to the final concentration of forces at Caseros, Serrano was stationed in Rosario. As Urquiza's Ejército Grande advanced, these northern units , which included forces under General Echagüe (Coronda) and Coronel Santa Coloma (San Lorenzo), retreated toward Buenos Aires to form the defensive line. 

Serrano's troops were integrated into the Center and Right sectors of the line, supporting the veteran core commanded by General Pinedo and General Echagüe.
He led elements of the provincial militias and cavalry that had retreated from the Santa Fe frontier.
Defensive Square. Along with officers like Videla and Maza, Serrano was part of the desperate effort to hold the perimeter around the Palomar and the Casa de Caseros as the federal wings began to collapse under the pressure of the Brazilian divisions and Urquiza’s cavalry.​

The center of Rosas’s line was a massive static block of infantry and artillery, designed to act as an unbreakable wall while the cavalry on the wings (theoretically) did the maneuvering. This was a line of infantry and artillery (where Chilavert was positioned with 30 guns) stretching across the open fields.

Colonel Pedro Díaz: He was a key infantry commander in the center-left. His troops were positioned near the Casa de Caseros, working in coordination with Maza. He was one of the veteran officers who tried to hold the "fortified" area against the Brazilian and Uruguayan assault.

The center was composed of several battalions of veteran infantry. These were Rosas’s most disciplined troops, many of whom were part of the "Batallones de Infantería de Línea." They were arranged in deep columns or squares to withstand charges, but their lack of mobility proved fatal when the wings collapsed. The center was heavily reinforced with nearly 30 to 50 pieces of artillery (depending on the source) under command of the legendary Martiniano Chilavert, who was the soul of this section.
The cannons were placed in intervals between the infantry battalions, often protected by small earthworks. They used a mix of heavy cannons and Congreve rocket launchers. Chilavert’s plan was to decimate the advancing Allied columns before they could reach the Caseros buildings.

If the left wing was at the Colegio Militar (Ciudad Jardín), the center extended southward. The center faced west/southwest. Therefore, Chilavert's cannons were aimed toward what is now Haedo and Morón, which is the direction from which Urquiza’s massive columns were advancing.

Colonels Costa and Hernández: These officers were part of reserve support on the right wing and center-right.
Colonel Jerónimo Costa was a legendary figure (hero of the defense of Martín García years earlier). At Caseros, he commanded a brigade of infantry, but his position was compromised when the cavalry under Lagos (on the far right) broke and fled.

Colonel José María Hernández died in a tragic and infamous manner during the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852.  As the federal forces began to collapse and flee, Hernández who was serving as Rosas's aide-de-camp and commanding a battalion attempted to stop his own troops from deserting. Instead of following his orders, his soldiers turned on him and killed him. His body was left disfigured on the battlefield. He was only identified two days later by his brother-in-law, Dr. Marcó del Pont, because Hernández’s loyal dog remained by the corpse, howling and refusing to leave.
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In the battle of Caseros both sides (in greater number) belonged to the same army of the Argentine Confederation, because Urquiza until his rebellion, was a general of the Argentine Confederation led by Juan Manuel de Rosas. For this reason, the scenario was chaotic since both sides had the same uniforms. General Urquiza, in order to differentiate his units, made them place a white bib over their red uniforms. In this work of IA, the infantry under the orders of Juan Manuel de Rosas, is attacked by Urquiza's cavalry.
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South (The Right Wing) 

The Lagos division consisted of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 cavalry men. Key units and subordinate commanders included: 

Colonel Hilario Lagos' Own Division: The core of his command, which included the Bragado Militia (roughly 600 men).
Other Cavalry Regiments: Elements from the N2 Regiment (specifically a line squadron directly under Lagos) and potentially squadrons from the N3, N4, and N9 regiments supported this flank.
While Colonel Martín de Santa Coloma was originally part of Hilario Lagos' cavalry force during the initial skirmishes, he was repositioned to the Right Wing (under General Pinedo) for the main engagement at Caseros.

The confusion often stems from the events at Campos de Álvarez (January 31, 1852), just days before the main battle.
At Álvarez Fields, Santa Coloma fought alongside Sosa and Bustos under the direct command of Colonel Hilario Lagos.

The Retreat. After this engagement, the cavalry withdrew toward the Marquez Bridge. When they realized General Pacheco was not defending it as expected, the forces fell back to the main Rosista line. For the main Battle of Caseros (February 3), Rosas reorganized the army. He placed Santa Coloma on the Right Wing under General Pinedo to bolster the defense of the Caseros House and the Palomar. 

When Urquiza launched his massive charge against the left, Lagos' division disintegrated quickly due to heavy desertions and overwhelming force. Many soldiers and smaller units from the collapsing wings fled toward the Center, seeking the protection of Colonel Chilavert’s artillery and Colonel Costa’s reserves.
This movement effectively turned the battle into a desperate "fortress" defense of the center-right sector (the Palomar square), where the remaining professional officers like Santa Coloma, Chilavert, and Hernández made their final, fatal stand.

The left wing was the "open" flank, composed mostly of cavalry but Colonel Pedro José Díaz is primarily associated with the Center of the federal line, although some historical interpretations place his infantry brigade as the literal pivot connecting the center to the left.
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Colonel Hilario Lagos, one of Rosas's most loyal and experienced cavalry officers, attempted to intercept Urquiza’s advance guard. However, he faced the overwhelming "power of the spear" of the Entre Ríos and Corrientes cavalry.
After losing those 200 men, Lagos realized he couldn't stop the "Ejército Grande" in open ground. His retreat to Ramos Mejía wasn't just a physical move; it was a retreat of morale.

That is a crucial detail that explains why the right wing of Rosas’s army was so fragile on the day of the main battle.
The Combat of Campos de Álvarez (January 31, 1852) just three days before Caseros was the final psychological blow to the federal cavalry. 

One of the most controversial chapters in Lucio Norberto Mansilla’s biography.

General Lucio Norberto Mansilla, who was the hero of the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado, was indeed sidelined from the main front at Caseros due to his deteriorating health. Instead of joining the field army under Rosas at the Caseros estancia, Mansilla was tasked with the urban defense of the capital city. His command and forces Mansilla oversaw the Northern Department, which included specialized and militia units from Ramallo, San Pedro, and Zárate. These were veteran forces that had previously defended the Paraná River under his leadership.
He organized a defensive perimeter within Buenos Aires using the Serenos (Police) and city militias. He ordered trenches to be dug at strategic street corners and placed men on the rooftops (azoteas) to prepare for a possible siege or street-to-street fighting.
He was also in charge of the approximately 6,000 men stationed in the barracks of Palermo (Cuarteles de Palermo), which served as the primary reserve and the last line of defense for Rosas's personal residence.​

When Juan Manuel de Rosas resigned and fled to the British consulate, he left a power vacuum. Lucio Norberto Mansilla, who was in charge of the city's urban reserves, also retreated, leaving Buenos Aires unprotected. 
Disbanded soldiers and local mobs began looting the city, targeting the homes of prominent Rosistas.To protect their property and lives, foreign residents organized "urban security brigades." British, French, Danish and Italian sailors (mostly from merchant and war vessels in the port) landed and patrolled the streets to restore order

While the battle was raging in the fields of Caseros, Mansilla remained in the city as the Commander of the Forces in the Capital. His actions or lack thereof as the news of the defeat arrived are a matter of historical record.

As Rosas’s defeated soldiers and deserting militias flooded back into Buenos Aires, they began a massive looting of the city. Mansilla, instead of using his remaining troops to maintain order, essentially withdrew to his home, effectively allowing the chaos to unfold.

​While the most intense and famous massacre occurred on the night of February 4, the general state of anarchy and looting actually lasted for several days before order was fully restored.  Order was only restored when foreign merchants and property owners organized their own defense, eventually supported by the arrival of Urquiza's vanguard and the international naval brigades. Hundreds of people involved in the looting were massacred in the streets. These were not formal trials but immediate, lethal responses to the "great sacking". 

Buenos Aires become the New Liberal Bastion - How Buenos Aires Mirrored Montevideo

For the porteños, the experience of February 1852 was a double trauma: first, the abandonment by Rosas's retreating troops which left them at the mercy of looters, and second, being "saved" by foreign sailors and then paraded over by Brazilians. 
Despite overthrowing the tyrant, Urquiza entered the city wearing the red Federalist ribbon. To the porteños, this was just "Rosas 2.0" but with a foreign-backed army. They realized that while the man was gone, the system (provincial dominance over the port) remained. This environment allowed leaders like Bartolomé Mitre and Valentín Alsina to seize the moral high ground. They used Sarmiento’s "Civilization vs. Barbarism" rhetoric to argue that Buenos Aires must be independent.

Urquiza himself famously entered the city wearing his white poncho and a red Federalist ribbon (the divisa punzó), which further confused and angered the Unitarian elites who had expected a complete break from Rosista symbolism. Along with Urquiza, the caudillos who joined his cause entered triumphantly. One of them was the brother of the Great Estanislao López*.

*The relationship between Estanislao López and Juan Manuel de Rosas was a complex alliance of convenience and mutual survival, rather than a deep personal friendship. While they were key partners in the Federalist cause, their relationship was often marked by tension and rivalry.

​The figure of Juan Pablo López (nicknamed "Mascarilla") serves as another stark example of the "Barbarism", representing a more cynical and predatory side of federalist leadership compared to his brother, the legendary Estanislao López. 

Following the death of Estanislao in 1838, Juan Pablo seized power, but his rule was marked by a lack of the popular legitimacy his brother had enjoyed. Unlike Estanislao, who was seen as a leader of a popular movement, Juan Pablo was frequently accused of using his position to enrich himself and his followers through the confiscation of property and the "plundering" of provincial resources to fund his military adventures.
He was notorious for changing sides. He fought for Rosas, then joined the Unitarians (the "Libres del Sur"), and eventually joined Urquiza's Ejército Grande only when it was clear Rosas would fall. 

This was probably also one of Jerónimo Costa's reproaches to Rosas on the HMS Centaur. 

That image of Rosas and his daughter, Manuelita, watching the city burn from the deck of the HMS Centaur, is one of the most haunting "final scenes" in Argentine history. The fact that the man who had ruled with an iron fist for two decades had to dress in a simple sailor’s coat and hide his face and that Manuelita had to do the same was the ultimate psychological defeat. Especially for the Federal cause.

Their fear wasn't of Urquiza's formal army at that moment, but of the uncontrolled mob. The very "people" (the plebe) that Rosas had claimed to represent and protect for twenty years had turned into a chaotic force that would have likely lynched him had they recognized him in the streets.

There is a brutal irony in the fact that the only place they felt safe was under the British flag, the same power Rosas had spent years publicly antagonizing during the blockades. From the deck of the English ship, Rosas and Jerónimo Costa witnessed a literal "end of an era". They saw the smoke and heard the shouting as the city was looted. For Costa, it was the sight of a soldier’s world collapsing. For Rosas, it was perhaps a validation of his darkest belief: that without his "Order," there could only be "Anarchy."

This is where Costa’s presence becomes so biting. As they watched the looting, Costa could rightfully point out that the chaos was the direct result of Rosas’s sudden resignation and flight. Rosas had essentially "turned off the lights" and left the city to tear itself apart while he sat safely in a foreign cabin.​

​The Foreign Intervention

Because Mansilla did not act, the diplomatic corps and foreign residents were terrified. It was the commanders of foreign warships (British, French, and American) stationed in the port who had to land marines to protect their citizens and restore a semblance of order, as the local authority had vanished.

Historians debate why he did this. Some suggest he was physically ill; others believe it was a calculated move to show that without Rosas, the city would fall into "anarchy." Others simply see it as a brother-in-law who had given up on a lost cause and didn't want to waste his life defending a city for a relative who was already on a ship to exile.

This stands in stark contrast to Pacheco, who eventually returned to a leadership role during the subsequent Siege of Buenos Aires. Mansilla’s legacy at the end of the Rosas era is permanently stained by those days of looting and his refusal to protect the capital.

The HMS Centaur and Conflict

While Jerónimo Costa and his infantry were still fighting desperately to hold the line (near the Casa de Caseros), Rosas realized the battle was irreovcably lost. The cavalry had fled, and the Allied forces were surrounding his core infantry.
According to several historical accounts, Rosas encountered Costa amidst the chaos. Costa, known for his extreme bravery (he was the hero of Martín García), was still prepared to die at his post. Rosas, however, saw that further resistance was useless and would only lead to a total massacre of his personal guard.

The Order to Disperse. Rosas reportedly told Costa and his other officers that "all was lost" and that they should save themselves. Instead of leading a final "Napoleonic" charge, Rosas decided to leave the field to avoid being captured or killed on the spot.

The Escape. Rosas, accompanied by a very small escort, rode away toward the city. He eventually stopped under a tree in Plaza Flores, where he used his horse's saddle as a desk to write his formal resignation.

After the defeat on February 3, 1852, Rosas, his daughter Manuelita, and several high-ranking officers including Jerónimo Costa, sought protection on the British frigate HMS Centaur.

While on board, a bitter argument erupted. Costa was deeply resentful of how the battle had been managed and Rosas’s decision to abandon the field. He reportedly accused Rosas of leaving his best men to be slaughtered while he secured his own safety.
As a result of this altercation, Costa refused to stay with Rosas. While Rosas transferred to the HMS Conflict to begin his journey to Southampton, England, Costa decided to remain in the River Plate region.

"Eight thousand four hundred and eighty soldiers with forty-three pieces of flying artillery had formed. The high Gastadores (Sappers or Pioneers) were at the head, looking more gigantic by tall half-rod morions (Bear-skin shakos), on a long white suede apron, carrying axes, picks, and shovels on their shoulders. Whistles and flutes, Chinese drums and bugles, bass drum and cymbals, infernal charanga out of tune. Behind the first battalion under the command of Colonel Quevedo, crossing white biricús on their chests, followed those of Major Aguilar, of the commander Don Pedro Ximeno, captain of the port; the Serenos Battalion, Commander Larrazábal; Lieutenant Colonel Herrera, and Major Romero.

................Colonel Chilavert's brilliant artillery brigade, each of the long guns dragged by twelve strong artillerymen and a double quarter of sixteen, the march of the army was closed by the Squadron of Suppliers ( Batallon Provicional) under the command of Colonel Valerio Sánchez and a very numerous cavalry, brought from all quarters, the formation nucleus of the great army of thirty-two thousand soldiers, whose brake speed was soon demonstrated by running with the defeat, with his general in the lead." 


Quote from Pastor Obligado on his description of the last parade on July 9, 1851.

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​The "Ejército Grande" (Great Army) Led by Justo José de Urquiza, this multinational alliance fielded between 24,000 and 28,000 men. 
Rosas' Forces (Argentine Confederation)
The army commanded by Juan Manuel de Rosas was slightly smaller, estimated at 22,000 to 26,000 men. 
The combined total of nearly 50,000 combatants represented about 3% of Argentina's total population at the time.

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​The painting of the Battle of Caseros was created by the renowned Uruguayan painter Juan Manuel Blanes in 1857.This specific work, titled "La batalla de Caseros (Final del combate)," was part of a series commissioned by Justo José de Urquiza to decorate his residence, the Palacio San José in Entre Ríos, Argentina.

Blanes was known for his dedication to historical detail. He based this painting on accounts of the battle and even corrected it after Urquiza himself pointed out that he should be shown at the front of his troops rather than on the sidelines.

The "Double Urquiza"

Interestingly, because of these corrections, Urquiza appears twice in the painting once in his original position on the lateral side and again at the front, wearing his characteristic poncho and hat (galera).
The work is a panoramic oil on canvas, capturing the chaotic final cavalry charge and the massive scale of the engagement that ended the rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas.Blanes is often called the "Painter of the Homeland" (El pintor de la patria) because of his extensive work documenting major historical events in the River Plate region.

In the Battle of Caseros, General Justo José de Urquiza did order his troops to use a white distinctive specifically a white ribbon or white vest to differentiate them from the forces of Juan Manuel de Rosas, who traditionally wore red. 
Historically, both sides in the Argentine Civil Wars often wore similar attire, primarily gaucho style clothing or red federalist uniforms. To avoid friendly fire and clearly mark his "Ejército Grande" (Grand Army) as a distinct coalition: 

Urquiza's troops were identifiable by their white vests and white ribbons, which served as a protest against the "federal red" imposed by Rosas. Under Rosas, it was mandatory for soldiers and even civilians to wear the punzó red (bright red) as a sign of political loyalty.
The Grand Army was a diverse force, so while the white distinctive unified them, there were still visual differences among the divisions

Brazilians: Wore formal, European-style parade uniforms.
Unitarians/Exiles: Figures like Domingo Faustino Sarmiento insisted on wearing European-style uniforms (french quepis and levites) rather than traditional ponchos as a symbolic "protest against the gauchesque spirit".

The strategy of Buenos Aires. (Based on the work of Adolfo Saldias, memoirs of Colonel Antonino Reyes.)

In the battle order of the Confederation Army, they had to include the prestigious General Angel Pacheco, on whom Rosas depended militarily in his strategy. But Pacheco had a passive and indifferent attitude, allowing the vanguard of the allied army to advance as his forces retreated under the command of his subordinate commanders and did not come to defend the strategically vital "Marquez" bridge. Adolfo Saldias in his "History of the Confederation Argentina" account on this amount of errors, by action or omission that brought about a battle over a small fortified perimeter around the Palomar  and Caseros House with trenches and wagons in 1852. (Place now occupied by the Colegio Militar de la Nación Argentina).

According to Adolfo Saldias, Rosas left all his military responsibility on the authority of General Pacheco.
A month before the capitulation of Oribe and delivery of their Federal Army enemies, Colonel Chilavert suggested to Rosas that Oribe's forces should march to the General Urquiza while preparing an army to invade Brazil. Rosas approved the plan but said he would consult with Pacheco.
Soon it happened that Urquiza marched on Oribe, which forced the capitulation and stayed with his army. Rosas in Urquiza had lost one of his best generals. With the loss of General Oribe and his army, surrendered to enemy officers of the Confederation and then joined in the alliance with the Empire of Brazil and Uruguayan forces of Rivera and the reduction of the fleet of Admiral Brown, Rosas was in a bad situation.
When Urquiza prepared his international army in Gualeguaychu, Colonel Chilavert pleaded with Rosas to defend the line of the Parana and offered to command it himself. Rosas said that he would consult with Pacheco. Urquiza soon moves to Gualeguaychu toward Rosario without any obstacle.
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When Urquiza moves from Rosario in the direction of Buenos Aires, Pacheco ordered Mansilla to withdraw his defensive position on the Rio Parana.  General Mansilla assumed that this decision by General Pacheco was intended to send him as infantry and artillery support for the cavalry of Colonel Lagos. And defend the line (Red line), of "Arroyo del Medio" where he would support the General Pacheco with his forces from Lujan. Together they would battle the "Allies." From that
position the would be covered in case of loss by the rear in Santos Lugares, which was the headquarters of Rosas. Allowing time for Rosas to receive the forces committed to the Fortifications at the containment lines of the Indians. Thus double the forces for an offensive against the "Allied Army".  Rosas replied to Mansilla that he would consult with Pacheco.
Urquiza, in front of the Allies, continued his march with impunity, leading to extend his lead in "Arroyo del Medio" where Colonel Hilario Lagos was at the head of his cavalry defending. Pacheco insist that Lagos must withdraw to the
rear in Santos Lugares. Lagos protested to Rosas that he and his cavalry in spite of the order of General Pacheco would be left there to battle the invaders. Rosas replied that he is sure of his patriotism, and to harmonize their behavior with the orders of General Pacheco.
According to Adolfo Saldias, there are times when Rosas reacted upon realizing the disorganization of his forces in operations. He calls his aide, Col. Antonino Reyes (Head of the Santos Lugares quarters), and orders him to call a
"War Council" with senior officers. But the reaction lasts just a minute. It is the need to rely on the General Pacheco what changes his attitude.
Colonel Reyes suggested to Rosas that he incorporate Colonel Pedro Jose Diaz, experienced military officer (Unitarian Party), who resided in Buenos Aires after being captured by Rosas at the Battle of Quebracho. Diaz responds to the
call that despite his condition (Unitarian Party), he will fulfill its mission as a soldier to defend his country against a foreign invasion. Paradoxically, both Diaz and Chilavert were of the Unitarian party, but fought alongside Rosas
on the grounds that they defended the country from another foreign invasion. Both Diaz's Infantry Brigade and the artillery batteries of Chilavert sustained battle to the end against the Imperial Forces of Brazil, during the Battle of
Caseros.
Between January 26 and 27, 1852, General Pacheco held meetings with the enemy (General Urquiza). At that time, he had the assistants of Colonel Pedro Bustos removed from around Lujan. Colonel Bustos made this complaint through the
Colonel Reyes but Rosas did not believe it and said, "That Bustos was crazy."
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According to Saldias: "The truth is that General Pacheco's orders to leave clearly gave the allies the way through. On the 26th  of January, when the Allies arrived at Cat Creek "Arroyo Del Gato", and continued from there to the Tigre lagoon (Chacras de Chivilcoy), he ordered all forces of the"Guardia de Luján" Lujan Fort to withdraw, (now the city of Mercedes), leaving only 600 men with Colonel Lagos who was the only one to face the enemy"
The allied army continued to advance from Chivilcoy to Lujan, arriving January 29, 1852. On the 30th, the enemy vanguard reaches the Alvarez fields a few kilometers from the leading divisions of the Argentina Confederation who were in
the Rio "Las Conchas", covering the strategic forward as "Puente de Marquez". That day the General Pacheco passes through the "Bridge - Puente de Marquez" without giving any orders and goes to his ranch in "Talar". The place now bears
his name "El Talar de Pacheco".
In Colonel Lagos's communications with Rosas on the approach of the Enemy, Rosas orders him to come out to meet him firmly as General Pacheco will be defending the "Puente de Marquez" with all his might. Colonel Lagos meets with Colonels
Sosa and Bustos, marching on the morning of January 31, 1852 with their light cavalry squadrons to meet the enemy.
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The best Confederation Argentina squads clashed in "Campos de Alvarez" with numerous allied cavalry. Despite the numerical inequality with cavalry of Colonel Hilario Lagos, it kept stopping the enemy cavalry, with successive
cavalry charges that became legendary. But they were enveloped in a hostile tide and retired to the "Bridge of Marques" which according to Rosas, General Pacheco would be defending.
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Marquez Bridge. 1928. Wikipedia.
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In this graph we see the battle of "Campos de Alvarez", when Colonel Lagos came to meet the enemy, organizing three parallel columns of cavalry along with Colonels Sosa and Bustos. At dawn on January 31st, Lagos launches himself at the head of the cavalry during the successive loads.  According to Saldias, he had his own division, the militia of Bragada of 600 men, Sosa's division with 1,300 men and Bustos's division with 600 men.  The divisions of Echague and Cortina were not present in the action.  A large part of the division that Lagos organized in Bragado was made to pass the bridge with Pacheco and did not factor in the fight.  When retiring to the bridge Marquez realizes that Pacheco was not defending it as he had been told. Pacheco retires to his estate (Ranch), near the Talar that now bears his name (see white arrow), the forces of the Confederation are to meet in an emergency meeting to decide which plan to follow.
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The yellow line shows the supply line for Urquiza.  The fleet went down the Parana, parallel with Uriquiza's column.  The importance of the "Las Conchas" River is seen.  The "Tigre" Shipyards were another important strategic site.
Upon reaching the "Puente de Marquez" Colonel Hilario Lagos believed to have found General Pacheco in that position, but Pacheco was not there. Lagos remained there fighting against the advancing enemy, requested orders from Rosas
and, from the Santos Lugares Headquarter, he was informed to remain in this position.
On February 1, 1852 all of the enemy vanguard focused on the "Alvarez Fields." Colonel Hilario Lagos communicated this to the headquarters. After dark he informed that if the enemy advances towards the river, he would retreat to the headquarters of Santos Lugares.
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When the Allies passed the Marquez Bridge, the Confederation formed a new line of defense along the Moron Creek.  This line was within reach for Chilavert's artillery in Palomar.
The enemy was a few kilometers from Santos Lugares. It is there where General Pacheco renounced his position as General in Chief, communicating to the rest of the commanders to deal directly with Rosas. Pacheco based his resignation on
Rosas being commander-in-command in The Headquarter at Santos Lugares. Rosas was shown by Colonel Reyes the written resignation of The General Pacheco. Rosas said to Colonel Reyes, "But do not see this?  Pacheco is crazy."  Rosas rejected his resignation and informed Pacheco that his position which he occupies is an important and honorable one, his resignation is not accepted by the Governor Juan Manuel de Rosas, so the illustrious General Pacheco continued in command.
But Rose became upset when told that Pacheco had not defended the "Puente de Marquez" with the infantry and artillery which drove them back. Rose was walking to and fro, in the presence of Colonel Reyes: "It cannot be that Pacheco has
disobeyed an order of the Governor".
During the night, Benjamin Victorica went to see Rosas taking a note of Pacheco. Rosas will speak on "the desirability of making the sum in the notes put to him."  He said goodbye without hearing the message.
The next afternoon, General Pacheco appeared in person at the headquarters of Santos Lugares.  Colonel Reyes announced it to Rosas, while Colonel Pacheco conversed with Colonel Bustos.  After less than five minutes, they were stunned when they saw General Pacheco with his head down and leaving without saying goodbye.
The emergency war council meeting held on the evening of February 2, 1982 with the participation of General Pinedo, Unitarian Colonel Chilavert and Diaz, Federal Colonels Jerome Costa, Sosa, Bustos, Hernandez, Cortina and Maza.
Basically it was decided to await the enemy (Empire of Brazil) and fighting it by taking Arroyo Moron as a defense.  Rosas decided a line forming an obtuse angle that stream. The front would extend from Caseros to Santos Lugares.  In Caseros, it would be a final encounter where the enemy was expected to be in a fortified square of 10,000 square meters of area, rounded by wagons and trenches around the House of Caseros and The Palomar. This place not only be the end of the "Rosas Era", but a thousand men who fought to the end.
Sources: Saldias, Pacho O'Donnell, Wikipedia (English, Spanish, and Portuguese versions)
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1850s - Grals Gregorio Araoz de Lamadrid and Justo Jose de Urquiza, oil paint canvas and daguerreotypes.

Allied "Great Army".

Luís Alves de Lima e Silva, Duke of Caxias, Commander in
Chief of the Brazilian Military Forces (Emperor Pedro II); Justo Jose de Urquiza Governor of Entre Rios; Fructuoso Rivera (Leader of  the Uruguayan Red Party);  Exiled Unitarian Party in Montevideo, among them Bartolome Mitre and Sarmiento; Benjamin Virasoro, Gobernor of Corrientes;  Juan Pablo Lopez, Governor of Santa Fe.

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"Forming the Ejército Grande"

Ex-Argentine Confederation (Rosas/Oribe Troops), transferred to Argentine Military Rebel Command:

Between 3000 and 4000 were Argentine Confederate soldiers who were besieging Montevideo and were stunned by the capitulation of Oribe, who will deliver them against their will to the alliance and were reorganized with unitarian officers exiled in Montevideo.
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One of them was a colonel named Pedro Leon Aquino who, upon arriving to Buenos Aires, was killed by his own men who returned to the ranks of the Confederation Argentina. The remaining Argentina Confederation Fleet under Admiral Brown was neutralized, their evacuation by river was blocked, and the impossibility of crossing hostile provinces in the direction of Buenos Aires meant that they were distributed to unitarian commanders. From this captured army, the colonels Jeronimo Costa, Jose Maria Flores, Mariano Maza and Nicolas Granada all escaped and went to their natural controls in Buenos Aires and quickly were sent into battle.
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Note in the photo the white vests used to differentiate their side from the Confederation troops in all red.
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Interesting painting recreates a battle scene which gives the impression that it was at sunrise.  You can see the vanguard of the infantry batallion with campaign uniforms and flag of the Confederation Argentina supporting a cavalry division crossing Arroyo Moron.  

4 Infantry Battalions (Ex-Rosas Army): Transferred after the Oribe's
capitulation in Montevideo), reorganized  and put under command of the Unitarian Officers exiled in Montevideo:

'Constitucion' (Colonel Jose Toledo).
'Federacion' (Colonel Rodriguez).
'San Martin' (Colonel Martin Tejerina).
'Buenos Aires' (Colonel Mariano Echenagucia).


5 Cavalry Divisions (Ex-Rosas Army): Transferred after the Oribe's
capitulation in Montevideo, reorganized  and put under command of the
Unitarian Officers exiled in Montevideo:

1 Division, under command of Colonel Tomás Burgoa w/ 430 men.
2 Division, under command of Colonel Manuel Hornos w/ 600 men.
3 Division, under command of Colonel Pedro León Aquino w/ 540 men.
4 Division, under command of Colonel Jacinto Susviela w/ 450 men.
5 Division, under command of Colonel Vicente González w/ 325 men.


2 Artillería Squadrons: Under command of Colonel Bernardo Castro 110 and
Colonel Bartolomé Mitre w/ 100 men.


Urquiza Army:

4 Infantry Batallions (Ex-Rosas Army transferred after the Oribe's
capitulation in Montevideo), reorganized as:
'Constitucion' (Colonel Jose Toledo).
'Federacion' (Colonel Rodriguez).
'San Martin' (Martin Tejerina).
'Buenos Aires' (Colonel Mariano Echenagucia).


Infantry of the Province of Entre Rios:
'Urquiza' (Colonel manuel Basavilbaso)
Entrerriano' (Lieutnant Colonel Ramon Lista).


Infantry of the Province of Corrientes:
'Patricios' (Major Acevedo)
'Defensor' (Major Marcelino Martinez)


Cavalry:
2 (Entre Rios Province), Division.
1 (Santa Fe Province) Division.
1 (Corrientes Province) Division.
Division Lamadrid.
Division Medina.
2 Urquiza Guard. Escort Squadrons. (Colonels Fausto Aguilar and Manuel
Carballo).


Artilleria: 2 Regiments (12 pieces). Colonel Jose Maria Piran and Light
Artillery Liutnant Colonel Gonzalez.

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Uruguayan Army Corps commanded by colonel César Díaz:

Voltíjeros Infantry Battalion, under the command of lieutenant colonel León
de Pallejas.
  • Guardia Oriental Infantry Battalion, under the command of colonel José María
    Solsona.
  • Orden Infantry Battalion, under the command of major Abella.

    Resistencia Infantry Battalion, under the command of colonel Lezica.
     Roving Artillery Corps, under the command of lieutenant colonel Nicolás de Vedia.

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Brazil Army Corps (Brigadier Marques de Sousa):

1st Light Artillery under command of Major Gonzalez Fontes.
Congreve Battery under command of Major Gonzalez Fontes.
5th Infantry Battalion under command of Major Lopez Persegueiro.
6th Infantry Battalion under command of  Lieutenant Colonel Ferreira.
7th Infantry Battalion under command of  Lieutenant Bruce.
8th Infantry Battalion under command of Major Resin.
11th Infantry Battalion under command of  Lieutenant Colonel Mello Albuquerque.
13th Infantry Battalion under command of Lieutenant Colonel Tamarindo.
2th Cavalry Regiment under command of  Lieutenant Manuel Luis Osorio. 

From the series "Uniformes Do Exercito Brasilero
1730 - 1889".

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Order of Battle:

Left Flank:

General Cesar Diaz (Uruguayan, Colorado-Party)

4 Uruguayan Infantry Battalions:

Voltíjeros Infantry Battalion: lieutenant Colonel León de
Pallejas.
Guardia Oriental Infantry Battalion: Colonel José María
Solsona.
 Resistencia Infantry Battalion: Colonel Lezica.
Orden Infantry Battalion: Major Abella.


1 Artillery Squadron:
Lieutenant Colonel Nicolás de Vedia

Battalions provided by the Confederation Argentina after the capitulation of Oribe in Montevideo and forced to serve in the Alliance.

The Empire of Brazil Army Corps (Brigadier Marques de Sousa:

Two infantry regiments of three battalions each:


N° 5 (Major Lopez Persegueiro); N° 6 (Leutnant Colonel Ferreira); N° 7 (Leutnant Colonel Bruce); N° 8 (Major Resin); N° 11 (Leutnant Colonel Mello Alburquerque); N° 13(Leutnant Colonel
Ferreito Tamarindo).


1° Roving Artillery Regiment and Congreve Rockets Battery: 
(Major Gonzalez Fontes).
1 Artillery Regiment.

Prussian Mercenaries: #1


The Brazilian Corp under command of Marques de Sousa, during the battle became the center.

Rearguard: 
 Cavalry Divisions: "Santa Fe" Cavalry: General Juan Pablo Lopez
(Federal Party).
Entre Rios Cavalry. Colonel Manuel Urdinarrin (Federal
Party).

Right Flank:

Gregorio Araoz de Lamadrid (Unitarian Party).

5 Infantry Battalions:

"Entre Rios and Corrientes Infantry" . Colonel 
Jose Miguel Galan (Federal Party).
Lieutenant Colonel Bartolome Mitre
(Unitarian Party).
 1° Roving Artillery Regiment and Congreve Rocket Battery
Lieutenant Colonel Gonzalez Fontes (Empire of Brazil).

4 Cavalry Divisions:

Province of Corrientes: General Benjamin Virasoro, (Federal Party).
Empire of Brazil: 2nd Cavalry Regiment: Leutnant Colonel
Manuel Luis Osorio.
Province of Entre Rios: General Lamadrid.
Province of Entre Rios. Colonel Miguel Galarza, (Federal Party) 
Uruguay: General Anacleto Medina (Uruguayan, Colorado-Party).
Corrientes. Colonel Jose Domingo Abalos (Unitarian Party).

Artilleria:
Colonel Piran (Unitarian Party).

Reaguard:
General Urquiza, Province of Entre Rios, (Federal Party).

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Watercolor by Artist Rangel.
#1 In this battle the Brazilian Army employed about one hundred hired German snipers.  These men, then equipped with modern Dreyse rifles, were strategically distributed among the Infantry units under the command of Captain Jose Francisco Wildt of the National Guard of Sao Leopoldo. Its mission was to hunt down the gunners of Rosas in its range, making this surprise tactic of breaking enemy artillery positions, and penetration of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment under the command of then Lt. Col. Manuel Luis Osorio, Marquis of Herval future. These German mercenaries passed into history with the nickname "Brummer" (grumbling).
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Dreyse Rifles in action at Sodowa Battle (Austro-Prussian War), where the Prussians with their breech-loading, rifled cannon, bolt action w/ 10-12 roun per minute. Dreyse rifles defeated the Austrians with their Lorenz muzzleloader rifles.  It is easy to imagine what little the Confederation Argentina could do before them with their Flintloock Muskets.  During the French-Prussian War, the Dreyse were bested by the French Chassepot, and replaced in the post-war by the Mauser.  Photo: Watercolor of Carl Röchling.

The Germans that served in the Imperial Brazilian Army during the Platine War (1851–1852). They were known as the "Brummer" (meaning "growlers" or "grumblers" in German).

The "Brummer" Legion

Facing a shortage of professional infantry, the Brazilian Empire recruited approximately 1,800 to 2,000 German mercenaries, mostly from the Schleswig-Holstein region. Many were veterans of the First Schleswig War.

The Needle Rifle

They were remarkably advanced for the time because they arrived equipped with the Dreyse needle gun (Zündnadelgewehr). This was the first bolt-action, breech-loading rifle to be used in mass combat.
While most troops at the Battle of Caseros (1852) were still using slow muzzle-loaders, the Germans could fire much faster and, crucially, reload while lying down or kneeling.
During the Battle of Caseros, they were integrated into the center of the allied line. Their modern weaponry and professional training provided a significant psychological and tactical edge for the Brazilian-led coalition.
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Left: Justo Jose de Urquiza. Center Brazilian Forces. Right: Brigadier Manoel Marques de Sousa.
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Marques de Sousa, Porto Alegre (on horseback pointing his finger) leads the Brazilian 1st Division during the Battle of Caseros. Wikipedia.

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Left Flank: 4 Uruguayan Infantry Battalions under command of Colonel Cesar Diaz. Center: 2 Ex-Oribe (Argentine Confederation Soldiers) surrendered in Montevideo Battalions and 1 Artillery Squadron. Brazilian Imperial Division with 6 Infantry Battalions and 1 Artillery Regiment under command of Br Gral Manoel Marques de Souza.
Right Flank: 5 (Entre-Rios/Corrientes Provinces), Infantry Battalions under command of Colonel Galan with Artillery Batteries under command of Colonels: Piran, Mitre and Gonzalez Fontes. 4 Big Cavalry Divisions (Corrientes, Entre Rios, Provinces and Brazil), under command of Generals Lamadrid, Medina, Colonels Galarza and Avalos.
Rearguard Left: 2 Cavalry Divisions under command of General Juan Pablo Lopez and Colonel Urdinarrin.
Rearguard Right: Under Command of General Urquiza.
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Right Flank: 2 Cavalry Regiments (Cnls Santa Coloma and Belvis) under command of Gral Pinedo (Federal Party). 3 Infantery Battalions and 10 artillery pieces (2 batteries?) under command of Colonel Mariano Maza (Federal Party), <Trenches and fortified square>.
Left Flank: 1 Cavalry Division under command of Colonel Juan de Dios Videla (Federal Party). 8 Infantry Battalions with Artillery Batteries under command of Colonels Jeronimo Costa (Federal Party) and Juan Jose Hernandez (Federal Party).
Rearguard and Reserve: 2 Cavalry Divisions under command of Colonels Sosa and Bustos (Federal Party). Center: 30 Artillery Pieces (5 batteries?), under command of Colonel Martiniano Chilavert (Unitarian Party). Left: 3 Infantry Battalions under Command of Colonel Pedro Diaz (Unitarian Party) and 3 Cavalry Divisions under command of Colonel Lagos (Federal Party).
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Urquiza noted that the left flank of the Confederation Argentina was weak since it was exclusively cavalry and sent all of his cavalry composed of 10,000 horsemen allies on the flank that covered Colonel Lagos. So impetuous was the charge that General Lamadrid left the boundaries of the battlefield.
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Colonel Lagos waited for him with 2000 lancers on foot and with two mounted columns for the attack.
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The fight was violent and sustained. The Allies were rejected, leaving over 400 men killed or wounded.
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Allied Colonel Galarza went in support of Lamadrid but Rosas had sent a cavalry division from the opposite end in support of Lagos. Colonel Lagos attacks with his two columns and the allies retreated in disorder. Urquiza sent there to the
cavalry division of General Lopez. 15,000 men on horseback at that point competed for victory.
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In the end, Colonel Lagos was surrounded by his numerically superior ally.  He tried retreat to the line, but was caught up in the dispersement of his own and carried to the battlefield. Urquiza, with the disappearance of the left flank of the Confederation Argentina, could wrap around the line infantry of the Confederation of Argentina with his cavalry.

Despite the success of the allied cavalry on the right flank, the center with the Brazilian Imperial forces had not advanced to take advantage of the result. They had been kept out of reach of Colonel Chilavert's artillery. On the left, Uruguayan troops had advanced in the oblique direction to Palomar - Caseros House, and were held back by the stubborn resistance of the infantry and Argentine artillery. The position of the Uruguayans became more critical as it is not supported from the center by the Brazilians. Also the cavalry division Sosa of the Confederation met him and made the situation even more complicated.
The Imperial forces begin to move towards the fortified center  and to the left flank two battalions in support of the Uruguayan forces of Colonel Diaz and the brigade (Ex-Oribe/Rosas Army) of Col. Rivero.
When the Brazilians are placed within reach of the artillery of Colonel Chilavert, this is right in sustained fire. According to Saldias, Chilavert's batteries took the Brazilians' batteries out of the battle. Despite the efforts of the artillery of Colonel Chilavert, infantry battalions start fleeing. One of them murdered his own Colonel Juan Jose Hernandez trying to keep his men in their positions.
The left flank, reinforced with two Brazilian battalions, advanced in an unstoppable way towards the fortified area (Palomar-Caseros). Colonel Costa managed to regroup part of their battalions (those who did not flee), with them he reinforced the trench where most of Colonel Maza's men had fallen. But is passed over by the impetus of the Uruguayan and Brazilian advance which, at the point of bayonets, was able to divide the rest of the fortification and penetrate buildings. According to reports of Uruguayan Colonel Cesar Diaz, the struggle within the fortified perimeter (Palomar-Caseros) was a butchershop;
According to Saldias about 800 men held for more than a half-hour melee, and very few of those who were trapped on rooftops of the fort survived.  The Uruguayan battalion of Voltigeros arrives to the fort hospital where the famous
physician Claudio Mamerto Cuenca was killed attempting to defend the wounded. According to figures 400 allies died during the battle and 1200 of the Confederation, but according to Brazilian sources it could be five or ten times
the number with respect to official figures.

When Juan Manuel de Rosas saw his destroyed flanks, he realized that he was watching his defeat.  Still located in the center of action were Colonels Diaz and Chilavert.  Rosas wanted to redeploy to the lines in order to back out to the City of Buenos Aires. He calmly ordered Colonel Bustos to charge against a column trying to surround him.  He made a change in the front
with tje Cavalry Division "Sosa", Diaz Brigade  and Chilavert leading, under fire, in total 3500 survivors, willing to fight to the end.

The Diaz Brigade basically consists of the Battalion of Colonel Reyes, who must have been next to Brigadier General Juan Manuel de Rosas. This brigade was reinforced with companies of coastal artillery with six pieces of
artillery. The brigade began a movement of withdrawal under enemy fire in trenches and tunas fences (cactus fences).  

Details of the Casa de Caseros:
Deviating from the path of Gaona before eaching the town of Moron, five leagues west of Buenos Aires, they came to the lands of Diego Caseros. At the heart of this huge farm of 800 acres was his
country mansion, surrounded by orchards, gardens and trees and a fence made with pears and ditches. That fence had two entrances: the main one being a gate on the east side, and overlooking the town, and the other was a gate that
was south. Entering through the main gate, you could walk home along the path bordering the garden. This was not a garden in modern terms, because it had vegetable gardens and orchards.  Among countless fruit trees, kumquat,
walnut, mulberry, peach and cherry-groves were asparagus, oregano and broom bushes of yellow flowers. From behind, separated by a small wall was another orchard of apple, peach and fig trees.

Souce: moronhistorico.org.ar

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Urquiza noticed Rosas' attempt to withdraw and sent all his forces to the center of battle, after an hour battle when Argentine forces were reduced against the ally tide.  Rosas tried to keep his men in their positions. Saldias wrote that when Rosas saw a fleeing soldier run across, he asked the trumpeter for his boleadoras and tangled the horse of the soldier on the run.
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According to Jose Maria Ramos Mejia, while Rosas argued with what remained of his officers to continue the retreat operations, his aide Col. Antonino Reyes removed him with the warning that all was lost and he had to flee. General Juan Manuel de Rosas flees into exile but Colonel Chilavert with 300 gunners continued in front of 12,000 enemies, only supported by Colonel Diaz and the rest of his brigade, reduced, exhausted, fatigued and out of ammunition.  These two colonels continued the fight to the finish. Paradoxically these colonels were from the unitarian party were the last to leave the battlefield and held high the banner of the Confederation of Argentina. The battle of Caseros was not the classic
struggle between unitary and federal, as the sides were mixed.  Some historians see something different, a second war against Brazil.
Sources: Adolfo Saldias "Historia de la Confederacion Argentina"; Jose Maria Ramos Mejia: "Rosas y su tiempo".
Webs: Wikipedia. lagazeta.com.ar. revisionistas.com.ar

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​During the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852. A former opponent of Juan Manuel de Rosas, Chilavert chose to fight for him because he viewed the opposing alliance with Brazil as a betrayal of Argentina. 
Commanding the center artillery, Chilavert was the last to stop fighting long after the rest of the Rosista army had collapsed or fled. 
When his battery ran out of ammunition, he reportedly ordered his men to collect spent enemy projectiles from the field and, eventually, to load the cannons with stones to continue the defense.
Refusing to flee despite multiple opportunities, Chilavert waited calmly by his cannons for the arrival of the victor, Justo José de Urquiza. Before his capture, historical accounts note he entrusted personal items, such as his watch, to be delivered to his family.
After a heated argument where he called Urquiza a "traitor" for enlisting foreign Brazilian troops, Chilavert was sentenced to be shot in the back as a traitor. He fiercely resisted, fighting off his executioners to face them head-on. He was ultimately killed with bayonets and rifle butts on February 4, 1852.
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The street in Nueva Pompeya was officially designated by an ordinance on October 28, 1904. At the time of the Caras y Caretas article in 1927, Nueva Pompeya was still a developing industrial and proletarian suburb, often associated with the "tango" identity of Buenos Aires.  Chilavert's heroism at the Battle of Caseros (1852) where he continued firing his cannons until he ran out of ammunition cemented his legacy as a martyr of the artillery branch.
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An article in Caras y Caretas from February 4, 1922 (Issue No. 1218) indicates that Juan Manuel de Rosas ordered the explosion of the powder magazine to create a smoke screen for his escape from the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852. This act depleted ammunition reserves, leaving Colonel Martiniano Chilavert's artillery and other infantry units (Colonel Pedro Diaz), without supplies to continue the resistance. Rosas left the battlefield without leaving precise orders, so some units remained on the battlefield until the end

​Jerónimo Costa, another loyal Federalist who would later be executed at Villamayor, is often depicted as the voice of the soldiers' betrayal. The "reproaches" center on the idea that Rosas abandoned the Federal cause the moment he set foot on a foreign ship. 

The immense spoils of war after the campaign against Rosas.
​

​The article also mentions the amount of material that remained in Urquiza's possession. Entire depots of weapons, all the artillery, wagons, thousands of rifles, gunpowder, entire depots of clothing. Paradoxically and mysteriously, Buenos Aires must have been left defenseless, but Urquiza organized the same army with which Buenos Aires would recover all that material after the battle of Pavón.

The victory of Buenos Aires over Urquiza after the loss at Caseros was driven by a fundamental shift from military to economic power. While Urquiza inherited the physical "spoils" of Rosas' army, Buenos Aires retained the Customs House and its immense tax revenue.
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 ​The Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852, resulted in a massive capture of military and logistical assets by the Allied forces under Justo José de Urquiza. The following figures represent the captured material left on the battlefield and at the Santos Lugares camp:

7,000 prisoners: Approximately seven thousand men from the Rosista forces were captured during the engagement.
60 pieces of artillery: This includes the total battery of 56 cannons and 4 rocket launchers that Rosas had deployed for the defense.
800 carts and 500 wagons (galeras): These logistical vehicles were captured as part of the massive baggage train.

4,000+ rifles: More than four thousand rifles were recovered directly from the battlefield.

7 clothing deposits: Seven distinct warehouses of military uniforms and equipment were seized at the Santos Lugares encampment.Numerous livestock:
Allied forces captured extensive numbers of horses (caballadas) and cattles.
Large ammunition park: A substantial "immense park" of gunpowder and war supplies was also taken into possession.

​However, all these trophies were of no use to Urquiza, since Buenos Aires (Now without Rosas) was re-organized in record time, and by the hand of Bartolomé Mitre, Rosas' defeated army was converted into a true war machine.

Mitre converted the defeated Federal army of Rosas into Caseros, into a Unitarian war machine.

The defeated Federalist troops did not just vanish; many were absorbed into the new military structures of the State of Buenos Aires. Bartolomé Mitre essentially took the raw manpower and territorial defense tradition of the Rosista era and professionalized it into a modern, centralized "Unitarian" force.

Following the Revolution of September 11, 1852, Buenos Aires seceded from the Confederation. Under leaders like Mitre, the city used its monopoly on customs revenues wealth it no longer shared with the other provinces to fund a rapid military buildup.
While Urquiza’s Confederation at Paraná struggled with bankruptcy, Buenos Aires became a "state within a state," buying the latest European weaponry and hiring foreign military instructors. It focused on superior infantry training and modern rifles, which proved decisive years later.

​While Justo José de Urquiza won the tactical victory at the Battle of Caseros in 1852, many historians argue that Bartolomé Mitre was the ultimate strategic winner. Mitre used the fall of Rosas as a springboard to transform Buenos Aires from a defeated province into the dominant force that eventually unified Argentina under its own terms.

Casero House, Palomar, Moron Creek and Santos Lugares Fort-Barrak Ruins.
Photos: February 4. 1899. Caras y Caretas, Billiken.

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The final assault on the House of Caseros and the Palomar (the circular dovecote) represents the climax of the Battle of Caseros on February 3, 1852. While the broader battle saw a swift collapse of Rosas's flanks, the fortified square around these buildings became a pocket of fierce, desperate resistance that cost approximately 1,000 lives. 

The Stronghold at the Palomar

The Palomar de Caseros, a historic circular building used for pigeon breeding, served as a key defensive position on the right of the Rosista line. Rosas had envisioned this area as a "fortified square" of 10,000 square meters, reinforced with wagons and trenches to serve as a final defensive bastion. 

The position was stormed by Brazilian infantry, supported by a Uruguayan brigade and an Argentine cavalry squadron.
This phase of the battle was notably brutal, involving close-quarters combat as the Allied forces overwhelmed the entrenched Rosista troops who fought to the end.
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There is a great contradiction between Bartolomé Mitre’s official history and the raw accounts of the soldiers who were actually in the trenches. Mitre, who fought in the battle as an artillery officer for the Allied Great Army, had a specific political motive, he wanted to portray Rosas’s fall as a total moral collapse. By claiming there were "very few deaths" and that the troops laid down their arms because they didn't want to fight for a "tyrant," Mitre was building the founding myth of the new Argentine state. However, the reality at the Palomar and the House of Caseros tells a different story.

The Imperial Brazilian infantry (around 4,000 elite troops) suffered a significant portion of the Allied losses. They faced the brunt of Martiniano Chilavert’s artillery and the desperate defense at the Palomar.

While Mitre described a general flight of Rosista troops, Brazilian reports detail a grueling assault on the House of Caseros and the Palomar. They described the defenders as being entrenched in a 10,000-square-meter area fortified with wagons and trenches, where about 1,000 Rosistas fought until they were annihilated.
Contrary to Mitre's "light" estimates, modern historical consensus based on Allied field reports places total casualties at approximately 2,000 (1,500 Rosistas and 500–600 Allies), with another 7,000 Rosistas captured after their lines were breached. 

 The reports by Manuel Marques de Sousa (the Brazilian commander) were intended for the Imperial government to prove the effectiveness and bravery of their professional infantry. They had no reason to hide the ferocity of the enemy; in fact, a tougher enemy made their victory look more impressive.

The reports confirm that the Uruguayan divisions under Venancio Flores were particularly ruthless, often finishing off wounded Rosistas on the field a "cleansing" that Mitre conveniently omitted from his foundational history of Argentina. 

The Palomar de Caseros remains a monument to this "forgotten" slaughter, standing today as a physical contradiction to Mitre’s minimized version of the events.
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Doctor Claudio Mamerto Cuenca 1812 -1852.

​The death of Dr. Claudio Mamerto Cuenca, known as the "Martyr of Caseros," is one of the most tragic and documented episodes of the battle's aftermath. Despite being a secret opponent of Rosas and a renowned poet, he died fulfilling his duty as Surgeon Major of the Federal Army. 

Dr. Cuenca was killed on February 3, 1852, while working in a makeshift field hospital behind the Palomar de Caseros. 
As the Allied troops breached the fortified square, Cuenca stepped forward unarmed and dressed in his medical uniform holding surgical bandages ("hilas") in his hands. He attempted to identify himself as a doctor and requested protection for the wounded soldiers under his care.

A company of the Allied "Ejército Grande," led by the commander León de Palleja, ignored his plea. According to historical accounts from survivors like Dr. Claudio Mejía, Palleja or his men responded with immediate violence.
Cuenca was struck multiple times with sabers on his head, shoulders, and arms. He was finally killed by a deep bayonet or sword thrust to the chest or abdomen.
Some accounts suggest the brutality was triggered because a group of Rosista soldiers near the hospital had feigned surrender only to open fire, causing the Allied troops to "pass everyone to the knife" in a retaliatory frenzy. 

After the slaughter, his friend Dr. Mejía recovered Cuenca's body and his inseparable medical bag. Inside, they found his hidden literary works nearly 20,000 verses of poetry, including works critical of the very regime he died serving. Even Bartolomé Mitre, who otherwise minimized the day's casualties, later praised Cuenca as a "soldier of humanity"

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After Colonel Juan Jose Hernández was killed by his own troops during their disorganized retreat, his body was left among thousands of others. His dog refused to leave the corpse and stayed by his side, which eventually allowed family members to locate and identify his remains amidst the devastation.
Hernandez had attempted to block their path to prevent a disorganized retreat, and in the confusion and desperation of the defeat, he was struck down by the very men he commanded.
The dog belonging to Colonel José María Hernández (often identified as Juan José Luciano Hernández, the uncle of Martín Fierro author José Hernández) was described as a loyal crossbreed or "perro de campo" (country dog).


This "perro de campo" is often contrasted in history with Purvis, the large and fierce bay-colored dog belonging to the victor, General Justo José de Urquiza. While Purvis became a symbol of power and victory, Hernández's dog became a symbol of tragic personal loyalty.

The "Cerco de Tuna" as a Defensive Asset

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Those tuna (prickly pear) fences were far more than just agricultural boundaries; they were the 19th-century equivalent of barbed wire. While the tuna fences were a natural defense, the use of trenches (trincheras) and spiked stakes (estacas) represented the more formal, "scientific" engineering of 19th-century warfare in the Rio de la Plata.

Several testimonies of the battle of Caseros mention prickly pear plants in the form of cercos, or fences made with these plants. The fortified square of the house of Caseros and the dovecote of that property, had a fence of prickly pears "Tuna" along a defensive ditch around the property. In the same way that the frontier forts of the time were defended.  
While they appear scattered along roadsides and borders today, their placement in the 18th and 19th centuries was often a deliberate choice by the estancieros.

Fosos - Zanjones

In the 18th century, these security ditches, often called fosos or zanjones, were vital defensive features for fortified frontier estancias. They served as a "social technology of defense," protecting the "casco" (main residence and auxiliary buildings) from external threats. In the case of the battle of Caseros, the property was defended by ditches and fences of prickly pear, plants that played the role of "barbed wire", due to their long spikes. 
​The defensive square (General Pinerdo) was completed by lines of supply wagons where the soldiers took cover (3 Inantry Battalion under command of Colonel Mariano Maza), 10 artillery guns, 4 batteries of Congree rockets (Colonel Martin Arenas) and two battalions of cavalry support (Colonel Santa Coloma and Major Balbis).

These stone and brick structures provided cover that was otherwise non-existent on the open plains. Just as Wellington used La Haye Sainte (and Hougoumont) to anchor his center and disrupt Napoleon’s charges, Rosas used the Caseros family house and the Palomar (the dovecote). These stone and brick structures provided cover that was otherwise non-existent on the open plains.

At Waterloo, the French had to funnel their attacks around the fortified farmhouses, exposing their flanks. At Caseros, Urquiza’s Great Army was forced to slow down to deal with the defenders entrenched behind the tuna fences and the thick walls of the estancia, preventing a clean sweep across the field.

In both battles, the fall of these "mini-fortresses" signaled the end. When La Haye Sainte finally fell to the French, it almost broke Wellington's line; when the Palomar de Caseros was finally surrounded and captured, the Rosista defense collapsed entirely.Because unlike the disciplined British infantry at Waterloo, Rosas' troops fled as soon as the battle began, leaving the defenders of Palomar on the right wing and the batteries of Colonel Chilavert supported by the Díaz Brigade, completely trapped.​
Very different was the story of the Battle of Pavón in 1861, where the cavalry of Buenos Aires that formed the wings, withdrew leaving alone the infantry that covered the center. The very well trained and disciplined infantry of General Mitre remained at their post and mysteriously reversed a battle that was already seemingly lost for them.
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The prickly pear (cactus) fence at Caseros served the same purpose as the abatis used at Curupayty. These were barriers of thorny trunks and sharpened branches placed in front of the moats to entangle and slow down advancing infantry.
​1829 - The "Romerillo" Trap (Mio-Mio)

Just as the Tuna plant had its tactical participation in the defensive system of the Argentine Confederation in Caseros, the mio-mio (Baccharis coridifolia), had its participation in an ambush by the Federal caudillo Estanislao López to the Unitary General of Buenos Aires Juan Lavalle in 1829.
That anecdote likely refers to the "trick of the romerillo" (or mio-mio), a tactical trap famously attributed to the caudillo Estanislao López of Santa Fe during the Argentine Civil Wars.
The plant in question is mio-mio (Baccharis coridifolia), also known as romerillo. It is highly toxic to livestock, but horses that grow up in areas where it is common naturally learn to avoid it. Horses from other regions, such as those from the city of Buenos Aires, do not recognize the danger and will graze on it, leading to mass poisoning.

Caudillos like Estanislao López, who were intimately familiar with the terrain of the littoral provinces, would lead Buenos Aires' superior cavalry forces into "romerillares" vast fields of this toxic shrub.
After a long march, the hungry Buenos Aires horses would be allowed to graze. Within hours, the enemy cavalry would be neutralized without a single shot being fired, as their mounts became sick or died, leaving the soldiers stranded on foot in the middle of the pampas.
One of the most famous mentions of this tactic occurs during the campaigns of the League of the Interior against the Federalists. While multiple leaders used the terrain to their advantage, Estanislao López was particularly renowned for his "guerrilla" tactics and his deep knowledge of the natural traps of the Santa Fe countryside. 

This "biological warfare" of the 19th century was a common way for provincial caudillos to defeat the better-equipped but less "land-wise" armies sent from the capital.

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Despite the fact that the urbanization of Buenos Aires and its surroundings buried a large part of the battlefield, there are still anecdotes and myths. The toponym Tropezón (literally "The Stumble") is tied to a specific moment during the Battle of Caseros. According to local tradition, as Juan Manuel de Rosas was retreating from the battlefield after his defeat by Justo José de Urquiza, his horse supposedly stumbled or tripped in this exact swampy area (now the border between San Martín and Tres de Febrero). Rosas fell and reportedly injured his hand. This is often used to explain why his famous resignation letter, written shortly after under a tree in "Hueco de los Sauces," was shaky or stained.

The spot where the "Restaurador" took his literal and political fall became known as El Tropezón. This name was later solidified when the railway station was built there.
While some geographers argue the name simply refers to the difficult, muddy terrain that made all horses trip, the Rosas story is the one that gives the neighborhood its epic historical character.

The Fiorini's tower in Villa Bosch is the missing link in this story.

Fiorini House (also known as the Mirador de los Artilleros in Villa Bosch/Caseros) was a strategic high point. Its tower provided a clear line of sight over the open fields where the Battle of Caseros unfolded. Given its elevation, it served as an ideal observation post to monitor the advance of the Urquiza’s Allied Grand Armies. 
From the tower of the Fiorini house, the Federal command could see the entire Allied advance. It sat right on the edge of the plateau where the main battle ended and the desperate retreat toward the city began.
As Rosas left this area under the protection of Colonel Sosa's Division, they didn't just retreat; they were cut off. The "stumble" at Tropezón wasn't just a random accident on a quiet road it occurred exactly where the fleeing cavalry (Sosa) collided with the surging Allied infantry, turning the retreat into a frantic struggle for survival.

In 1852, there was a dirt road part of a network of rural trails that connected the Casa de Caseros
(the epicenter of the battle) with the surrounding estates. This path ran through the Fiorini fields, following the natural slope of the land that is now occupied by the Urquiza Railway tracks near El Tropezón station.

The Escape Route:

The tactical decision to keep the reserves in Palermo and Santos Lugares instead of deploying them to the front line is one of the most criticized aspects of Juan Manuel de Rosas's leadership during the Battle of Caseros.

Rosas kept a significant body of veteran troops in the city, primarily at his residence in Palermo, under the command of his brother-in-law, Lucio N. Mansilla. Historically, this reserve composed of thousands of infantrymen remained static. Critics often argue that if these troops had been sent to reinforce the crumbling center or wings, the battle's duration or outcome might have changed. Mansilla, however, was tasked with the "last defense" of the city, a role that became moot once the frontline collapsed.

The 4,000 men at the Santos Lugares barracks were Rosas's direct reserve. These troops were stationed at the Cuartel General (Headquarters), which served as the logistical and administrative heart of his power. Rosas's failure to bring these fresh troops into the fight once the Grand Army's cavalry "steamroller" broke his wings left his professional center (under Chilavert and Díaz) completely isolated. 

Rosas reportedly passed through the area near the house of Fiorini during his retreat. The "accident" or confusion at the Tropezón crossing was a result of the rapid Allied pursuit.
Rosas did not flee toward his own barracks at Santos Lugares, likely because the Allied cavalry specifically the divisions under Lamadrid and Medina had already outflanked the Rosista left wing and were cutting off the path to the military headquarters. 

Juan Manuel de Rosas escaped through the enemy lines following his crushing defeat at the Battle of Caseros by abandoning the field on horseback, often described as riding away alone after realizing his army had collapsed. His escape was facilitated by a combination of personal disguise, tactical retreats, and international diplomatic protection. 
The Escape Route, Upon reaching what is now Plaza Garay (specifically the "Hueco de los Sauces"), he sat on a bench or carriage and wrote his official resignation on his knee. To move through the city undetected, he reportedly disguised himself, possibly as a simple sailor or traveler, to reach the safety of the diplomatic quarters. 
He sought refuge at the house of the British minister, Robert Gore, who provided him with protection during the chaotic period of looting that followed the battle.
Under the cover of night, he and his daughter, Manuelita, boarded a British warship first the HMS Conflict and later the HMS Centaur which transported them to England and into permanent exile. 

His ability to pass through enemy lines was also likely aided by the general disarray of the Allied Army, which was distracted by the surrender of major pockets of resistance (like the Palomar) and the immediate opportunity to plunder the city.

The forgotten little colonel, and the forgotten little soldier

 Juan Manuel de Rosas had a long-term relationship with María Eugenia Castro (often called "La Cautiva"), with whom he had several children who were never officially recognized. 
Eugenia was the daughter of Colonel Juan Gregorio Castro, a friend of Rosas. After her father died, Rosas became her guardian and she moved into his residence at Palermo as a lady-in-waiting to his wife, Encarnación Ezcurra. Following Encarnación's death in 1838, Eugenia became Rosas's companion and lived in the mansion until his fall in 1852.
According to historical and genealogical records, the couple had at least six children who were raised in the Palermo residence but were socially treated more as servants than as members of the elite Rosas family.

Ángela Castro Rosas: Known as "El Soldadito" (The Little Soldier), she was reportedly Rosas's favorite.
Ermilio (or Emilio) Castro Rosas: Often referred to as "The Colonel". He was taken by Rosas to the Battle of Caseros when he was seven years old. When he was a young man (about 21), he fought in the War of the Triple Alliance (Or War against Paraguay) where he dies in battle​.
Nicanora Castro Rosas: Lived a modest life in Argentina after the battle.
Joaquín Castro Rosas. 
Justina Castro Rosas.
Adrián Castro Rosas

Battle of Caseros - "Bring your children to work day".
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According to family traditions and historical accounts from Nicanora in her old age, on the day of the battle, Rosas was accompanied to the field by Angela ("El Soldadito") and her brother Ermilio ("El Coronel"), both of whom were dressed in military uniforms. 
Before the final disastrous outcome, Rosas ordered both children to retreat from the battlefield and join the other children including Nicanora at the Ezcurra house for safety.
Despite his affection for them, Rosas only offered to take Angela and Ermilio (his "favorites") with him into exile in Great Britain. Their mother, Eugenia Castro, refused to leave her other children behind, resulting in all of them including Nicanora being left in Buenos Aires in near-poverty. ​

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These graphs were made taking the testimonies of those who were participants and witnesses of the battle such as Antonino Reyes (Oriental - Uruguayan born), interviewed at the time by Adolfo Saldías. From the other side, the Memoirs of the Uruguayan Colonel César Díaz. In the case of Bartolomé Mitre, although he participated in the battle, his contribution is politicized in his eagerness to ignore the desperate resistance of the defenders of this sector. 

The hinge of cavalry squadrons

According to Antonino Reyes, the deployment behind the Palomar/Caseros House was organized as a deep "containment" or "mobile shield" rather than a single line. This is how Colonel Juan de Dios Videla fits into the layout alongside Bustos and Sosa.
General Agustín Pinedo with the infantry and fixed defenses at the Palomar. Major Balbis and Colonel Santa Coloma were tasked with protecting the immediate rear of the house and the right flank against a sweep from the Morón Creek.

Reyes places them here as a veteran cavalry screen (Cnels Bustos and Sosa). Their job was to act as support line for the infantry of Costa and Hernández (the Center).
Juan de Dios Videla was positioned exactly at this inter-wing junction. His division of cavalry provided the link between Pinedo's fixed right wing and the mobile squadrons of Bustos/Sosa.

Infantry: In this defensive canton, Pinedo had Colonel Maraño Maza under his command with three infantry battalions. Maza was forced to surrender his battalion to Urquiza in the Banda Oriental after the Treaty of Pantanoso (Urquiza-Oribe). He also had to hand over his flying artillery that was probably given by Urquiza to Colonels Castro or Mitre (Unitarians). So Maza in Caseros had to command battalions of new formation. A mix of veteran troops from the Argentine Guard Battalion (under Pinedo's orders) and new recruits. During the siege of Montevideo Maza commanded the "Defenders of Freedom Battalion" which when it passed into the hands of Urquiza, was renamed "Constitution Battalion" and ironically (or by the way) was used by Urquiza in Caseros against Maza himself.

The artillery of the Pinedo Division would have been under the orders of Unitary Colonel Martín Arenas, who was taken prisoner at the end of the battle. This colonel would have been in charge of the 10 artillery pieces and the four batteries of "Congreve" rocket launchers. Note that in this sector, General Pinedo dies during the retreat, while Colonel Maza goes into exile in Uruguay. But the one who falls prisoner is Colonel Martín Arenas, probably at the hands of the Brazilians when they take the Palomar.

"Independence" vs "Constitution"

Rosas based his on defending the border (Sovereignty), while Urquiza based his on institutional organization (the Constitution). When Urquiza captured the veteran battalions in Montevideo (October 1851), he performed an immediate political "rebranding" before marching them toward Caseros:

Under Rosas, names like "Independencia" evoked resistance against foreign colonial powers and Brazilian imperialism. By renaming them "Constitución," Urquiza stripped away Rosas's argument that the Allied army was a "traitorous" force. If the goal was the "Constitution," then the war wasn't against the Nation, but against a "tyrant" who refused to uphold the law.

Rosas / Malvinas (Sovereignty): In both cases, the discourse focuses on territorial integrity and the external enemy as the primary source of national unity. "Sovereignty" is used to justify internal hardship or authoritarianism.
Urquiza / (Democracy/Constitution): Following the collapse of the previous model (the defeat of Rosas or the defeat in Malvinas), the new order legitimizes itself through the Constitution and Democracy. The priority shifts from fighting an external foe to establishing internal rights and legal structures.
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The Wagon Wall (El Tren de Carretas)


At the Battle of Caseros, Colonel Juan de Dios Videla commanded a cavalry division on the extreme right wing, with the 350-man "Batallón Provisional" composed of Abastecedores de Corrales stationed behind him to guard the logistics park. These urban militia members, acting as a final infantry shield, represented the core of the Rosista power base alongside the provincial cavalry. 

Historically, these men were drawn from the urban working class of Buenos Aires, particularly the abastecedores (meat suppliers and slaughterhouse workers) from the Corrales de Abasto. These men were among Rosas's most fanatical supporters, as the meat industry was the economic backbone of his power.

The logistics of the Grand Allied Army

The Allied Great Army did not bring logistics or supplies but was supplied from the enemy camp. This means confiscation or looting. In its ranks it brought caudillos such as Juan Pablo López who had plundered his own province.
The image of a disciplined, professional force is largely a myth created by later historiography; in reality, Urquiza’s logistics were built on the old "caudillo" system of predation.

The Ejército Grande did not carry a modern supply train. Instead, it operated on the principle of vivir sobre el terreno (living off the land). To feed 24,000 to 28,000 men and over 50,000 horses, the army seized cattle and grain from the estancias of Buenos Aires province as they advanced.
 After the battle, the looting of the Santos Lugares barracks and the outskirts of Buenos Aires was widespread. The soldiers viewed this as their "pay," especially the troops from the Litoral who felt they were taking back what the Buenos Aires customs house had "stolen" from them for years.

The presence of Juan Pablo López is the perfect example of this predatory nature. The brother of Estanislao López, "Mascarilla" was notorious for his shifting loyalties and his tendency to treat provinces including his own Santa Fe as personal loot.
His reputation for violence and expropriation preceded him. When the people of Buenos Aires saw caudillos like him in Urquiza's ranks, it reinforced Rosas's propaganda that the "liberators" were actually a horde of anarchic looters backed by foreign gold.
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The number of Brazilian troops in the Platine War (1851–1852) is indeed a subject of intense historical debate, often obscured by the political agendas of the time. To compare, during the war against Paraguay, Brazil mobilized between 146,000 and 200,000 men. For the battle of Caseros most historians estimate around 5000 of his professional army.

As in the war against Paraguay, the Empire of Brazil used large numbers of slaves for military purposes. The case of the Brazilian Division in Caseros: In the Battle of Caseros, many of the infantrymen in Marques de Sousa's division were black men, both freedmen and slaves. In the Empire of Brazil, the figure of the "Freedmen of the Nation" was used: slaves who were bought by the State or "donated" by their owners to serve in the army in exchange for a freedom that was often only nominal until the end of the service.

On the Argentine side of the Rosas era there was also a strong presence of Afro-descendants integrated into military units, although with political nuances different from those of Brazil. While in Brazil slavery was the basis of its economy and empire, in the Argentine Confederation, Rosas presented himself as the protector of the "lower classes", including the black population.

The number of Brazilian troops in the Platine War (1851–1852) is indeed a subject of intense historical debate, often obscured by the political agendas of the time. To compare, during the war against Paraguay, Brazil mobilized between 146,000 and 200,000 men. For the battle of Caseros most historians estimate around 5000.

The force that fought at Caseros was the 1st Brazilian Division, led by Brigadier Manuel Marques de Sousa. Unlike the gaucho or Corrientes militias, this was a professional and veteran unit. Most of the soldiers and officers, including Marques de Sousa and cavalry chief Manuel Luís Osório, came from Rio Grande do Sul, a province that by 1851 had already consolidated its control over the territory of the former Eastern Missions after the conflicts of previous decades. The Eastern Missions functioned more as a transit area and base of operations for Brazilian forces that advanced from the north into Uruguay to defeat Oribe before crossing into Buenos Aires.
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From the perspective of the Empire of Brazil, the 1851 intervention was a "preemptive war." The Emperor Pedro II and his diplomats, particularly Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão (Marquis of Paraná), understood that a consolidated Rosas was an existential threat to Brazil's southern borders.

Rosas never truly accepted the independence of Uruguay or the loss of the Misiones Orientales (Rio Grande Do Sud). His long-term project was the reconstruction of the old Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. If Rosas had succeeded in fully controlling Montevideo through Oribe, he would have controlled both banks of the River Plate, effectively "closing" the rivers and isolating Brazil’s landlocked province of Mato Grosso.

Recovery of the Misiones Orientales

Brazil feared that once Rosas settled the "Oriental" question (Uruguay), his next target would be the Misiones Orientales (the Seven Missions territory). This region had been a point of bloody contention since the colonial era. Brazil knew that Rosas viewed the 1828 treaty which established Uruguayan independence and confirmed Brazilian control of the Missions as a humiliation imposed by the British.

The Rio Grande do Sul "Buffer"

The province of Rio Grande do Sul had just finished the devastating Farroupilha Revolution (1835–1845), a separatist war against the Empire. Rosas had flirted with supporting the Farroupilha rebels. Brazil feared that if Rosas grew too powerful, he would rekindle separatism in Rio Grande do Sul to destabilize the Empire’s southern flank.

Free Navigation of the Rivers

This was the "legal" casus belli. Brazil needed the Paraná and Uruguay rivers to remain international waterways to communicate with its interior. Rosas’s policy of "river enclosure" was a direct economic strangulation of Brazilian interests.

The "Treaty of October" (1851)

To ensure Rosas couldn't claim the Missions, Brazil made Urquiza sign treaties as a condition for their support. In exchange for Brazilian gold and troops, Urquiza had to:

Recognize Brazil's right to intervene in Uruguay.
Accept Brazilian borders (effectively renouncing claims to the Misiones Orientales).
Guarantee the free navigation of the rivers.


By fighting at Caseros, Brazil wasn't just "helping" Urquiza; they were destroying the only leader capable of challenging their hegemony in the Southern Cone.
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The economic rivalry between Entre Ríos and Buenos Aires was the primary driver of Urquiza's rebellion. As Governor of Entre Ríos, Urquiza was frustrated by Rosas’s strict protectionist policies that choked the economy of the Littoral provinces. 
The Economic Conflict

Customs Monopoly

Rosas forced all international trade to pass through the Buenos Aires custom house. This allowed Buenos Aires to collect all import and export duties, depriving provinces like Entre Ríos of vital revenue.

Direct Trade with Brazil

Urquiza sought the "Free Navigation of the Rivers". This would allow Entre Ríos to trade directly with Brazil and European powers through its own ports, bypassing the Buenos Aires monopoly and the taxes imposed by Rosas.

Export Interests

Entre Ríos was a major producer of cattle and salted beef. By removing Rosas, Urquiza could export these goods directly to the massive markets in Brazil and the Caribbean, significantly increasing the province's wealth. 

Post-Caseros Economic Measures

Once Urquiza took power, he immediately moved to break the Buenos Aires economic stranglehold

Baron of Mauá. 
He partnered with the famous Brazilian financier, the Baron of Mauá, who founded the first bank in Rosario and provided massive loans to the new Confederation government.

Law of Differential Duties (1856)
Urquiza enacted laws to favor foreign goods that arrived directly at Confederation ports rather than those previously unloaded in Buenos Aires.

Treaties of Free Navigation
He signed international treaties, such as with the United States, declaring the Paraná and Uruguay rivers free to the commerce of the world. 

By aligning with Brazil, Urquiza wasn't just gaining a military ally; he was securing the financial backing and market access needed to make Entre Ríos and the Confederation economically independent from Buenos Aires.
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Colonel Pedro Díaz, commander of the Infantry brigade who supported both the artillery of Colonel Chilavert, and the cavalry of Colonel Hilario Lagos (before he disbanded). 

Everything Caseros for Rosas was a nightmare. Its federal commanders escaped in their great majority, but those who resisted the battle were those unitary commanders who fought on his side. Colonels Martiniano Chilavert, Pedro Díaz and Major Martín Arenas were Unitarians, while their enemies in battle claimed to be federal.
These career officers fought like lions, they did not abandon their troops, they demonstrated in Caseros great capacity for command, in the face of an enemy that outnumbered them and outnumbered them.

The battle of Caseros is very complex, because it was buried by the liberal historiographical complex that was imposed since the middle of the 19th century. However, it is at the same time very easy to understand: The left wing, composed exclusively of the bulk of Rosas' cavalry, disbanded early, and the bulk of the infantry, commanded by Colonels Hernández and Costa, also disbanded. The resistance of Palomar and the house of Caseros supported by Sergeant Major Martín Arenas (since General Pinedo and Colonel Maza had withdrawn) and the artillery of Colonel Chilavert supported by the Díaz infantry brigade were isolated. If Díaz was able to retreat later with his men, it is because Chilavert covered his retreat. Chilavert then saved his own men and was left alone in position.
Probably Martin Arenas survives after being taken prisoner, because it was the Brazilians who took the dovecote, since the Orientals who took Caseros' house, killed even the wounded and the doctors. 
The Palomar was taken by the 1st Brazilian Division under Marques de Sousa. As a professional, regular army unit, the Brazilians adhered to a more formal code of military conduct.

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Probably the cavalry under the command of Colonel Lagos made a hinge that connected the barracks of Santos Lugares. So the battle front of the Rosas's Army was not entirely linear here.
In the account provided by Adolfo Saldías based on Antonino Reyes, the opening of the battle was indeed a massive, lopsided cavalry engagement.
Lagos was positioned on the left wing of Rosas’s army. He was one of Rosas’s most experienced cavalry officers, but he was positioned in a way that left him vulnerable to a flanking maneuver.
Urquiza’s strategy was to use his strongest asset the cavalry from the Coast (Litoral) to crush the wings before the infantry reached the center.

General Medina's Division (Entre Ríos)
General Lamadrid's Division (Tucumán/Mixed)
Colonel Galarza's Division (Entre Ríos)
Colonel Ávalos's Division (Corrientes) — This Colonel moved from reserve to active support.

Reyes describes this as an overwhelming force. There were simply too many divisions for Lagos to handle. The cavalry of the "Ejército Grande" didn't just attack; they performed a wide "encircling" movement.

Lagos's troops, seeing the sheer number of riders (especially the dreaded Entre Ríos cavalry), began to break.
Once Lagos was neutralized, the entire left flank of Rosas's army collapsed, leaving the infantry and Chilavert's artillery in the center (where the Brazilian Division and Rivero were) completely exposed.

Saldías uses Reyes’s testimony to argue that the battle was essentially decided on the wings by this massive cavalry charge before the "foreign" infantry even reached the main house of Caseros.
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